Quick Thoughts: F-22s in Syria

UDPATED 9/24: Revisions reflect new information on Arab forces and corrections on Tomahawk launch locations

Image 1: F-22 taking off from Al Dhafra air base in the UAE to participate in operations over Syria. Image Credit: USAF, 2014.

American F-22s entered combat for the first time in the early morning hours of September 23rd. Roughly 200 munitions were expended on 22 targets by a mix of B-1B, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and F-22 aircraft along with 47 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from the USS Arleigh Burke and USS Philippine Sea from the Red Sea and Arabian Sea respectively. A total of 48 US aircraft were joined by aircraft from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain which all served in direct combat roles. Qatar abstained from bombing targets in Syria but graciously provided logistical support and access to its facilities. According to Tyler Rogoway from Foxtrot Alpha, the following Arab aircraft participated in the strike:

four Jordanian F-16MLU Vipers
four Saudi F-15S Eagles
four UAE F-16E/F Block 60 Vipers
two F-16C Vipers from Bahrain

The F-22s participating in the strike were likely from the 1st Figher Wing (FW) based at Langley-Eustis Virginia; A group of six block 35 F-22s from the 1st FW were sighted in transit to Al Dhafra air base in the UAE earlier in April (Cenciotti, 2014). The F-22s participated in the second of three waves of aircraft bombing ISIL, Al Nusra Front, and Khorasan Group targets.  Below is video from an unidentified aircraft recording an F-22 strike against an ISIL compound.

It is unknown if the aircraft participating in the strike were upgraded to the increment 3.1 standard which offers a host of significant improvements including: synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes to the AN/APG-77, electronic attack capabilities, geo-location of electro-magnetic emitters, and GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB I) integration. If the aircraft were not upgraded to the 3.1 standard, it can likely be assumed the Raptors used 1,000 pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). However, in the author's opinion, the effects of the four of munitions used on the structure (two munitions can be observed hitting the structure at the 9 second mark and another pair of munitions can briefly be seen impacting the structure at the 11 second mark prior to the cut towards a farther distance perspective) in the video above are more consistent with the effects of four 250 lb SDB Is rather than four of the much larger 1,000 lb JDAMs.

Increment 3.1 aircraft would be significantly more useful to American forces striking targets in Syria relative to increment 2.0 aircraft given the SAR, SDB I, and geo-location capabilities; increment 3.1 upgrades allow the F-22 to become a potent suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft. F-22s over Syria were likely assigned to protect other coalition aircraft in the event the Assad regime activated its integrated air defense system (IADS) or launched what remained of its air force in addition to preforming an air to ground strike (Mehta, 2014). The Syrian Air Force is equipped with Mig-21 and Mig-29 fighter aircraft but the combat readiness Assad's fighter fleet is questionable. However, the Syrian response was minimal in terms of actions despite the strong protest in rhetoric. Both Iran and Syrian officials were informed shortly in advance of the strikes and given assurances Assad regime forces would not be targeted. Syrian radar acquisitions on US aircraft were passive, indicating that Assad's forces sought to avoid confrontation (Pande & Babb, 2014).

It is notable that no report mentions the participation of of  Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) or similar "gateway" aircraft in support of strikes against ISIL. The F-22's intra-flight data link (IFTL) can only transmit and receive signals to other F-22s or specialized gateway aircraft which in turn translate the signal for other aircraft. Without a gateway aircraft, F-22s would only be able to receive Link-16 tracks (the standard data-link for many US-NATO equipped fighter aircraft ) and would be unable to transmit its own Link-16 tracks to other aircraft particpating in the strikes such as the F-16s (Majumdar, 2012). Until the Raptor fleet is upgraded to the 3.2A standard, F-22s will lack two way Link-16 capability. Raptor pilots might have resorted to using unstealthy radios in order to communicate with other coalition forces (emitter locator systems could theoretically detect transitions via conventional radios). However, given the deactivated state of Assad's IADS, the use of radios likely wouldn't be a significant issue.

As for the selection of targets, David Axe and Robert Beckhusen recently wrote how US signals intelligence assets have provided invaluable information to US forces in Iraq (and likely in Syria as well preceding the American air strikes).

Related Articles: 

The Benefits of Stealth and Situational Awareness
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part I Introduction
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II Adaptations to Budget Cuts
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part III Upgrades

Image 2: F-22 pilot refuels from a KC-135 tanker after participating in operations over Syria. Notably, the pilot has an American flag in the cockpit, a customary practice during real combat operations (Cenciotti, 2014). Image Credit: USAF

Sources 

1. http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/f-22s-used-in-syria-strikes-right-force-right-time-say-analysts/
2. http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-22-s-takes-first-shot-against-ground-not-air-target
3. http://www.voanews.com/content/us-arab-partners-air-strikes-islamic-state-syria/2459099.html
4. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230036/Mideast-Countries-Play-Major-Role-Islamic-State-Strikes
5. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230034/Analysis-Long-Road-F-22-s-First-Combat-Mission
6. http://theaviationist.com/2014/09/23/f-22-debut-over-syria/
7. http://theaviationist.com/2014/04/01/f-22-not-deploying-near-russia/
8. http://theaviationist.com/2014/09/23/f-22-isis-compound/
9. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140922/DEFREG04/309220020/US-Begins-Airstrikes-Islamic-State-Targets-Syria
10. http://www.defensenews.com/interactive/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230031/U-S-Airstrikes-Pound-Militant-Groups-Syria
11. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/stealth-fighters-make-combat-debut-as-u-s-bombs-syria-aa60258f73f5?source=latest&amp
12. http://news.yahoo.com/u-military-releases-video-f-22-strike-against-215023884.html
13. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-f-22-raptor-finally-bloodies-its-talons-in-attack-o-1637984159
14. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/09/f-22-raptor-carried-us-flag-on-maiden-combat-mission-into-syria/ 

Japan's Domestic Stealth Fighter Ambitions - Assessment of the Proposed F-3

Image 1: ATD-X aircraft

In June Japan's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) developed ATD-X was first unveiled to the public. Japan initially launched the program as part of an effort to persuade the United States to export the F-22 Raptor which was banned for export by Congress in 2004 (Axe, 2011). However, Japan currently has three principal uses for the ATD-X: a testbed for the development of counter-stealth technologies, to assist in the development of both fifth fighter technologies in tandem with the sixth generation i3 concept in an attempt to gain access to co-development of the next sixth generation American fighter program, and - if Japan cannot gain co-development rights - then proceed with a domestically produced sixth generation F-3 aircraft (Perrett, 2014). Former defense minister Onodera has indicated Japan will decide whether to proceed with domestic production in 2018 upon reviewing a potential partnership with the United States. The most probable outcome will likely be similar to the following:

• The United States will rebuff the Japanese offer for sixth generation co-development 
• Japan will in turn proceed with its domestic development program under significant diplomatic pressure from the United States to terminate the program
• Japan's low defense budget and limited defense aerospace industry will either force Japan to cancel the program after few years at which point: 
• The US will likely attempt to co-opt Japan with an offer for a much more limited role in the American program sixth generation program than originally desired by the Japanese Government (to eliminate competition in the fighter export market) 
•  OR Japan will continue with development of the F-3 despite the high opportunity costs with only a few dozen F-3 aircraft produced    

While the plausible series of events described above are certainly bleak from Japan's perspective, one cannot reasonably conclude Japan's defense aerospace industry could mass produce a sixth generation aircraft by 2030. Not only will the inherent limitation's of Japan's own defense industry constrain the development of the F-3, but also the United States will exert immense diplomatic pressure on the Government of Japan to cancel the F-3 program. Part I will detail the prospects for the joint development of a sixth generation aircraft between the United States and Japan as well as examining the inherent weakness of Japan's defense aerospace industry. Part II will examine how the US will pressure the Government of Japan should it continue with the development of the F-3, how the F-3 program would unfold if unhindered by the US and given budgetary priority by the Japanese Government, and the strategic impact the F-3 would have in the Asia-Pacific region.

 Prospects for an American Partnership

Image 2: F-X sixth generation fighter concept by Lockheed Martin

Japan has indicated a preference for American co-development route over the domestic production and development route. However, it is unlikely the United States will allow Japan to participate in the development of either the USAF F-X or USN F/A-XX sixth generation fighter programs at an early stage (Japan is likely soliciting entry in the USAF program). The first USAF sixth generation aircraft will be a high-end air dominance platform designed to replace the F-22 Raptor while the USN intends to procure a sixth generation replacement to the F/A-18E Super Hornet; both services aim to field the aircraft in the early 2030s.

In a similar manner as the Raptor, the first USAF sixth generation aircraft will incorporate numerous sensitive and revolutionary technologies not initially available in other platforms. Given the sensitivity of the technologies incorporated in its design, its unclear if the US would be willing to allow for co-development - or even export - given the recent history with the F-22 program. While the USAF and USN are in the process of defining which key technologies will constitute sixth generation capabilities, the US maintains a competitive advantage in all of the most likely technologies including: variable-cycle engines, gallium nitride based radar arrays, directed energy weapons, multi-frequency band stealth, "artificial intelligence" (more likely a form of data management software), and limited "self-healing" capabilities such as the vehicle system network (VSN) in use on the F-35.

It remains unclear, from the American perspective, to what extent the US could benefit from Japanese participation in development of the F-X aircraft. The US maintains a comparative advantage in all the aforementioned technologies a result of its significantly greater Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget which is $63 billion for FY 2014, larger than Japan's entire $49 billion  FY 2015 defense budget.

Image 3: Lockheed Martin Falcon 10 test aircraft equipped with Aero-Adaptive/Aero-Optic Beam Control (ABC). Solid state lasers have made substantial advancements in recent years under US Navy, Air Force, and DARPA programs. Directed energy weapons such as Lockheed Martin's ABC have the potential to intercept enemy missiles and aircraft. The 150 kilowatt High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS) could also be employed against ground targets. Image Credit: Air Force Research Laboratory

While Japan is certainly a stalwart ally of the United States, Washington has credible reasons to be protective of the American defense industry. Even if Japan were unable to be in a position to credibly compete with the United States in arms exports, which is largely the case as detailed in the next section, Japan has had several incidents of leaks related to sensitive US systems. In 2007, a Japanese officer was arrested after leaking radar and transmission frequencies for the US Aegis system. The incident prompted the US to temporarily halt shipments of components related to upgrading Japan's Kongo-class destroyers. The US concern over the limited ability of Japan to retain US sensitive technological secrets promoted Japan to enact a new state secrets law in 2013 which details harsh new penalties for those who leak classified information (Lucy, 2013). While the new law will assuage Washington's concerns to some extent, its unlikely Washington will fundamentally shift its position toward co-development (counter intelligence remains a concern, particularly against Chinese intelligence services).

The US has only shown a consistent willingness to co-develop systems that incorporate technologies already in use by the US military such as the SM-3 Raytheon-Mitsubishi partnership or to some extent the F-35 (though largely co-production rather than foreign assistance in early R&D work with the exception of BAE Systems and Elbit Systems). In summary, the US Government remains wary of the possibility that sensitive US produced technology could be obtained by foreign companies and nations from both an economic and national security perspective and it is unlikely that concern will change in future decades.

Limitations of Japan's Domestic Defense Aerospace Industry 

Image 4: Japanese F-2 fighter 

Upon being denied entry into the American F-X program, Japan will likely pursue a domestically produced 6th generation aircraft. However, the inherent limitation's of Japan's defense industry will either result in the eventual termination of the F-3 program or a limited production run of only a few dozen aircraft. The Japanese defense aerospace industry has been unable to cost effectively design and produce military aircraft in large quantities for the last three decades. Until recently, Japan's self imposed arms export ban limited sales to the domestic market. Furthermore, Japan's annual defense budget for the last decade has equaled approximately 1% of GDP with the FY 2015 budget allocating $49 billion toward defense. The result of comparatively low military budgets combined with limited production orders from the domestic market has historically resulted in Japanese defense aerospace firms being unable to achieve economies of scale production (Axe, 2011).

The net effect being Japanese domestically produced fighter aircraft are much more expensive than their international equivalents and few Japanese aircraft are produced. For example, the flyaway cost for a Mitsubishi F-2 is $136 million in 2014 dollars, more than three times the cost of the F-16C Block 50/52+ from which the design was based and more than the flyaway cost for a current F-35A under the recent LRIP 7 contract (Defense Industry Daily & Butler, 2014). While the F-2 incorporates modest improvements over the F-16 C Block 50/52+ design, the improvements are not proportionate to increase in cost. Similarly, Japanese produced F-35s are expected to cost 27% more than their American manufactured equivalents due to the incorporation of Japanese made components (Defense Industry Daily, 2014).

The Government of Japan has been consistently willing to support its domestic defense industry at the cost of potentially greater defense capabilities, which would result from the deployment of more numerous imported systems, and will likely continue to do so. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, and other domestic defense firms have strong ties with both the Japanese Diet and are the source of tens of thousands of jobs within the Japanese economy. However, the development of the F-3 will cost more than any other Japanese aerospace program to date.

Image 5:Japan is in the process of upgrading its fourth generation fighter force. License built F-15Js and F-15DJs compose the majority of the Japanese self defense force;s (JSDF) fighter aircraft fleet with 223 in Japan's inventory. Japan's fleet of F-15s are undergoing mid-life upgrades which include improvements to the central computer, electronic counter-measures system, radar, Integrated Electronic Warfare System (IEWS), and the inclusion of new weapon systems (IHS Janes, 2013).

General Hideyuki Yoshioka estimates the total program cost will be $100 billion over the service lives of the aircraft, assuming a few dozen are produced (Axe, 2011). Richard Aboulafia, an aviation expert from the Teal Group, estimates the development costs alone for the F-3 program will be at least $20 billion. The enormous funds required to develop, produce, and maintain the F-3 are incongruent with Japan's aggregate defense expenditures. In order for the full production and development of the F-3 to be plausible, Japan cannot continue to spend merely 1% of its GDP on defense without massive cuts to other Japanese weapon programs.

Sources

1. Japan to encourage universities to develop military technologies, Jon Grevatt, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/42535/japan-to-encourage-universities-to-develop-military-technologies
2. ATD-X Emerges Amid Japanese Fighter Choices, Bradley Perrett, 2014. http://aviationweek.com/defense/atd-x-emerges-amid-japanese-fighter-choices
3. Japanese MoD denies reports of 2015 first flight for ATD-X prototype, Kosuke Takahashi, 2014.                                                                                                                                                 http://www.janes.com/article/41815/japanese-mod-denies-reports-of-2015-first-flight-for-atd-x-prototype
4. Japan's indigenous stealth jet prototype 'to fly this year', Kosuke Takahashi, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/36713/japan-s-indigenous-stealth-jet-prototype-to-fly-this-year
5. Japan to develop stealth-detecting long-range radar, Kosuke Takahashi, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/27447/japan-to-develop-stealth-detecting-long-range-radar
6. Onodera says Japan may buy more F-35s 'if price is right', Kosuke Takahashi & James Hardy, 2014.                                                                                                                                   http://www.janes.com/article/40622/onodera-says-japan-may-buy-more-f-35s-if-price-is-right
7. F-35 Deal Targets Unit Cost Below $100 Million, Amy Butler, 2013. http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-deal-targets-unit-cost-below-100-million
8. Japanese MoD Budget, 2014.                                                                                                           http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/260130.pdf
9. UCLASS Requirements Shifted To Preserve Navy’s Next Generation Fighter, Dave Majumdar & Sam LaGrone, 2014.                                                                                                           http://news.usni.org/2014/07/31/uclass-requirements-shifted-preserve-navys-next-generation-fighter
10. Air Force Seeks Laser Weapons for Next Generation Fighters, Dave Majumdar, 2013.  http://news.usni.org/2013/11/20/air-force-seeks-laser-weapons-next-generation-fighters
11. Navy’s Next Fighter Likely to Feature Artificial Intelligence, Dave Majumdar, 2014.  http://news.usni.org/2014/08/28/navys-next-fighter-likely-feature-artificial-intelligence
12. Next Generation Engine Work Points to Future U.S. Fighter Designs, Dave Majumdar, 2013.   http://news.usni.org/2014/06/23/next-generation-engine-work-points-future-u-s-fighter-designs
13. GaN Revolution, Dave Majumdar, 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110228/DEFFEAT01/102280305/GaN-Revolution
14. Israel Sells Arms To China, U.S. Says, Michael R. Gordon, 1993 http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/13/world/israel-sells-arms-to-china-us-says.html
15. Report: Israel Passes U.S. Military Technology to China, Bryant Jordan, 2013. http://defensetech.org/2013/12/24/report-israel-passes-u-s-military-technology-to-china/
16. Japan Aims To Launch F-3 Development In 2016-17, Bradley Perrett, 2012.   http://aviationweek.com/awin/japan-aims-launch-f-3-development-2016-17
17. Japan military school raided over Aegis data leak, Martyn Williams, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/21/AR2007052100710.html
18. Intelligence: Japan Plugs Aegis Leak, Stragegy Page, 2007. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20071216.aspx
19. Japan's State Secrets Law: Hailed By U.S., Denounced By Japanese, Lucy Craft, 2013. http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/12/31/258655342/japans-state-secrets-law-hailed-by-u-s-denounced-by-japanese
20. Japan’s New Fighter a $100-Billion Program?, Kyle Mizokami, 2011. http://www.warisboring.com/2011/03/10/japans-new-fighter-a-100-billion-dollar-program/
21. DARPA Plans to Arm Drones With Missile-Blasting Lasers, Allen McDuffee, 2011. http://www.wired.com/2013/11/drone-lasers/ 
22. Navy to Test-Fire DARPA's Hellads Laser, Graham Warwick, 2013. http://aviationweek.com/blog/navy-test-fire-darpas-hellads-laser 
23. DARPA testing planes with a 'Star Wars'-style laser cannon, Eric Mack, 2014. http://www.cnet.com/news/darpa-is-testing-planes-with-a-star-wars-style-laser-cannon/ 
24. Defense Industry Daily, 2014.                                                                                                         http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/darpas-abc-of-airborne-lasers-09164/
25. F-15J, Global Security, 2011.                                                                                                         http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/f-15j.htm
26. Japan Responds to Regional Threats With Air Power Boost, Chris Pocock , 2014. http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/singapore-air-show/2014-02-12/japan-responds-regional-threats-air-power-boost 
27. Lockheed's New Laser Super Turret Could Change Air Combat Forever, Tyler Rogoway, 2014. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/lockheeds-new-laser-super-turret-could-change-air-comba-1635210849

Resurgent Russia Part II

Client States - Objectives in the Near Abroad

Image 1: Graphic of the conflict in Ukraine. Russian backed separatists launched a counter-offensive against Ukrainian forces in late August 2014 and are believed to be heading for Mariupol. Image Credit: Swedish Defense Ministry

"Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum — from pro-Western liberals to leftists and nationalists. It rests on three geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower, a great power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon — the political, military, and economic leader — of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. [emphasis mine] It has proven remarkably resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin". - Leon Aron, 2013

The current crisis in Ukraine is often discussed as the latest in a series of events responsible for escalating tensions between Russia and the West which were marked by extensive economic ties and varying degrees of political cooperation only one year prior. Furthermore, President Vladimir Putin is often described as irrational given his refusal to arm Ukrainian separatists destitute the enormous financial and political costs incurred by Russia as a  result of Western sanctions (Judah, 2014). However, a more comprehensive view of the crisis in Ukraine indicates Russia's current actions are consistent with the Russian Federation's long held post-Soviet foreign policy aims and Russian objectives in Ukraine would not have been significantly impacted by more assertive EU or American actions. Maintaining significant influence in Ukraine is a non-negotiable Russian foreign policy interest, a Western aligned Ukraine with possible future EU and NATO membership would have been intolerable.

"'Coercion requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want—worse off not doing what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.' However irrational it might seem to the rest of the world, there is no feasible penalty that makes the desired Western outcome in Ukraine acceptable to Moscow." - Samuel Charap, 2014

In relative terms, Russia's interests in Ukraine vastly outweigh American and EU interests and Russia is subsequently willing to go to extreme lengths to pursue what it considers a critical component to its national security policy - establishing Russian regional dominance. No amount of Western punitive action short of war can realistically alter Russian objectives in Ukraine including the often discussed minimalist provisions of arms, intelligence support, etc. that the West could provide to the Ukrainian Government. Russia's support of the separatists and the annexation of Crimea must be put into the context that the ousting of former President Viktor Yanukovych was a major blow to Russian interests in Ukraine and the new pro-Western elected Government threatened long-term Russian influence. The annexation of Crimea and the continued support of Ukrainian Separatists are frantic attempts to secure long term Russian influence in reaction to the rapid deterioration of Russia's regional posture.  

Image 2: Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed at Sevastopol Crimea. Image Credit AP 

In order to facilitate continued Russian influence in Ukraine inspite of the currently hostile central Ukrainian Government, Moscow desires a federated Ukraine in which eastern provinces would be semi-autonomous and more sympathetic to Russian interests (Gates, 2014). Furthermore, the continued support of armed separatists based in Lugansk and Donetsk effectively prohibits Ukraine from NATO membership; NATO does not admit new member states with ongoing territorial disputes (Vandiver, 2014). The annexation of Crimea secures Russian access to the Mediterranean from Sevastopol and ensues Ukraine will be unable to achieve energy independence. When Russia annexed Crimea, it gained access to 36,000 square miles of territory in the Black Sea adjacent to Crimea which are rich in natural gas deposits.

"Now not only does Russia now control that, Ukraine does not. That was potentially the secret to greater energy independence for Ukraine somewhere down the road. That's now not going to be possible. So, it's kind of been a win-win for Putin in that respect, both security and economically. And so I think -- I think it'll be very tough for a Ukrainian government to move westward given the economic leverage that Russia has." - Robert Gates, 2014

Net Effect of Russian Actions  on Russia's Strategic Outlook

While Vladimir Putin has secured long term Russian influence over Ukraine, the Russian Federation's aggregate strategic position in Eurasia has largely been compromised as a result. Many post-Soviet states such as Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan have openly voiced concern over Russian actions in Ukraine and have reinvigorated their efforts to increase diplomatic ties with the United States. While US options for realistically altering Russian involvement in Ukraine in the short term is limited, the US has been presented with significant long term opportunities to shore up diplomatic and military relationships with other post-Soviet States with the objective being to contest Russian regional hegemony.

"[many post-Soviet states] had taken risks, done things that were of politically unpopular to support the United States whether that was sending forces to Afghanistan and Iraq whether that was signing energy deals favoring US allies, and in response the US wasn't doing enough to protect them either diplomatically or militarily...The ability of Russia's effort to court these states will have a lot to do with how they perceive US interest and commitment to them. Many would like to see a deeper security relationship with the United States including: weapon sales, temporary rotations of forces, and training. Even countries that have very different relations amongst themselves like Azerbaijan and Armenia both seem to have an interest in a higher level of US military support for the other as long as it does not disrupt the balance...The issue for a lot of these countries is that they see they have entered a new world with Russia and they are very much looking to the United States and NATO but toward the United States in particular for some kind of leadership to reassure them that this new world is not going to fundamentally threaten their sovereignty and independence."  - Jeffrey Mankoff, 2014

Image 3: US F-16's prior to training mission at Lask Air Base, Poland. Image Credit: DOD 2014. 

Russian actions in Ukraine have not only reinvigorated the efforts of neighboring countries to pursue ties with the US but also it has severely weakened the Russian economy. While the $100 to $200 billion dollars in capital flight as a result of Western sanctions have certainly contributed toward Russia's downgraded future economic outlook, Russia's self imposed food ban against the US, EU, and Australia is likely to inflict even greater damage toward the Russian economy; Inflation is expected to rise to 7-8% if sanctions continue into 2015 (Filatova, 2014). Russia's planned $720 billion dollar military modernization program through 2020 has only been made possible as a result of continued economic growth over the last decade.

In summary, the crisis in Ukraine has actually constrained Russia's ability to assert regional hegemony rather than promoting it. Members of the United States Congress continue to lament at the relative inaction of the Obama Administration with respect to Ukraine but Putin has clearly established the entity that can inflict the greatest possible damage toward Russia's future strategic prospects is Russia itself. An appropriate response from the United States, detailed in Part III, must be cognizant of the self defeating nature of Russia's Ukraine policy and the desire of many post-Soviet states to pursue closer ties with the United States. 

Author's Note: Future articles will be published on a weekly basis unless otherwise noted (generally every Monday or Tuesday). 

Sources (In addition to Part I)

1. Ukraine’s Army Slogs Through the Merciless Donbass - Blood, borscht and BTRs, Robert Beckhusen, 2014.                                                                                                                             https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ukraines-army-slogs-through-the-merciless-donbass-9634b9a371d1 
2. Ukrainian military moves to endgame, Tim Ripley, 2014.                                                                      http://www.janes.com/article/42233/ukrainian-military-moves-to-endgame
3. The "Near-Abroad" Factor: Why Putin Stands Firm over Ukraine, Hilary Appel, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-near-abroad-factor-why-putin-stands-firm-over-ukraine-10517
4. Special Operations: All Glory To The 45th For Conquering Crimea, 2014. https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/20140325.aspx
5. Analysis: Crimea intervention - The increasing sophistication of Russia's military resurgence, Tim Ripley, and Bruce Jones, 2014.                                                                                                         http://www.janes.com/article/36143/update-analysis-crimea-intervention-the-increasing-sophistication-of-russia-s-military-resurgence
6. Is NATO Back? That Depends on Germany, Emily Cadei, 2014.                                                       http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/is-nato-back-that-depends-on-germany/33475.article
7. Is NATO a Bulwark in Need of Reform or a Relic?, Hanna Kozlowska , 2014.                                 http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/is-nato-a-bulwark-in-need-of-reform-or-a-relic/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1
8. How NATO Could Confront the Putin Doctrine, David Francis, 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/08/26/how_nato_could_confront_the_putin_doctrine_petro_poroshenko_belarus
9. The 'Putin Doctrine' And The Real Reason For Russian-American Conflict, Mark Adomanis, 2013.  http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/03/13/the-putin-doctrine-and-the-real-reason-for-russian-american-conflict/
10. Russia Lies About Invading Ukraine as It Invades Ukraine, Anna Nemtsova, 2014. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/28/russian-moms-denounce-putin-s-not-so-secret-ukraine-invasion.html
11. NATO: These new satellite images show Russian troops in and around Ukraine, Dan Lamothe, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/28/nato-these-new-satellite-images-show-russian-troops-in-and-around-ukraine/
12. Why Obama's Coercion Strategy in Ukraine Will Fail, Samuel Charap, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-obamas-coercion-strategy-ukraine-will-fail-11006
13. Arm Ukraine or Surrender, Ben Judah, 2014.                                                                                      http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/opinion/arm-ukraine-or-surrender.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0
14. Putin's Goal for Ukraine, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 2014.                                                                          http://nationalinterest.org/feature/putins-goal-ukraine-11170 
15. Kissinger on Russia's global integration, 2014. http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/05/11/kissinger-on-russias-global-integration/ 
16. Food imports ban backfires on Russia's economy, Irina Filatova, 2014.                                               http://www.dw.de/food-imports-ban-backfires-on-russias-economy/a-17888880 
17. Putin’s new model army, The Economist, 2014.                                                                                  http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602743-money-and-reform-have-given-russia-armed-forces-it-can-use-putins-new-model-army 
18. Polish MiGs deploy as NATO steps up air defenses, Bartosz Glowacki, 2014. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/polish-migs-deploy-as-nato-steps-up-air-defences-398747/
19. The Putin Doctrine Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, Leon Aron, 2013.  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine
20. NATO rejects Russia’s ‘hollow denials’ of Ukraine intervention, John Vandiver, 2014.  http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-rejects-russia-s-hollow-denials-of-ukraine-intervention-1.300593