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Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Canada and the F-35 Part III: Procurement Proposal




The most credible argument against the acquisition of the CF-35 has nothing to do with the performance limitations or the direct cost of the F-35 itself.  Canada's Air Force remains woefully ill-equipped in terms of C4ISR abilities (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 

Currently Canada's defense spending accounts for 1.4% of its GDP. (Source 77) This figure is considerably less than the mutually agreed upon 2% GDP standard set by NATO. (Source 78) The result's of Canada's hesitation to fulfill its defense obligations has taken a serious toll on its capabilities. The Canadian Air Force maintains no electronic warfare capabilities, no significant intelligence gathering capabilities (only 3 UAV's on lease from Israel), and no command and control aircraft (e.g. AWACS). The results from Operation Unified Protector were clear, Canada and non-American NATO countries are too dependent upon American forces for C4ISR and logistical support. (Source 79) 

It would be naive to believe Canada's defense budget will increase above planned levels in the near future. The Canadian Air Force will have to make due with the funds allocated to it inspite of the Government's failure to meet the 2% GDP target. Canada must coordinate its procurement of equipment with other allies to ensure the future NATO force remains balanced and critical logistical and  C4ISR criteria are fulfilled. The following proposal of equipment will allow Canada to keep planned military spending levels while greatly increasing the overall electronic warfare and C4ISR abilities among non-American NATO allies.  

The following price figures are taken from the United States Defense Department Budget Proposal YF 2013 (Source 74) and Sources (80-82). With the C$10 billion dollars allocated to the procurement of the CF-35, the author recommends the Canadian Government acquires the following.

2014 Proposal 
  1. CF-35 Lightning II; Quantity: 35  - $5.95 billion USD (Unit Cost 187.5-165 million; $170 million dollar estimate used) 
  2. MQ-9 Reaper UAV's; Quantity: 6 - $393 million USD (Contract would include 5 year support and maintenance contract in addition to ground control stations) 
  3. F/A-18E Super Hornet Block I; Quantity 30 - $2.3829 billion USD (Unit cost $79.43 million, contract should include option to upgrade fleet to Block II status) 
  4. EA-18G Growler; Quantity: 12 - $1.02732 billion USD (Unit cost $85.61 million) 
  5. Spare engines, electronic components and assorted additional systems ~$120 million USD

Projected Total Cost: $9,873,220,000 USD ($9.873 billion); $126.78 million remaining  
NOTE: Purchase is subject to USD - Canadian Dollar exchange rate; cost may comparatively be less to Canada if the appreciation of the Canadian dollar continues. 

The Super Hornet was selected to bolster the CF-35 force out of necessity.  Under ideal budgetary circumstances, Canada should be able to purchase all 65 CF-35 aircraft. Because of the EA-18G and MQ-9 Reaper purchases, the remaining funds would have yielded an insufficient number of CF-35 aircraft to protect Canadian airspace. The F-15SE was a very attractive option but the lower cost of the Super Hornet was the deciding factor. Although the CF-35 is more capable than the F/A-18E in many aspects, the Super Hornet still provides a robust performance against potential adversaries (especially if Block II upgrade is purchased). The author recommends that the Super Hornet should be ordered as an interim gap-filler to hedge against JSF program delays.

There are very real and ongoing development issues for the F-35 Program. However, the author is confident the vast majority of concerns will be fixed or mitigated given time. The author recommends the Canadian government delays its procurement of the CF-35 by a year to two years (authorize purchase in 2015-2016 vs. planned 2014). This would reduce both the cost and number of  in service design modifications the CF-35 fleet would have to undergo. This would be accomplished by the interim purchase of 30 F/A-18E Super Hornets. Modifications to extend the service life of a few dozen the current CF-18 should be considered. Another possible option is to lease a few F-16's from the U.S Government while the transition to the CF-35 is completed.


The CF-35 offers the greatest degree of survivability  most capable avionics, and highest lethality of any export aircraft available to Canada. With the addition of CUDA, Block 4, improved transonic drag performance  and emergency shut off valves, the CF-35 is more than qualified to meet Canada's overall defense needs. This proposals offers a balanced approach to meeting Canada's defense needs. The combination of abilities gained from the inclusion of the JSF, Super Hornet, Reaper, and Growler gives the CAF more strength than the mass purchase of any single aircraft.


Should the funds be available after the initial purchase (can also be included in original package), the author recommends the procurement of the following weapon systems to increase the effectiveness of the purchased aircraft. 

Proposal II: Total Cost $750 million USD 

- 600 SDB: $17.5 million - $24 million
- 100 AGM-88E AARGM – 101.94 million
- 300 AIM-120D – $459 million
- 126 AIM-9X – $67.5 million
- CUDA (?) $97.96 million


These purchases will not address every need of the Canadian Air Force. However, this proposed package will greatly increase the electronic warfare, air supremacy, and ISR capabilities of the Canadian Air Force. With this combination of aircraft, the CAF will be able to enter an enemy's IADS and neutralize key SAM sites and radar arrays. This capability is paramount to securing NATO's ability to defeat IADS systems. Groups of CF-35's working in tandem with missile laden F/A-18E's is a force to be reckoned with. These assets will also provide an excellent defense of Canada's airspace.



Image 2: The small diameter bomb (SDB) is an affordable 250 lb (113.6 kg) precision guided munition. The SDB is a general purpose weapon that can be utilized in a variety of situations. The SDB features a small explosive payload and a high degree of accuracy to reduce collateral damage.  (Image Credit: USAF)


Image 3: The EA-18G Growler is a modified version of the Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet. The two aircraft share 90% of their components. Australia recently chose to convert half of its Super Hornet fleet into EA-18G's. The Growler will grant the CAF electronic warfare and enhanced SEAD capabilities. The Growler will also increase the survivability of deployed 4.5 generation assets against SAM systems. (Image from Defense Industry Daily, 2013)

Source Material 

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NOTES


-high wing loading (87.71 lb/ft^2 with 50% fuel) = generally indicates low sustained turn abilities; expect less than legacy F-15C which has a sustained turn ability of 15-16 degrees; Su-30MIK 22-23 degrees, F-22A 28 degrees sustained turn (SOURCE 19)
-F-35A has an average thrust to weight ratio, not exceptional. T/W 1.00 depending on internal fuel levels (50% are more accurate estimations as unless aircraft is dogfighting above its own airbase, fuel levels will be closer to 50%)
-AOA (angle of attack) performance is within expected parameters (Lockheed Martin, 2012); Both 20 degree and 50 degree AOA tests were completed successfully
-Top speed of Mach 1.8 (noted as mach 1.6+ by some sources) is not impressive. Raptor can achieve mach 1.8 without engaging afterburner. Mach 2 is normal for most high performance fighter aircraft. 


   Given the IR reduction methods employed on the CF-35's airframe, the OLS-35 will not detect the F-35 until it is considerably closer e.g. 19 nautical miles or 35 km. The Su-35 will have to resort to using its OLRS-35 IRST system to find the F-35.

"     The existing OLS-35, developed for the Su-35BM, is credited with the ability to detect a ‘fighter type’ target head on from 27 nautical miles, and from behind at around 50 nautical miles, through a 90° sector." - Air Power Australia, 2010

      Su-30MK 667: 39,021, 10692, 460, 3977.6 (10), 101.2, 133.26945 = 54385.06/667 = 81.5 
      Su-35BM 667 ft² (40,570 lb, 11.500 (5750), 460(2), 3977.6 (10), 101.2, 133.26945, = 50992.06/667 = Rafale M: 22,480 , 4070 (8), 260, 130, 391.6 (2)= 32331.6/492 ft² = 65.71463414634146 
      Eurofighter: 24,600, 384.56, 4070 (8), 220, 100, 4950 = 34324.56/551 = 62.29502722323049
      JAS 39 NG: 12600, 3052.5 (6), 384.56, 220, 100, 2494.8 = 18851.86/323 =58.36489164086687 
      F-15E: 31,700, 6561.5, 248 gun, 105.21lb ammo, 752 AIM-9, 2010 = 41376.71/608 ft² = 68.05379934210526 
      RAPTOR 840 sq ft / 43,340, 18,000 lb (9,000), 248 gun, 105.21lb ammo, 752 AIM-9, 2010 = 55455.21/840 sq ft = 66.01810714285714

2 comments:

  1. I'm not an expert butI believe you have presented a sensible proposal. I venture to make one change which I suspect would make the F35 an even better fit for Canada. That change is for Canada to go with the "C" or "carrier" version instead of the "A" or "Airforce" version. Yes, it is proposed at this time that the C version would cost about 10-15 Mil more per aircraft than the A version but for that extra money we would get some pluses. Those pluses being that we would have an aircraft which could air to air refuel using the tanker equipment we currently have. This makes the most sense to me since the same tanker could refuel both the F35 as well as the F18. If we get the A version, it of course would not be compatible. Also, the C version would give us slightly more range which could certainly come in handy over our vast north. Along with the C version we would get a much more rugged landing gear designed for the extremes of carrier deployment. This should translate into a much lower maintenance cost of the landing gear provided maintenance schedules are adjusted to reflect land use only. With the bigger wing of the C version also comes the ability to takeoff and land at slower speeds which again translate into slightly less wear and tear but also increased safety margin due to less runway length required. This being an important factor when operating from bases in the Canadian north in winter. Yes, acceleration is slightly less and although not a direct compensation, it should be noted that due to wing design, manueverabilty is noticeably increased.

    These points I firmly believe should be discussed then considered and further explored.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The CF-35 has a number of differences from the F-35A modified to Canada's unique needs e.g. aerial refueling probe and a dragshute. The cost of these modifications should be below the price differential between the F-35A and F-35C. The C variant has a longer range maximum range but due to the increased weight some performance criteria are not quite as high as the A variant(transonic acceleration and lower g tolerance).

      Delete