American Innovation: October 2013

Monday, October 28, 2013

Interesting Articles of the Week

Author's Note: I aught to have more time to work on the blog since my midterms are almost over. In the meantime, I recommend you take a look at one or two of these if you have the time.

India Concerned About Fifth-Gen Fighter Work Share With Russia - By Jay Menon

"Indian government officials are expressing concern over the country’s work share in its Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) collaboration with Russia...India’s work share in FGFA research and development and other aspects of the multi-billion dollar project at the moment is only around 15%, even though New Delhi is bearing 50% of the cost. The total program is expected to cost India about 1.5 trillion rupees ($25 billion)."

Special Ops Uniform Will Transform Commandos Into an Iron Man Army - By Allen McDuffee

"The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit, or TALOS, will deliver 'superhuman strength with greater ballistic protection' by providing a powered exoskeleton to haul heavier equipment, liquid armor capable of stopping bullets, built-in computers and night vision, as well as the ability to monitor vital signs and apply wound-sealing foam. Put together, the capabilities would make the already elite Special Operation Forces nearly invincible in the field, says the Army."

China’s Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads - Edward Wong and Nicola Clark

"In the past, Chinese companies have been known mainly as suppliers of small arms, but that is changing quickly. From drones to frigates to fighter jets, the companies are aggressively pushing foreign sales of high-tech hardware, mostly in the developing world. Russian companies are feeling the greatest pressure, but American and other Western companies are also increasingly running into the Chinese."

The Navy’s newest warship is powered by Linux - Sean Gallagher

"When the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) puts to sea later this year, it will be different from any other ship in the Navy's fleet in many ways. The $3.5 billon ship is designed for stealth, survivability, and firepower, and it's packed with advanced technology. And at the heart of its operations is a virtual data center powered by off-the-shelf server hardware, various flavors of Linux, and over 6 million lines of software code."

Boeing and Raytheon Score $10.8B Weapons Sales to Saudis, UAE - By Chris Pocock

"The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) last week notified Congress of another massive sale to Gulf countries by American companies. Saudi Arabia is buying air-launched weapons worth $6.8 billion for its new F-15SA Strike Eagles; the UAE is buying air-launched weapons worth $4 billion for its F-16s."

Boeing, Lockheed Team on Long Range Strike Bomber - By Aaron Mehta

"Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the two largest defense companies in the world, are teaming up on the next-generation bomber...The team would combine Boeing’s bomber experience, including maintenance and upkeep, with Lockheed’s stealth experience. Even so, Northrop may still be in the lead position, given its experience with the stealthy B-2 Spirit and an early, aggressive campaign that included a three-story tall poster at this year’s Air Force Association conference in National Harbor, Md."

Can You See Me Now? - Code One, photo by Paul Kelly

"A US Air Force F-22 Raptor serves as a Red Force aircraft during a detect-to-engage training exercise over the guided-missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG-88) on 24 September 2013. Preble is on patrol with the USS George Washington (CVN-73) Carrier Strike Group in the US 7th Fleet area of responsibility supporting security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The Raptor pilot is assigned to the 27th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron and is currently deployed from Langley AFB, Virginia."

Unfortunately, Code One does not elaborate on any more details and I was unable to find much else on the training exercise in terms of specifics.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76788

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft - The American Approach Part I

Image 1: F-35 with F-22

Author's note: Because viewers have expressed a desire not to be overwhelming with content all at once, this article will be broken into two parts.

Introduction

Part II of the Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft series will examine the American model of fighter employment. As explained in part I, the fighter employment doctrine of any country is typically dictated by the following factors:

National security objectives: regional vs. global power projection, countering anti-access (A2) threats, etc.
Strengths and weakness of its defense industry - specialization, experience of aerospace firms, access to intellectual capital, etc.
Constraints to military budget and existing support infrastructure for assets and personnel

The purpose of this series of articles is to account for the divergent reasoning behind the employment of aircraft within different countries, specifically the United States and Russia. In particular, this article's goal is to explain why the United States opted for the mass deployment of the fifth generation F-35 over 4th generation alternatives. As established in part one, any comparison between the F-35 and its probable competitors must account for other factors aside from performance based specifications. While performance based specification have a critical role in any evaluation, without understanding how the aircraft was intended to be used in conjunction with understanding the training of American pilots receive, one cannot draw meaningful conclusions regarding the potential combat effectiveness of the F-35. The mass deployment of the F-35 is a procurement strategy that is best tailored to the specific the national security objectives of the United States given the constraints of its defense industry, and budget. As with the Russian model, It is difficult to understand the American method of fighter procurement and employment without first understanding the broader strategic challenges the United States will face over the next two to three decades.

National Security Objectives

The threats posed by rogue nation states and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, will likely persist over the next two three decades (Clapper, 2013). However, the growing economic and military development within the People's Republic of China is beginning to take priority over the aforementioned threats in terms of dictating the overarching national security strategy for the United States. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, China's military has sought to acquire a range of anti-access of capabilities to deny a foreign power, namely the United States, from intervening in a regional conflict. The following are all examples of anti-access weapons: short range ballistic missiles, long range cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, sea mines, diesel electric attack submarines, GPS jamming systems, and surface to air missile systems.

China's efforts to develop anti-access capabilities gained momentum after the third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996) and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999). During the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States sent two carrier strike groups into the Taiwanese strait in support of Taiwan. In Kosovo, the Chinese embassy was an unintended target of the US bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. In both of these events, the Chinese military concluded it lacked any viable options to respond to US military actions (Erickson, 2013). The current Chinese strategy of employing anti-access weaponry is largely the result of the Chinese military establishment's aim to produce a set of viable military options to the PRC leadership in the event of hostilities with the United States.

Image 2: The three main components of ASB's design. (Image Credit: Department of Defense, 2013)

As a result of China's growing anti-access capabilities, power projection into the Western Pacific is much more difficult for the US and its allies. In response to China's growing anti-access capabilities, the United States formed the Air-Sea Battle(ASB) operational concept. ASB is not a "war plan" in the event of hostilities with china, rather the ASB concept provides a framework that enables US forces to effectively operate even in highly contested anti-access environments, such as the Western Pacific. In effect, this enables the United States to maintain a credible military deterrent against nations employing extensive anti-access strategies and equipment. Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments provide a good summary of the US Air-Sea Battle concept:

"Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed an unprecedented ability to project military power with few constraints to its freedom of action in all domains—air, sea, undersea, land, space, and cyberspace. Today, the diffusion of advanced military technologies to potential adversaries, particularly the proliferation of precision-guided munitions and nuclear weapons, combined with the adoption of novel concepts of operation, has enormous implications for America’s future ability to project power abroad.

Air-Sea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, a report released by CSBA in 2010, offered a diagnosis of the problem specific to the Western Pacific and proposed a candidate operational concept for projecting military forces to the region despite China’s possession of a robust A2/AD battle network. AirSea Battle recommended that a U.S. military operational concept designed to 'set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a stable, favorable conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific' should account for the region’s specific geographic and geostrategic features, including the strengths and weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the capabilities of America’s allies and partners." - Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, 2011

Image 3: US air bases in the Pacific (Image Credit: Washington Post)

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010 report, an authoritative DOD review of US strategy, recommended the deployment of 10-11 theatre strike wings to the pacific (720-792 aircraft) alongside 6 dedicated air superiority wings (432 aircraft). The F-35 will comprise a substantial portion of these deployed aircraft over the next decade. Both the USAF and USMC will give the Pacific stationed units priority in the deployment of the F-35. Gen. Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), announced the F-35 will be stationed from four of the most important Pacific air bases: Misawa (J), Kadena (J), Kunsan (SK), and Osan (SK). Carlisle also indicated that the USAF sought to increase its presence in Australia with the addition of a rotational force of bombers, tankers, and fighter aircraft (Defense News, 2013). The presence of F-35 aircraft at these bases would significantly increase the US military's deterrent in the region. Numerous high value PLA military facilities are within the unrefuled combat radius of the F-35 from both Osan and Kunsan including targets within the Beijing and Shenyang military regions.

Unrefueled combat radius of F-35A = 593 nautical miles (nm) or 1,093 km
Kunsan to Beijing = 527.5 nm (976 km)
Osan to Beijing = 537 nm (994 km)

Budget & Strength's of Defense Industry

The national security concerns of the United States and the framework in which it employs its military, Air-Sea Battle, dictates how its financial resources and defense industry are best utilized to fulfill its needs. Despite the doom and gloom discussions regarding sequestration, American military spending currently accounts for nearly 40% of the global total at $682 billion dollars (Time, 2013). The entirety of funding provided to the USAF alone, $140 billion dollars in 2013, is larger than the official PLA budget for its entire military or more than twice as large as the current budget of Russia's military. As far as the constraints of military funding are concerned, the United States military is afforded an unparalleled level of flexibility in terms of procurement options. This level of procurement flexibility has tangibly altered how the US aerospace industry designs military aircraft.

Rather than opting for a specialization in low-cost fighter aircraft with high production figures, the US defense industry has been able to invest more money into the individual aircraft while also producing the aircraft in large numbers as a consequence of the US military's considerable budget. While the current $103-$98 million dollar price for the F-35 is likely to significantly decrease as production rises, even the most optimistic projections do not indicate the unit production cost of the F-35 will be as inexpensive as current Russian 4.5 generation aircraft (Defense News, 2013). However, the large military budget of the United States enables it to procure the more expensive F-35 on a large scale despite the higher unit cost. As a consequence of this fact, the USAF plans to field a largely 5th generation fighter force over the next two decades unlike the Russian air force. The financial resources and intellectual capital required to design and produce stealth aircraft in significant quantities is a trait that is largely unique to the United States. In total, the US Military plans to procure 2,243 F-35 aircraft by 2037 for a cost $396 billion dollars (Selected Acquisition Report, 2012).

Image 4: F-35 production line

In many methods of evaluation, the US defense industry maintains a significant advantage over its Russian, Chinese, and European counterparts in the areas of stealth technology, avionics, sensors, and software. While this statement is likely to be initially perceived as a thoughtless expression of American nationalism, this assertion is both empirical and objective in nature. The current technological edge attributable to the higher level of funding available to research and development within the United States. Defense Department research in development (R&D) composes more than half of all publicly funded R&D spending in the United States or $70 billion dollars in 2013 (Sargent, 2013). Several historical examples exist that corroborate the impact of American R&D spending in regards to its technological advantage. The development of Actively Scanned Electronic Array (AESA) radars by the United States is a relevant case study:

"The US DoD recognized the need for a better antenna technology more than two decades ago. A new technology, using the phased array concept but with a miniature transmitter and receiver in each antenna element, was seen to be the answer to the limitations of existing technologies. Known as active phased arrays or AESAs, these antennas became the holy grail in the radar community...The enabling technology for AESAs is the Gallium Arsenide Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuit (GaAs MMIC) or microwave circuit on a single chip. GaAs MMICs would permit the low cost mass production of AESAs, with high reliability and repeatability. Gallium Arsenide is however a finicky material to make chips from and it took almost two decades for the fabrication technology to move from expensive botique manufacture to industrial strength mass production...At this time the US are leading the pack by a large margin in AESA technology, with the EU and Israelis trailing." - Kopp, 2012

Comparison of Russian Zhuk ME to US AESAs:

"The first observation any Western radar engineer will make is that the Zhuk ME with 652 TR channels has between 50% and 70% of the TR channels of a comparably sized US radar, which is typically in the 900 to 1200 single TR channel module count class. This is a byproduct of the packaging technology available to Russian industry, which is a generation behind the US and EU in this area. That is no accident insofar as the US invested vast sums into the development of high density packaging techniques suitable for the thermally challenging environment of the AESA antenna." - Kopp, 2012

Image 5: Advances made in US transmit receiver module designs in the late 1980s

As a result of substantial early R&D investment into AESA radars, the United States currently maintains a significant lead over its major competitors. The first mass produced fighter deployed AESA radar by the United States, the Northrup Grumman AN/APG-77, entered service in 2003. In comparison, the first European mounted AESA, the Thales RBE2, entered service with French Rafales in 2013. The Russian Zhuk-AE will be the first operational Russian AESA with the deployment of the Mig-35 in 2016 ¹ No reputable source has confirmed the deployment of a Chinese fighter mounted AESA radar as of October 2013.

Despite the recent Russian, European, Chinese, and Israeli advances in AESA technology, the United States will likely continue its advantage in radar technology as a result of its substantial advantage in R&D. The United States is already years ahead of its competitors in the next significant development in radar technology, Gallium nitride Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuits (Defense News, 2013).

"GaN-based MMICs is unsurpassed — revolutionizing the design of radars by creating not only higher performance but also lower system cost. With over 5 W/mm of power density, GaN RF amplifiers can provide more than 5X the power per element of GaAs in the same footprint." - Raytheon, 2010

In summary, the resources allocated to US Defense R&D over time exceeds that of most nation's military spending in their entirety let alone foreign military R&D, it would be an unexpected result if the United States was not technologically ahead in these aforementioned technology areas. As part II will examine, The modern American fighter employment model favors low observability and heightened situational awareness over supermaneuverability. This philosophy is not only evident within the F-35 design but also within the F-15 silent eagle and Super Hornet Block III. These 4.5 generation designs feature improved avionics and a heavily reduced radar cross section but neither has been upgraded with supermaneuverability traits such as thrust vectoring engines in contrast with Russian 4.5 generation designs. As a result of the proficiency of US firms in the aforementioned technological areas, it is natural that the US military's current method of fighter employment attempts to capitalize on its technological advantage in the areas of stealth, avionics, sensors, and software through low observability and heightened situational awareness.

Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft - The American Approach Part II

Sources

1 Despite the fact that the first Russian AESA was unveiled in 2008, Russia has yet to be physically install an AESA into operational Russian fighter squadrons as of 2013. Russia plans to deploy the 5th generation PAK FA in 2016 as well, although this estimate was judged by the author to be overly optimistic^↩

Saturday, October 12, 2013

So Blogger Just Deleted 1/3 of The American Fighter Doctrine Article...

I was going to publish, "Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft - The American Approach" on Sunday but Blogger decided to not save my most recent edits which constituted about a third of the article. It will take me a much shorter period of time to reconstruct that content than it initially took to write it but I likely won't be able to publish anything until Monday as a result. This is probably going to accelerate my efforts to build my own website, blogger can be a real pain at times. Thank you for your continued patience.

Sunday, October 6, 2013

Japan's New Flat Top

Author's Note: The How Best to Employ Fighter aircraft Part II - the American Perspective, is 90% completed and will likely be published sometime after Wednesday. In the meantime, here are some of my quick thoughts on Japan's New Flat Top.

As China continues to assert itself territoriality and expand its military, other regional powers will come together to curb the expansion of China's influence. While US and European defense budgets decline, non-China Asian defense budgets have risen at consistent rates in response to China; India and Japan's renewed effort to expand their naval capabilities should come as no surprise to Chinese observers.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) recently launched the largest Japanese warship since World War II, the 820 foot long 24,000 ton Izumo "helicopter destroyer". The response from China's collective media outlets was to characterize the deployment of the Izumo as evidence of Japan's "aggressively militaristic foreign policy".

(1) Helicopter Destroyer?

The Izumo is clearly distinct in to both appearance and functionality to what is widely accepted as a conventional destroyer design. Some observers assert the Izumo is a carrier rather than a destroyer but this assertion is also incorrect. By US Navy hull qualifications, the Izumo is actually a landing helicopter assault (LHA)/landing helicopter dock (LHD) class ship which is colloquially referred to an amphibious assault ship. Amphibious assault ships are typically much smaller than an aircraft carrier and serve a distinctly different role in the fleet. LHA/LHD ships are typically in the 20,000 ton range and accommodate helicopters, hundreds marines, a dozen or more amphibious landing vehicles (e.g. landing craft air cushion) and sometimes a few fixed winged aircraft while aircraft carriers often weigh in upwards of 40,000 tons and can host an entire carrier air wing. The primary mission of LHA/LHD vessel is amphibious warfare and anti-submarine warfare operations not the projection of extensive air power over vast distances.

“Chinese A2/AD abilities that have attracted attention are China’s increasing submarine fleet, the DF-21D [anti-ship ballistic missile], anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as China’s new Type 052D destroyers with enhanced air defense capabilities...To deal with the subs, Japan already has a lot of what it needs in place. Japan’s past emphasis on ASW and other capabilities for assuring the integrity of its maritime perimeter gives it a base from which it could easily recalibrate its [Navy] to help clear the way for the [US Navy] to insert itself into any conflict relating to Taiwan or Okinawa" - Corey Wallace, 2013

If I had to guess the reasoning for the term "helicopter destroyer", I'd say it has something to do with the fact that the Japanese military is constitutionally mandated to serve only in a self defense capacity with almost no offensive abilities. Under the direction of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the JMSDF has expanded its roles to include amphibious assault as the defense of disputed islands becomes a higher national priority. The justification for new amphibious assault ships is Japan needs to be able to retake or rapidly reinforce disputed Japanese territories. Even with the aforementioned justification, assault ships have historically served as offensive platforms so the name "helicopter destroyer" might be a way to dodge the offensive capabilities issue as conventional destroyers have already served in a defensive capacity in the JMSDF for decades.

(2) F-35B?

Some media outlets have stated the Izumo is a carrier and could someday host F-35B aircraft. At the moment, Japan has only ordered 42 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) F-35A aircraft to replace its F-4 Phantom fleet. It is likely Japan will order more F-35A's in the near future for the F-XX program (~100 aircraft) but F-35B purchases are not as likely. Corey Wallace from the New Pacific Institute thoroughly examines why the Izumo design is poorly suited to accommodate the F-35B among other practical limitations that make the acquisition of the F-35B unlikely for Japan.

"Japan has not yet purchased the F-35B, committed to a purchase, [2] and may not be able to afford to.[3] Anyone who proposed as a policy option, and/or signed off on purchasing an 'aircraft carrier' (for $1.2 billion) like the Izumo for the specific purpose of it launching jump jets that may not materialize, would deserve some kind of award for idiocy given the uncertainty about whether Japan will in the next decade even have planes it could use on such a vessel...So, the Izumo has no ski-jump, no specialized landing pads, no angled flight-deck allowing for simultaneous launch and recovery missions, the SDF has no F-35Bs, and the Izumo is too small to accommodate more than a handful of F-35Bs anyway. As an 'offensive' aircraft carrier, it is a little weak."

The V-22 Osprey is more likely to serve on board the Izumo in the immediate future. Japan has already expressed interest in acquiring the V-22 Osprey and has practiced operating the V-22 from smaller Hyuga class helicopter destroyers with the USMC in operation Dawn Blitz of the coast of California earlier this year.