Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part I
Image 1: The
Su-35 can accommodate a maximum of 17,637 pounds (8,000 kg) of ordinance
mounted on 12 external hardpoints. The Su-35 will be armed with three principal
air-to-air missiles (AAMs): the R-27, R-73, and R-77. Note: various Russian
sources claim the long-range R-37 will be integrated with the Su-35, but no
live fire tests of the R-37 from the Su-35 have been documented at this time. Image
Credit: Sukhoi.
R-27/AA-10 Alamo
Image 2:
R-27 variants. Image Credit: Artem Company.
The R-27 is
a highly modular beyond visual range (BVR) missile family designed by Vympel–now
the Tactical Missiles Corporation–during the late 1970s for use on the Mig-29
and Su-27 fighters; the missile is currently produced by the Artem Company, a
subsidiary to the state-owned Ukrainian export firm Ukroboronprom.[1] The R-27 series of missiles
can generally be categorized by their diameter, 230 mm for the baseline variant
and 260 mm for the “energeticheskaya” or energetic variants which feature a larger
warhead, rocket motor, and extended range.[2] All variants have an 8g maneuverability
limit and utilize an active radar proximity fuse to activate the missile’s
73/86 pound (33 kg/39 kg) continuous rod warhead. The R-27 is comparatively
larger than most medium range BVR AAMs; the “energetic variants” of the R-27
have launch weights between 343 kg to 350 kg which is more than twice the weight of the 161 kg AIM-120D. The weight, wingspan of the “butterfly”
control surfaces, and 4.5+ meter length of the extended range series of R-27
limit external carriage to a maximum of six missiles for the baseline Su-27
Flanker and eight missiles for the Su-35.[3][4] Across both the 230 mm and
260 mm variants, there are four principal guidance types: semi-active radar
homing (SARH), infrared (IR), passive radio frequency homing (PRFH), and active
radar homing (ARH). Detailed descriptions of each method of guidance are described
in the notes section at the end of the article.
The R-27R/RE
is the most numerous BVR missile in the VKS inventory and is roughly equivalent
to the U.S. AIM-7 Sparrow.[5] The R-27R/RE utilizes an
inertial midcourse guidance with radio command updates and a terminal SARH
seeker to locate targets. The N135 Irbis is able to illuminate up to two
separate targets simultaneously to guide SARH missiles.[6]
The baseline
R-27R variant has a range of 38 nautical miles (70 km) against approaching
non-maneuvering targets compared to the R-27RE’s 70 nautical miles (130 km)
range.[7] The only confirmed
instance in which the R-27R was used in combat was the Ethiopian-Eritrean War
in 1998-2000 which will be discussed after the R-73.
The R-27T/ET
series is visually distinct from all other R-27 variants as a result of its IR
seeker in the nose section of the missile. While the R-27T/ET is technically a
BVR missile from a maximum kinematic range perspective, in practical terms it
is limited to within visual range (WVR) engagements. The missile’s 36T seeker
must be locked-on to a target before launch as the R-27T/ET does not feature
inertial guidance and cannot receive radio command midcourse updates.[8] The R-27ET features an
upgraded seeker which provides greater IR countermeasure discrimination
performance and has a maximum acquisition range of approximately eight nautical
miles or 15 km.[9]
The R-27P/EP
is among the few PRFH AAMs in service. The missile utilizes a passive X-band
PRGS-27 (9B-1032) seeker to detect emitting targets from distances up to 108 nm
(200 km) away. However, the missile is still constrained by its limited power
supply and propellant. Thus, the effective maximum kinematic range against
approaching targets is 60 nautical miles or 110 km.[10] Vympel has marketed the
R-27P/EP as capable of engaging airborne early warning and control (AWACS)
aircraft, stand-off jammers, and fighter aircraft. The R-27P/EP is
theoretically able to provide BVR capabilities without alerting adversary radar
waring receivers (RWR). However, the missile is constrained in that it requires
a cooperative constantly emitting target. The first live fire tests of the
R-27P occurred in 1984 and the R-27P entered Soviet Air Force service in 1987. A
limited number of missiles were produced prior to the collapse of the Soviet
Union by the Artem plant in Ukraine.
R-27A/AE is
an ARH variant of the R-27 family which did not enter production as a result of
the development of the more advanced R-77.
R-73/AA-11 Archer
Image 3: R-60 (left most) and R-73 missiles on display at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Through the “Foreign Materiel Acquisition
and Exploitation Program”, the U.S. Government has acquired everything from Russian
MANPADS to complete S-300V and S-300PMU
systems.
Image Credit: USAF.
The primary
IR guided missile of the VKS is the R-73 which is fulfills a similar role to
the American AIM-9 Sidewinder. The R-73 is slightly larger than the AIM-9X, the
R-73M2 has a diameter of 170 mm, a launch weight of 110 kg, a 8 kg warhead, and
a length of 2.9 meters. Like the Sidewinder, the R-73 family of missiles
contains more than half a dozen variants which vary in terms of seeker type,
fuse, off-boresight capability, and rocket motor. The Molniya OKB (design
bureau) began work on the R-73 during the 1970s in Ukraine with the intent of
developing a more maneuverable successor to the R-60/AA-8 Aphid. Responsibility
for designing the new missile was transferred to Vympel in 1979 and the R-73
was first operationally deployed in 1984.[11] The R-73’s capabilities
were greatly enhanced as a result of the Shchel-3UM helmet mounted sight which enabled
off-boresight shots. U.S. pilots were able to thoroughly examine the
capabilities of the R-73 and Shchel-3UM through a series of exchanges with the German
Air Force in the 1990s. Lt. Col. Fred "Spanky" Clifton (Ret.), an
F-16 pilot who was able to fly the Mig-29 in Germany, explains the Archer and
HMS was much more effective than expected:
The Archer and the helmet-mounted sight (HMS) brought a real
big stick to the playground. First, the HMS was really easy to use. Every pilot
was issued his own HMS…Being on the shooting end of the equation, I saw shot
opportunities I would've never dreamed of with the AIM-9L/M...In the WVR
(within visual range) arena, a skilled MiG-29 pilot can give and Eagle or Viper
driver all he/she wants.[12]
Despite the
effectiveness of the R-73 and HMS, U.S. pilots generally judged the R-27 was
significantly inferior to the AIM-7 and AIM-120. This conclusion was largely
made evident a few years later in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War between 1998 and
2000 described later in the article.
The next major
evolution in the R-73’s design is the R-74M which features an improved range of
21.5 nm or 40 km, 60°+ off-boresight capability as well as improved dual-band
Impuls IR seeker with extended detection range and countermeasure
discrimination capabilities. There are two variants of the R-74M, the R-74ML
laser proximity fuse variant and the R-74MK with an active radar fuse.[13] The R-74M entered service
in 2012, but the Impuls seeker is manufactured by the Arsenal company in
Ukraine meaning Russia’s continued access to new R-74M seekers remains in doubt
post-Crimea. Russia has had to launch numerous domestic industry programs to
mitigate the loss of Ukrainian defense imports.
Image 4: Russia
recently undertook a domestic development program to replace the Ukrainian
produced Sura-M helmet mounted display for the Mig-29SMT, Su-30SM, and Su-35S.[14]
The latest
variant of the R-73 is the R-74M2 which is analogous to the AIM-9X Block II. The
R-74M2 features a Karfagen-760 IR seeker, more accurate internal guidance,
datalink, and an improved rocket motor.[15]
Combat Record R-27 & R-73
In 1998, the
Eritrean Air Force (ERAF) was supplied with an initial batch of six Mig-29s and
at least 36 R-27 and 72 R-73 missiles; Eritrean pilots were trained by
Ukrainian mercenaries.[16] The Ethiopian Air Force
(EtAF) received at least eight Su-27S aircraft, including two Su-27UBK
trainers, as well as 80 R-27 and 96 R-73 missiles from Russia between 1998 and
1999. In contrast with the ERAF, the EtAF Su-27s were often flown by Russian
pilots.[17][18] Detailed accounts of
aerial engagements during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War are sparse. Tom Cooper and
Jonathan Kyzer’s article, “Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998 – 2000”, originally
printed in AFM Magazine’s August 2000 edition, is one of the few
works to provide detained information regarding the combat performance of the
R-27; an expanded version of the article is available courtesy of the Air
Combat Information Group. Cooper and Kyzer describe two major engagements
during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in February 1999 and in May 2000 which feature
the use of the R-27 and R-73.
February 1999 Engagement:
…on the morning of 25 February
four MiG-29s were sent to intercept two Su-27s which were patrolling along the
front-lines at Badme. Both Sukhois, flown by Ethiopian pilots, detected the
appearance of their opponents in time and attempted to disengage, when - all of
a sudden - they came under an attack by
several R-27/AA-10 missiles. None of the weapons fired by the Eritreans – which
were meanwhile inside the Ethiopian airspace – hit, but after evading them,
the Ethiopians decided to turn back and fight. The lead, Maj. Workneh, acquired the enemy and fired what was reported as a
"salvo" of R-27s, targeting one MiG-29 after the other. However, all
the missiles missed and the only result was that the Eritreans were forced
to break their attack - only to be pounced by the faster Su-27s. The result of
following dog-fight was one Eritrean MiG-29 shot down, probably by an
R-73/AA-11 IR-homing, short range air-to-air missile (fired again by Maj.
Workneh).[19]
[emphasis added]
Image 5: Russian Su-27 intercepted by the RAAF, this aircraft is armed with a typical mix of R-73, R-27T, and R-73ER missiles. Image credit: RAF.
May 2000 Engagement:
On 16 May 2000 Eritrean
Air Force flew couple of counterattacks against the Ethiopian “left hook”,
advancing against the western flank of Eritrean positions....at least one MiG-29 was damaged sufficiently
to crash-landed at Asmara, obviously after being damaged by R-27. The ERAF
remained stubborn: only two days later, two MiG-29s were scrambled to intercept
an incoming formation of EtAF MiG-21s.
The leading Eritrean pilot missed with his R-27s, but then shot down at
least one of Ethiopian fighters, using the 30mm gun during a short dogfight.
Nevertheless, only minutes later, the same MiG-29 was in turn intercepted by a
pair of EtAF Su-27s. As the Sukhois engaged, one of them collided with an
Africa Buzzard (a very large bird), and had to return to base after sustaining
heavy damage. The other Sukhoi – flown by one of former Derg-pilots –
continued, engaging the MiG and shooting it down by a single R-73.[20]
[emphasis added]
Cooper and
Kyzer conclude the R-27 likely had a probability kill (PK) less than that of
the AIM-7E and AIM-7F Sparrow variants utilized in Vietnam which had a PK of
between 8-10%.[21]
A maximum of 24 R-27 missiles were fired throughout the war–which were likely
the R-27R variant, but only one R-27 managed to maneuver close enough to its
intended target such that its radar proximity fuse to activated. In contrast,
the R-73 proved itself as a lethal WVR missile; a total of nine missiles were launched
resulting in five aerial victories or a PK of 55%.[22] As Cooper and Kyzer
explain, the majority of engagements between EtAF Su-27s and ERAF Mig-29s occurred
within visual range. Curiously, the Mig-29 – which is often regarded as having
superb maneuverability characteristics – performed poorly against the larger
Su-27. It’s possible the disparity in aerial victories between the ERAF and
EtAF is attributable more towards training and personnel quality issues rather
than hardware. It is unclear to the extent, if at all, the engagements between
the ERAF and EtAF influenced Russian defense developments in the late 1990s to early
2000s.
After the
poor performance of the AIM-7 in Vietnam, the U.S. made significant investments
in upgrading the AIM-7 between 1970 into the 1980s such as greater jam
resistance, look-down shoot-down capability, improved rocket motor, etc.[23] However, it is generally
understood that the Russian defense industry received little in terms of
research and development funding during the 1990s and early 2000s as a result
of Russia’s financial difficulties; many new projects had to be sustained by
export orders. Therefore, it is unclear to the extent in which Vympel tried to
rectify the R-27’s shortcomings through upgrades or design changes to new
missile orders. It is also unclear if the engagements during the Eritrean-Ethiopian
War had impact on Russian conceptions of ideal fighter characteristics, e.g.
such as emphasis on WVR maneuvering. The combination of continued investments
in the R-73 while the development of the R-27’s successor, the R-77, lagged
suggests the Russian Air Force weighed WVR capabilities as a higher priority.
- SARH guidance is the process in which the launch platform illuminates a target with its radar and the missile’s onboard receiver detects the reflected radar energy. By comparing the reflected beam’s characteristics to its source, the missile is able to determine the targets position and speed.[24] In order to properly function, SARH guidance requires the launch platform’s radar to continuously track and illuminate the target–which imposes limitations on the launch platform’s freedom to maneuver–and missile’s receiver must continuously detect the reflected radar energy. Furthermore, SARH requires the launch platform’s radar to continuously emit signals thereby exposing the launch platform to radar warning receivers (RWR) and other emission location systems.[25] However, SARH provides substantial BVR capabilities when compared to IR guided missiles.
- IR guided missiles do not emit signals, rather they home in on heat sources (infrared radiation) such as jet engines. In order to successfully intercept the target, IR seekers must discriminate against background IR radiation sources and IR countermeasures. The first IR guided missiles could only be fired against tail-aspect targets as a result of seeker limitations. Subsequent generations of IR guided missiles such as the AIM-9L are all-aspect capable. The principal limitation of IR guided missiles is the limited detection range of their seekers. The latest generation of IR guided missiles such as the AIM-9X Block II feature lock-on after launch (LOAL) capability.
- PRFH missiles similarly do not emit signals, but home in on RF emitting targets.
- ARH missiles have their own radar seekers which activate during the terminal stage of flight. ARH guided missiles enable “fire and forget” capability i.e. the pilot has freedom to maneuver after initially designated the target with the plane’s radar. By having its own seeker (often a monopulse X-band seeker), ARH missiles are inherently less susceptible to certain forms of jamming.
Author’s Note: I’m still planning on writing that article with 12 Raptors vs 48 Su-35s. There are far more variables than I had anticipated so I’m still researching a couple of topics like Russian air defense doctrines, electronic warfare, “jointness” between the various armed services, battle management networks, datalinks (which are very hard to research) as well as basic fighter maneuvering tactics. As such I’ll probably write an article or two on the topics above for my own edification. Below is a teaser to show some of the assets which will show up in the backstory and simulation:
Note that the 790th fighter regiments do not operate the Su-35S at this time. Only the 22nd
and 23rd fighter regiments operate the Su-35S in large numbers (the 159th just received there first four aircraft in November 2016), but more deliveries will take place between 2016 and 2020. A typical
squadron of fighter aircraft in the VKS consists of at least 12 aircraft.
Works
Consulted
George M. Siouris, Missile Guidance and Control Systems, Springer-Verlag New York, 2004.
Jeffrey T Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Westview Press, Jul 14, 2015.
Piotr Butowski, “Russian Air Power Almanac 2015”, Air Force Magazine, 2015. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2015/July%202015/0715russia.pdf
Sebastien Roblin, "Russia's MiG-29 Fulcrum: A Super Fighter or Super Failure?", July 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-mig-29-fulcrum-super-fighter-or-super-failure-17054
Tactical Missile Corporation, “Products”, last
accessed November 2016. http://eng.ktrv.ru/production_eng/
[1] Artem Company, “R-27 missiles”,
last accessed November 2016.
[2] Vympel offers R-27EP anti-radar
air-to-air missile Piotr Butowski
[3] Artem Company, “R-27 missiles”,
last accessed November 2016.
[4] Piotr Butowski, “The Flanker
Family Part Two: Upgrades, Su-33 and Su-35”, Combat Aircraft September 2016 Issue, pgs. 61-66.
[5] Sukhoi Products: Su-35 multi-role
fighter, last access October 2016. http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/Su-35/
[6] Piotr Butowski, “The Flanker
Family Part Two: Upgrades, Su-33 and Su-35”, Combat Aircraft September 2016 Issue, pgs. 61-66.
[7] Global Security, “AA-10 ALAMO R-27”,
last updated November 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/aa-10-specs.htm
[8] Jane’s, “Russian Air-Launched
Weapons 38”, 2001.
[10] Piotr Butowski, “Vympel offers
R-27EP anti-radar air-to-air missile”, 2007.
[11] Gian Vito, “Molniya-Vympel R-73
(AA-11 Archer)”, 2012. https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=it&u=http://www.aereimilitari.org/forum/topic/16951-molniya-vympel-r-73-aa-11-archer/&prev=search
[12] Tyler Rogoway, “How To Win In A
Dogfight: Stories From A Pilot Who Flew F-16s And MiGs”, 2015. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-to-win-in-a-dogfight-stories-from-a-pilot-who-flew-1682723379
[13] Piotr
Butowski, Jane's International Defense Review, August 2014.
[14] BMPD/ CAST, “Helmet-mounted target
designation system NSTS-T for Russian fighter jets”, November 2016. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2200980.html
[15] Piotr Butowski, Jane's
International Defense Review, August 2014.
[16] Pieter D. Wezeman “United Nations
Arms Embargoes Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behavior Case study: Eritrea
and Ethiopia, 2000–2001.” http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAEE-E.pdf
[17] Ibid.
[18] Jonathan Kyzer, et al., Air Combat
Information Group, “Air War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1998-2000”,
2003. http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=138&Itemid=47
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Gian Vito, “Molniya-Vympel R-73
(AA-11 Archer), October 2012. https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=it&u=http://www.aereimilitari.org/forum/topic/16951-molniya-vympel-r-73-aa-11-archer/&prev=search
[23] F-16.net, “AIM-7 Sparrow”, last
accessed November 2016. http://www.f-16.net/f-16_armament_article10.html
[24] Robert L. Shaw, Fight Combat
Tactics and Maneuvering, pp. 38
[25] Robert L. Shaw, Fight Combat
Tactics and Maneuvering, pp. 38
