Aviation News - PAK FA

Recent news about the Russian PAK FA, and its Indian counterpart the FGFA, has unveiled numerous shortcomings within the aircraft. Indian officials have voiced concern over the aircraft's limited reliability, inadequate radar, and poor stealth features. In December, patents from the Sukhoi Design Bureau were released; these documents detail the limits of its radar reduction features. 

Russia can't deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF - By Ajai Shukla

“Business Standard has reviewed the minutes of that meeting. The IAF’s three top objections to the FGFA were: (a) The Russians are reluctant to share critical design information with India; (b) The fighter’s current AL-41F1 engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of the Sukhoi-30MKI’s AL-31 engines; and (c) It is too expensive. With India paying $6 billion to co-develop the FGFA, “a large percentage of IAF’s capital budget will be locked up...On January 15, the IAF renewed the attack in New Delhi, at a MoD meeting to review progress on the FGFA. The IAF’s deputy chief of air staff (DCAS), its top procurement official, declared the FGFA’s engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate, its stealth features badly engineered, India’s work share too low, and that the fighter’s price would be exorbitant by the time it enters service."

The FGFA program is looking like another example of Russian-Indian "co-development" in which India pays an exorbitant sum of money to Russia for only marginal improvements in its domestic defense industry resulting from Russian technology transfers.

PAK FA stealth features patent published - By Piotr Butowski

"The papers claim that the radar cross-section (RCS) of an Su-27 was in the order of 10-15 m 2 , with the intention being to reduce the size of the RCS in the T-50 to an "average figure of 0.1-1 m 2...In particular, the patent spells out the benefits of internal weapons carriage, s-shaped engine air ducts, (which were considered but are actually not implemented in the production PAK FA), and the use of radar blockers. It adds that the inlet guide vanes of the engines' compressors generate "a significant portion [up to 60%] of the radar cross-section of the airframe-powerplant system in the forward hemisphere" and that this is reduced by using radar-blocking devices and radar-absorbing coatings in the walls of the air ducts."

David Axe's details the PAK FA's reliability problems further in an article called, The Indians HATE Their New Russian-Made Stealth Fighter.

"Press reports in 2013 indicated that Sukhoi was having problems with quality control in the T-50 effort. At least one of the prototypes needed patches on its wings to keep from falling apart during high-stress maneuvers." - David Axe, 2014

The engine blades for the PAK FA are easily visible in the image above.

For comparison, Global Security cites the F-22A's frontal radar cross section (rcs) at .0001m^2 and the F-35 has a frontal rcs of .0015m^2. The PAK FA's rcs is subsequently several orders of magnitude larger than its American counterparts.

Author's Note: I am still working on the Raptor article, but I'm not able to work on blogging as much due to college work. However, I will try to consistently publish at least one article per week.

Miscalculation: The Need For a New US Fighter Export Strategy in the Global Fighter Market - Part II

Image 5: F-16 technology demonstrator with diverterless supersonic inlet

Recommendations

Lockheed Martin could make several additions to the F-16 to make the aircraft more competitive against the Gripen and new Russian 4.5 generation designs such as the Su-30MK2 and Mig-35. In order to reduce costs, these new upgrades should ideally build upon Lockheed Martin's existing F-16 R&D projects. Lockheed Martin has already experimented with a variety of advanced technology in the F-16 as a means to test technology for the F-35 such as "power-by-wire" flight controls, diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI), and low-observable asymmetric nozzle (LOAN) technology. Furthermore, Lockheed Martin has also experimented with other non F-35 related F-16 technology demonstrator projects such as the 85 degree angle of attack capable thrust vectoring NF-16D Variable-stability In-flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA) and the F-16 Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI) which had an internally mounted forward looking infrared (FLIR) system. The combination of all of the following features would be unpractical and it would make the F-16 too expensive for the low-end fighter market. Ideally, the most feasible of the following upgrades would be offered in a way such that the customer could pick and choose which upgraded features they are willing to pay for.

Upgrades to Lower Radar Signature

Image 6: low-observable asymmetric nozzle technology demonstrator on the F-16 

- LOAN
- DSI
- Have Glass I canopy & Have Glass II radar absorbent material (RAM) coatings
- composite materials from Lockheed/Mitsubishi F-2
- Internal weapons pod

The incorporation of DSI into a mass production variant of the F-16 is likely unfeasible despite the significant reductions to the F-16's frontal rcs that would result from its incorporation into the design. However, incorporating Have Glass I, Have Glass II, composite materials from the F-2, and an internal weapon pod remain feasible and relatively inexpensive. Both Have Glass I and Have Glass II are already used to reduce the radar cross section of operational F-16s (Evangelidis, 2004). In conjunction Mitsubishi, Lockheed Martin has already developed composite materials used in the construction of the F-2 (a modified Japanese F-16 variant) which both reduces the weight of the aircraft and slightly reduces its radar cross section (Defense Industry Daily, 2013). Boeing's development of a low-observable weapons pod for the F/A-18E Block III demonstrates the feasibility for developing a similar pod for the F-16. A low observable weapons pod would limit radar returns that typically result from the carriage of armaments on external wing mounted pylons.

The combination of all of these features would significantly reduce the radar cross section of the F-16 but the aircraft will not be comparable to the F-35 due to the radar returns resulting from the F-16's unstealthy vertical tail and lack of planform alignment. Furthermore, this heavily upgraded F-16 would have easily detectable electronic emissions and would only have limited infrared spectrum protection from Have Glass II. However, the goal of proposed comprehensive F-16 upgrade program is merely to grant the F-16 a competitive edge over other low-end fighter aircraft, not to attempt to match the F-35 in low observability characteristics. Furthermore, if the level of technological sophistication is too high, the aircraft's export prospects will be diminished as a result of the AECA. Thus, the incorporation of the most feasible low observable recommendations would fulfill both making the F-16 more competitive against other reduced radar cross section low-end fighter designs and the level of technological sophistication would likely not pose a major problem with regards to exports. Furthermore, it is likely the composition of the Have Glass II RAM can be downgraded as needed to alleviate export concerns.

Image 7: Have Glass II RAM treatment with characteristic speckled texture. Have Glass II has been applied to over 1,700 F-16s using the Computer Aided Spray Paint Expelling Robot (CASPER) which also applies RAM coatings to the F-22 (Evangelidis, 2004). Have Glass II is typically applied to F-16CJ "Wild Weasel" aircraft which hunt surface-to-air missile sites.

Improvements to Maneuverability

- 32,500 lbf capable F110-GE-132 turbofan or
- thrust vectoring engine technology from VISTA 
- power-by-wire flight control system
- composite materials from existing Lockheed/Mitsubishi F-2 program to lower aircraft weight

As with the radar signature reduction features, adding all of these maneuverability enhancements is impractical. While adding thrust vectoring to the F-16 from the VISTA program would undoubtedly yield extensive tangible improvements to the F-16's maneuverability characteristics, adding thrust vectoring would also almost certainly be the most expensive upgrades on the list of potential maneuverability related proposals. However, the F110-GE-132 turbofan is already in production and in use in UAE F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft. The F110-GE-132 turbofan offers a considerable improvement over the current 28,500 lbf Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229 turbofan in the Block 50 and the 28,984 lbf F110-GE-129 turbofan (all figures in afterburner or military power). It is important to note F110-GE-132 is not currently offered as part of the F-16V configuration (Dorr, 2012). The addition of the GE-132 would synergize with the incorporation of both "power-by-wire", which removes the mechanical backup for a total 6% reduction in weight, and the composite materials from the F-2 which would further increase airframe weight reduction. As a result of reduced weight and increased thrust, the upgraded aircraft would have a significantly higher thrust to weight ratio over the current F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft.

Image 8: Composite wing from an F-2. From Defense Industry Daily: "In the end, the F-2 delivered on its techno-industrial promises. Mitsubishi’s heavy use of graphite epoxy and co-cured composite technology for the wings encountered some teething problems, but proved to be a leading-edge use of a technology that provides weight savings, improved range, and some stealth benefits. This technology was then transferred back to America, as part of the program’s industrial partnership."

Improvements to Sensors 

Image 9: FLIR in F-16 AFTI. Image retrieved via F-16.net

Lockheed Martin has been diligent about consistently upgrading the F-16's internal avionics with its most recent F-16 variants. The incorporation of either Northrup Grumman's Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) or Raytheon's Advanced Combat Radar (RACR) into the F-16V grants greatly increased situational awareness and beyond visual range (bvr) combat capabilities. Currently the United States enjoys nearly a ten year lead over its international competitors in the field of fighter mounted AESA. However, by the 2020s other low-end fighter aircraft will incorporate AESAs such as the Eurofighter, Mig-35, Gripen Next Generation (NG), etc. In order for the F-16 to remain competitive, the inclusion of an internally mounted infrared search and track (IRST) system is necessary. Lockheed Martin has developed an externally pod mounted IRST system for the F-16 called "IRST". While this is a relatively low cost and efficient means of adding IRST capabilities to older existing airframes, externally mounted pods generally diminish aerodynamic performance. Lockheed might be able to use the incorporation of the AN/ASQ-28 IFTS on the F-16E/F Block 60 as a starting point for incorporating an internally mounted IRST on the F-16.

Upgrade Summary 

The objective of a comprehensive upgrade program for the F-16 is to provide enough new capabilities to the F-16 airframe as to make the aircraft viable against the Gripen NG and new super maneuverable Russian fourth generation fighter aircraft. At a minimum, this would entail the inclusion composite materials to reduce weight and provide some rcs reduction, "power-by-wire" for additional weight reductions, the addition of a more powerful engine such as the F110-GE-132, a low-observable weapon pod, and incorporation of an internally mounted IRST system. The research and development time for many of these improvements would be reduced as Lockheed Martin has already researched the basis for these improvements in past F-16 technology demonstrator programs during the 1990s to early 2000s. Furthermore, many of these features are incorporated in existing operational aircraft (either the J-2 or F-16E/F Block 60).

Capitalizing on Saab's Weaknesses 

Image 10: JAS-39 F Demonstrator. Image Credit: Saab.  

Despite its recent success in Brazil's $4.5 billion dollar FX-2 contract, Saab retains three key vulnerabilities Lockheed Martin could exploit in the future.

1. Finite production capacity and significant additional R&D is required for Gripen NG 
2. Limited training and logistics support from Saab
3. Sweden's comparatively limited international clout vs. the United States 

Saab has a comparatively limited production capacity compared to Lockheed Martin. Sweden's order of 60 next generation Gripen aircraft will occur between 2018 and 2026 (Hoyle, 2013). With more orders from Switzerland and Brazil, any additional Gripen NG customers will likely have to wait past 2020 for their initial deliveries. Lockheed Martin can deliver F-16's at a much faster rate and only a modest amount of R&D work remains for the aforementioned F-16 improvements when compared to the NG.

"'This is not just an upgrade of the existing Gripen; it is a complete redesign, and essentially a new aircraft. Because of the small number to be built, the R&D costs per unit are likely to be very high.' The upgraded Gripen would grow in length from 14.1 to 14.9 meters, it would have a slightly wider wingspan, and its maximum takeoff weight would increase from 14 to 16.5 tons. The number of onboard weapon stations would rise from eight to 10, engine power would increase by 22 percent, and range would expand from 3,500 to 4,075 kilometers." - Gerard O'Dwyer, 2012  

Saab's proposal to build a fighter pilot school at Air Force Base Overberg South Africa has been denied by the South African Government (Martin, 2013). This facility would have provided much needed training and logistic support to current Gripen users. Saab is in the process of finding a new site for its fighter pilot school but it will likely not be completed for several years. Meanwhile, the United States Air Force conducts training exercises with other nations that operate the F-16 on a routine basis e.g. a detachment of USAF F-16's from the 176th Fighter Squadron (FS) was recently deployed to Poland for training exercises.

Limitations of Analysis 

Image 11: Lockheed Martin Fort Worth F-16 production facility. Image Credit: Kenny Roberts

Before concluding, its worth mentioning the limits of the analysis above. While the analysis above emphasizes the volume of orders within the low-end fighter market, it does not address aggregate value of high-end vs low-end fighter sales. One of the basic tenants of economics is the assumption that firms act in a profit maximizing manner. For example, despite the larger volume of aircraft sold in the low-end market, the few sales of high-end aircraft can provide a disproportionately large source of revenue when compared to even the largest sales of low-end aircraft. For example, Boeing was recently awarded a massive $29.4 billion dollar contract for 84 new F-15SA strike eagles and 68 upgrade kits for Saudi Arabia's current strike F-15S eagle fleet. In comparison, the largest F-16 sale in recent years, the UAE purchase of 80 new F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft, was valued at only $6.4 billion. It could be that Lockheed Martin has already judged marginal benefit, in terms of continued or increased F-16 sales as a result of more than piecemeal upgrades to the F-16, as insufficient to justify the marginal cost of comprehensive F-16 upgrades. It is also possible that Lockheed Martin has judged the opportunity cost, in terms of resources allocated to sustaining F-16 production, to be too high at a time when it needs additional resources for the F-35 program.

However, Lockheed Martin's concern that heavily upgrading the F-16 could result diminished international interest in the F-35 is ill-founded.

"LockMart has been very discrete with marketing and upgrading this plane, because aggressively selling a very capable fourth generation fighter at $45 million could easily annoy the Air Force and jeopardize international F-35 sales too. It even moved the F-16 production line to a much smaller and less prominent building. The worst enemy of The Best is The Good Enough." - Richard Aboulafia, 2012

So long as the upgrades provide enough new capability to nations as to make the F-16 comparable to its 4.5 generation counterparts, its low price and the diplomatic ties with the United States will once again make the F-16 very attractive to low-end customers. It is plausible that Lockheed doesn't need to fully match the Gripen NG from a capabilities standpoint due to the variable of strengthening diplomatic ties with the US as discussed in Part I, but as of now the F-16 is sufficiently behind its counterparts as to diminish the effectiveness diplomatic ties variable. In the high-end market, the upgraded F-16 will not offer enough new capability to justify foregoing the fifth generation F-35. The F-X III fighter competition in South Korea serves as an example of a high-end fighter market customer chose the F-35 over a cheaper heavily upgraded 4.5 generation alternative, Boeing's F-15SE "Silent Eagle". In many respects the F-15SE is similar to the upgraded F-16. Thus, Lockheed Martin can effectively meet demand from both markets without fear of damaging its own prospects in the high-end market with the F-35 by appropriately upgrading and marketing the F-16.

Conclusion 

Image 12: F-16 near Fort Worth. Image Credit: Code One Magazine

It is in Lockheed Martin's best interests to aggressively market upgraded variants of the F-16 to countries within the low-end fighter market such that it can retain the high-end market with the F-35 and the low-end market with the F-16. This is not a call to replace the F-35, rather Lockheed Martin should seek to meet the demands of both the low-end and high-end as to not loose out on potential revenue. By aggressively marketing a heavily upgraded F-16, Lockheed Martin can increase sales without serious concern that interest in the F-35 would be diminished, the low-end and high-end fighter market largely represent two separate markets blocks of international consumers.

Author's Note: Next article will be: "The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors". Release date is yet to be determined, maybe next week?

Sources

1. U.S. leads global arms exports surge, Steve Hargreaves, 2013.         http://economy.money.cnn.com/2013/06/27/weapons-exports/
2. America the Isolated?, Fareed Zakaria, 2013. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2143560,00.html
3. Will South Korea Ever Choose an FX-III Fighter?, CRAIG SCANLAN, 2013. http://newpacificinstitute.org/blog/2013/04/17/will-south-korea-ever-choose-an-fx-iii-fighter/
4. F-35 Program Information, Lockheed Martin, 2013. http://events.aviationweek.com/html/ad13/Nov%2014_1000_Branyan_REDUX.pdf
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6. JSF PSFD MOU, 2009.                              http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/documents/JSF_PSFD_MOU_-_Update_4_2010.PDF
7. F-16V Is Latest ‘Viper’ Variant for Fighter Market, ROBERT F. DORR, 2012. http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/f-16v-is-latest-viper-variant-for-fighter-market/
8. How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight?, Dario Leone, 2012. http://theaviationist.com/2012/12/10/viper-dogfight/
9. Saab Offers Gripens at Used F-16 Price, GERARD O'DWYER, 2010. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100426/DEFFEAT04/4260308/Saab-Offers-Gripens-Used-F-16-Price
10. F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet, Defense Industry Daily, 2013.                                                                                                                                                  http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-embarking-upon-f-x2-fighter-program-04179/
11. Boeing And Saab To Propose Gripen For T-X, Bill Sweetman, 2013. http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_11_2013_p0-615489.xml&p=1
12. SPECIAL REPORT: Flying the flag, Gunnar Akerberg, 2012.                    https://www.flightglobal.com/fg-club/in-focus/gripen/?intcmp=SHOW-gripenarticlebottom- fgclubpromo
13. Lockheed Martin F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER A “Low Observable” Approach, Vassilios A. Evangelidis, 2004.                                                                                                                              http://evangelidis.gr/embry/F35LO-ShortReport-HTML.htm
14. Variable-stability In-flight Simulator Test Aircraft, Multi Axis Thrust Vectoring, F-16.net, 2013.  http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article19.html
15. F-16 'Power-by-Wire' flight without back-up a success, F-16.net, 2000.                                            http://www.f-16.net/news_article584.html
16. Advanced Fighter Technology Integration, F-16.net, 2013.                                                                  http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article13.html
17. JSF Diverterless Supersonic Inlet, Code One, 2000.           http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=58
18. Have Glass/Have Glass II Top Coat Paint Application Services, Federal Business Opportunities, 2013.                                                                                                               https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=2d666c108252bf8f89e628fc2caaf380&tab=core&_cview=1
19. Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon, Scramble - The Aviation Magazine, 2013.  http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/Lockheed_Martin_F-16_Fighting_Falcon#Have_Glass
20. F-16 "Have Glass" paint finish - what is it?, Darson, 2009.  http://www.britmodeller.com/forums/index.php?/topic/29709-f-16-have-glass-paint-finish-what-is-it/
21. F-16 Fighting Falcon  The Most Technologically Advanced 4th Generation Fighter in the World, Lockheed Martin, 2013.  http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/aero/documents/f16/f16_brochure_a11-34324h001.pdf
22. Radar Cross Section (RCS), Global Security, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm
23. F-16C/D Block 50/52, F-16.net, 2013.                                                                                              http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article9.html
24. The UAE’s F-16 Block 60 Desert Falcon Fleet, Defense Industry Daily, 2013.  https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-uaes-f-16-block-60-desert-falcon-fleet-04538/?utm_campaign=didsearch&utm_source=did&utm_medium=autosuggest&utm_term=F-16
25. Lockheed & Mitsubishi’s F-2 Fighter Partnership, Defense Industry Daily, 2013. https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lockheed-mitsubishis-f2-fighter-partnership-03188/
26. AN/ASQ - Equipment Listing, Andreas Parsch, 2008.                                           http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/jetds/an-asq.html
27. F-16E/F block 60, F-16.net, 2013.                                                                                                   http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article10.html
28. Revolutionary AESA Technology, Raytheon, 2013.  http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/racr/
29. Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) for the F-16, Northrup Grumman, 2013.  http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/SABR/Pages/default.aspx
30. Production of the F-16 will likely continue through 2020, F-16.net, 2013.                               http://www.f-16.net/news_article4810.html
31. The Saudis’ American Shopping Spree: F-15s, Helicopters & More, Defense Industry Daily, 2013.                                                                                                                                                  http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/a-2010-saudi-shopping-spree-06520/
32. General Electric, 2012.                                             http://www.geaviation.com/engines/military/f110/f110-132.html  
33. Trouble for the Twin-Engine Giants?, Andrew Chuter,  AaronMehta,  & Pierre Tran, 2014.  http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140104/DEFREG/301040008/Trouble-Twin-Engine-Giants-
34. April 2012 Letter, Richard Aboulafia, 2012.                     http://www.richardaboulafia.com/shownote.asp?id=360
35. Saab gets deal to complete Gripen E development, Craig Hoyle, 2013. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/saab-gets-deal-to-complete-gripen-e-development-383850/ 
36. Will Gripen-NG Project Bring More Defense Cuts for Sweden? Gerard O'Dwyer, 2012.  http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120901/DEFREG01/309010001/
37. Gripen Fighter School in SA a ‘missed opportunity’, Guy Martin, 2013. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?%20option=com_content&view=article&id=31236&catid=74&Itemid=30   
38. Av-Det partners with Poland as first F-16 rotation arrives, Sarah Webb, 2013.                                    http://www.usafe.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123347749

Image 13: Japanese J-2. 

Miscalculation: The Need For a New US Fighter Export Strategy in the Global Fighter Market - Part I

Image 1: F-16D, Image Credit: Code One Magazine

The United States dominates the global arms industry; weapon sales by US firms comprise 39% of all global arms exports. In comparison, Russia, the world's second largest arms exporter, only constitutes 14% of all global arms exports (Hargreaves, 2013). In recent years, the value of sales relating to combat aircraft has grown relative to other widely exported weapon systems. Between 2005 and 2009, sales of combat aircraft accounted for 27% of global arms sales (Wezeman, 2010). Over the course of the last half century, US aerospace firms have outperformed and outsold their competitors by large margins due to two factors. One, arms sales openly serve as a means to solidify national security and diplomatic ties. This factor inherently works to the benefit of the United States as its synergies with the US' foreign policy strategy of cultivating strategic alliances around the world. Furthermore, due to the superpower status of the United States, many nations have a large incentive to improve national security and diplomatic ties with the United States. For example, in the recent FX-III fighter competition in South Korea, the Eurofighter consortium's bid was widely believed to be irrelevant as the South Korea Government would not seriously consider a non-American firm due to its potentially harmful effects on the South Korean-US relationship (Scanlan, 2013). The second factor that has historically served to the benefit of US firms is US aerospace firms have had a intimate understanding of global fighter market. The global fighter market can be divided into two categories, the low-end fighter aircraft market in which customers buy aircraft between $30 to $50 million dollars and the high-end fighter aircraft market which countries typically buy aircraft upwards of $50 million dollars (Aboulafia, 2013). The judgement of what is considered low and high-end purely reflects pricing and not performance.

The following is a list fighter aircraft deliveries between the years 2005 to 2009 at both the low-end and high-end fighter market. While it is unlikely that this is a comprehensive list of the global fighter market, it remains a suitable sample size to make credible evaluations of the global fighter market. Countries producing aircraft for their own use, such as the United States, were omitted from the list as the primary purpose of the list is to detail the fighter export market. The primary sources for the following data is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Defense Industry Daily, and F-16.net. Please refer to the notes section at the end of the article for more details.

Of the roughly 596 fighter aircraft that were exported between 2005 and 2009, 80% of fighter aircraft were $50 million dollars or less*. Sales of aircraft delivered exceeding a $50 million dollar unit price, are in bold. The data is in agreement with Richard Aboulafia's assessment from the Teal Group:

"the export market follows a different pattern than the producer countries. Only six export customers have ever purchased high end fighters (in the $65-80 million recurring flyway class)"

Over the course of the last three decades, US firms have successfully marketed aircraft to both the high-end and low-end fighter aircraft markets with the F-16 and F-15 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009). After the end of the Cold War, US firms continued to solidify and expand their market share by offering a host of upgrades and co-production agreements. However, in recent years the US has begun to loose its dominant hold on the low-end fighter export market to European firms, particularly to Saab, the producer of the JAS-39 Gripen.

The Emerging Competitor - JAS-39 Gripen 

Image 2: Jas-39 Gripen

Saab aggressively markets the Jas-39 as a practical low cost solution to air-superiority in an aircraft market where high priced designs such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, F-15E, and F-35 have become the norm. The following is from a Saab marketing brochure on the JAS-39 E:

"Cost-effectiveness underpins development and  production as well as purchase price, operating cost and maintenance – in other words, the product’s entire life cycle. A 2012 study published by IHS Jane’s ranked the world’s combat aircraft by operating cost. The study confirmed that the Gripen system is one of the   most cost-effective systems in comparison with relevant alternatives from other countries such as F-35, Eurofighter, Rafale, F-18 and F-16. Gripen’s operating costs are half the size of the F-18’s and only one-third – or less – the size of the Eurofighter and Rafale, both of which are competitors on the export market. Corresponding costs for the F-35 are estimated to be at least five times larger than Gripen’s."

Despite its limited international influence, Sweden has limited defense ties and diplomatic clout when compared to the United States, Saab understands its role in the global fighter market with relation to the second variable and has subsequently specialized in providing aircraft for the low-end fighter market. In certain circumstances, Sweden's status in diplomatic relations grants Saab an advantage as seen in the recent Brazil fighter competition after Edward Snowden's leaks damaged the international reputation of the United States. The low-end fighter market remains a stable niche where Saab is able to find customers: Switzerland, Hungary, Thailand, the Czech Republic, South Africa, and Brazil are all in the process of ordering or operate the Jas-39 aircraft. While the JAS-39 C/D or even the upgraded JAS-39 NG cannot match high-end fighter aircraft in many performance based evaluations, the Gripen's airframe is largely more advanced than the three decade base F-16 airframe and provides enough in terms of avionics to make it competitive with the F-16 and its Russian counterparts. Overall, the Gripen package offers stiff competition to the F-16 and Lockheed Martin cannot afford to underestimate its competitor if it seeks to maintain its portion in the low-end fighter market.

The F-35 

Image 3: F-35A

Lockheed Martin has the unique distinction of producing both the most widely exported fighter aircraft in recent years, the "low-end" F-16 with more than 4,500 aircraft sold, and arguably the most sought fighter aircraft at the "high-end", the  F-35. Lockheed Martin believes the F-35 will succeed the F-16 as the next widely exported American fighter aircraft with an expected 3,100 aircraft ordered over its production cycle (JSF PSFD MOU, 2009). I do not dispute Lockheed's claim on its face value. The following countries have either signed agreements or expressed strong interest in the F-35 program: Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Israel, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Korea and the United Kingdom (Lockheed Martin, 2013). However, these developed nations largely compose the existing high-end fighter market and Lockheed Martin is capitalizing on Boeing's lack of a 5th generation design. Thus, Lockheed Martin is set to take Boeing's historical role of producing the US' main high-end fighter export, the F-15 and its derivative strike eagle. Lockheed Martin has won every fighter competition its entered the F-35 into which speaks to the demand of fifth generation capabilities among traditional high-end fighter market customers.

“...recent market trends signal that the plane that offers the highest capability will win, Aboulafia said.'Look at South Korea. The market has decided that the F-35 wins the countries it is entered in, which means you have to look at the last of the contests where F-35 does not play a role.'” -Andrew Chuter,  AaronMehta,  and Pierre Tran, 2014

Although interest in the F-35 among countries within the high-end fighter market is significant, it is clear that interest in the F-35 among countries that traditionally acquire low-end fighter aircraft is comparatively less mature. From a purely price oriented assessment based on the data above and the cost figures provided by Lockheed Martin, the F-35 is unlikely to be able to fully match the export success of the F-16. Two in  factors will hinder the F-35 success in the low-end fighter market.

The first factor is price. Despite steady cost reductions within the F-35 program, the aircraft is not projected to reach a unit price near of $50 million dollars, even by the most optimistic estimates. By 2019, Lockheed Martin estimates the unit cost of an F-35 will be $85 million dollars in 2019 or $75 million dollars in current 2013 dollars (figures were adjusted for expected inflation by Lockheed Martin). This would make the F-35 cheaper than currently sold F-15E strike eagles or Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A's, which are the two most popular high-end exported fighter aircraft. The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), provided by the Department of Defense, projects the F-35 flyaway or unit cost will not drop below $70 million dollars even into the 2030s near the projected end of F-35 production. Its worth noting that from a capabilities perspective, the F-35 is worth every penny of the $75 million price for a nation that can afford it as it simply outclasses both the 4th generation F-16 and 4.5 generation JAS-39. However, from a marketing perspective, there are still portions of the global fighter market where its relatively high unit price makes it less competitive even with its substantial capabilities factored in.

The second factor is many nations do not maintain the necessary diplomatic ties with Washington to receive sensitive fifth generation technology. The F-35 was designed from the onset for export, unlike the F-22A which is currently banned for export to keep its advanced features "safe" even from the most stalwart US allies, such as Australia. Even with this in mind, its likely the F-35 will not be able to be sold as broadly as the less technologically mature F-16. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), technology deemed to be "sensitive" by the discretion of the President is banned for export in select countries. The United States routinely withholds sensitive technology from countries it deems to be not "deserving". For example, if Pakistan expressed an interest in the F-35 to replace its current F-16s, many in the United States would agree that it is not in the national security interest of the United States to supply the F-35 to Pakistan due to allegations that Pakistan allowed Chinese engineers to examine its fleet of F-16s among other ongoing defense issues between the United States and Pakistan. Concerns over sensitive technology transfers largely do not apply to the older F-16 or are less acute when compared to the F-35. For example, the most advanced variant of the F-16 is not operated by the US but by the United Arab Emirates (F-16E/F Block 60).

Image 4: UAE F-16E Block 60

Current F-16 orders from Iraq, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates will keep the F-16 production line open until the third quarter of 2017. After F-16 production shuts down in 2017, the United States will not have a readily available fighter aircraft in the low-end fighter export market for at least another twenty years into the 2030s. As capable as the F-35 is, and despite steady cost reductions in recent years, the F-35 is unlikely to fully fill the gap left by the F-16 in the low-end fighter export market. The advanced avionics incorporated in to the latest models of the F-16 serve as piecemeal and incremental improvements at best and do not provide enough new capabilities to grant the F-16 a competitive edge against the new supermanuverable Jas-39NG and Mig-35 which will also be equipped with AESAs. Historically, US aerospace firms will not mass produce a new fighter aircraft without an endorsement from the US military, which would guarantee some orders, even if demand for a low-end fighter from the US exists elsewhere e.g. the failed F-20 Tigershark.

In order to keep the F-16 production line open past 2017, Lockheed Martin cannot continue to offer only incremental F-16 upgrades such as the F-16V "Viper". The Viper does not make any major changes to the base airframe. The only differences between the new F-16V variant and the older F-16C Block 50/52+ is the F-16V includes an AESA radar, improved cockpit displays, and an improved mission computer architecture (Dorr, 2012). While the improvements to the internal avionics will provide a noticeable enhancement to situational awareness, the base F-16 airframe remains unable to evenly compete with more mature 4.5 generation air frames such as the JAS-39 or Mig-29M2. For example, combat exercises at Red Flag 2012 showed the Gripen was able successfully dogfight F-16s flown by veteran aggressor pilots.

With the F-35 program, Lockheed Martin is poised to secure a large market share of the global high-end fighter export market. However, in order to retain its current position as the leading supplier of the low-end fighter market, more than incremental changes to the base F-16 airframe are required to make the F-16 more competitive against increasingly capable opponents. By aggressively marking a heavily upgraded F-16 in the low-end fighter export market, where the F-35 is comparatively less relevant than the F-16, Lockheed Martin can secure contracts from both markets without serious concern of diminished interest in the F-35 or loosing its position as the largest supplier in the low-end fighter market.

Author's Note: Part II will be released Monday January 13th and it will include a list of upgrade recommendations for the F-16, ways to exploit Saab's weaknesses in the international low-end market, and the limits of this paper's analysis will be discussed. As always, feel free to ask any questions in the comments or message me on the F-16.net forums.

Sources

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Notes 

* Data is from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Defense Industry Daily (DID), and F-16.net. Please note that this data does not compose the global amount of aircraft delivered between 2005-2009 but does serve as an adequate sample size to make assessments of the global fighter market. Data provided by SIRPRI indicated combat aircraft, which includes fighter aircraft, thus DID and F-16.net provided clarification as to how many units were delivered that were actually fighter aircraft vs. other types of combat aircraft. Approximately 20% of all fighters sold can be considered high-end fighter aircraft if all 25 F-15E's ordered by Israel were delivered during this period. However, this is not the case. Deliveries of  some F-15E units to Israel occurred prior to 2005 but the author was unable to find an exact delivery schedule of F-15Es to Israel. Thus, the percentage of high-end fighter aircraft delivered between 2005 and 2009 is actually less than 20% of total fighter aircraft deliveries. The majority of aircraft delivered to Israel during this period are a result of the Peace Marble V F-16 sale. Please also note that the data provided shows aircraft deliveries which is not necessarily equal to the size of the entire aircraft order. For example, the four Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft delivered to Saudi Arabia are part of a 72 aircraft order but only four of these aircraft were delivered in 2009. The data also includes second-hand deliveries of used aircraft.