The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part I Introduction

Image 1: Pair of F-22As

The Advanced Tactical Fighter program (ATF), which resulted in the creation of the F-22A Raptor, was originally concerned with designing a new fighter aircraft capable of establishing air-superiority over Europe in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union. In the subsequent two decades since the conclusion of the ATF program, the United States' national security challenges have radically changed. The US has moved from a European centric defense posture to a Asia-Pacific oriented defense posture, globalization has greatly eroded the technological superiority of US forces relative to potential adversaries in a variety of defense related sectors, and the combination of the Great Recession coupled with spending trillions of dollars on two major counter insurgency campaigns has hindered the Military's ability to prepare for a high intensity conventional conflict against a near-peer adversary. In total, only 195 F-22's were produced out of the USAF's original request for 750 aircraft. Of these 195 aircraft, eight are reserved for test and evaluation purposes leaving 185 in the USAF inventory due to crashes. Of these 185 aircraft, only 143 are combat coded at any one time while the remaining 42 aircraft rotate between attrition reserve, deep maintenance, and training roles (Schanz, 2011). Part one of this article will examine the problems facing America's Raptor force in the coming decades as a result of these three factors. Part two will examine how the US military is adapting to these changing circumstances while part three will examine an number of potential proposals to further increase the relevance of the Raptor in future decades.      

New US Mission Objectives

Image 2: 94th Fighter Squadron F-22 with external fuel tanks

As the War on Terror and the threat posed by rouge nation states continues to evolve but generally subside relative to the intimidate post 9/11 period, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is dictating a larger portion of the US' global defense posture. However, it is important to note the PRC is not analogous to the Soviet Union on its impact for being the single defining issue for US defense policy. Despite these reservations, the Pivot strategy and the creation of Air-Sea Battle do represent significant measures to address the national security challenges posed by a strong China. The exact objectives of the Pivot, and its overall importance within the context of US global aspirations, are frequently debated in Government but Ronald O'Rourke from the Congressional Research Service provided a coherent list of ideal or existing US objectives before the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. While these objectives are specifically related to China's naval modernization, they have broader implications for the Pivot and the Western-Pacific.     

• preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another;   
• preserving the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II;   
• fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations;   
• shaping the Asia-Pacific region; and   
• having a military strategy for China.

The Raptor provides a unique set of capabilities to the United States in meeting these objectives from both a passive influence perspective to providing critical air-superiority capabilities in wartime conditions. Taiwan still factors into the US' Western-Pacific strategic considerations but a potential conflict between the PRC and Taiwan is no longer the single dominant concern for both US and PRC strategic planners. Conversely, disputed territories between the PRC and US allies like the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea have become more relevant to the US Western Pacific posture. A limited conflict or skirmish over a territorial dispute, such as the Senkaku Islands, has significantly different strategic considerations than a protracted conflict between the PRC and Taiwan for the survival of the Taiwanese state.

Geographical Issues

Image 3: Central battle space vs. Pacific theater. Image Credit: RAND, 2008

The original ATF program requirements specifically tailored the to the unique circumstances of engaging the Soviet Air Force over Europe under the Air-Land Battle concept. Throughout the Cold War, the United States established a network of hardened airbases throughout Western Europe which were typically within 400-500 nautical miles of potential Warsaw Pact and Soviet targets. The proximity between the US-European airbases and potential targets would have allowed for efficient sortie generation rates while keeping the airbase out of imitate danger from the ground (RAND, 2008). The Pacific theater is between three to four times the size of the central European battle space for which the F-22 was designed to operate and the US Military's basing options are heavily constrained by the geography of the Western Pacific. Given the large distances between friendly airbases and potential targets, US tanker aircraft would be indispensable for sustaining US combat operations. RAND analyzed the prospect of deploying the entirety of the USAF's F-22A Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI) to Andersen air force base (AFB) Guam in support of Taiwan during a large scale conflict with the PRC on the graph below.    

Image 4: Raptor sortie generation rates from Andersen. Image Credit: RAND, 2008.

With a combat radius of only 410-470 nautical miles and maximum range of 800 miles (depending upon use of supercruise and relying upon internal fuel stores only), the F-22's would require several refueling stops before reaching the target area roughly 1,500 nautical miles from Andersen at Guam (Lockheed Martin, 2012). Under RAND's projections, given the extended distance resulting in extended time devoted to reaching the desired location for a combat air patrol near Taiwan, only six F-22's could continuously operate over Taiwan at any given time for a total of 138 Raptor sorties per day. In contrast, PLAF forces would be able to mount 1,300 sorties within the vicinity of Taiwan. If the United States were to operate closer to the Taiwanese strait, such as Kadena 486 nautical miles from Taiwan, F-22's stored or being refueled on the ground would be at significant risk from PRC conventional ballistic missiles such as the DF-11 and DF-21. Because the US prioritized the European theater for decades during the Cold War, US airbases in the Western-Pacific region remain relatively unhardened against cluster munition warheads (RAND, 2010). Andersen AFB is currently the only US airbase outside of Chinese conventional ballistic missile range. 

Limited Fleet Numbers & Budgetary Austerity 

Image 5: F-22 production line. Image Credit: Lockheed Martin

Despite the recent passage of the bipartisan $1.1 trillion dollar Omnibus spending bill, defense funding over the past few years has been largely marked by mandated arbitrary budget cuts and continuing resolutions instead of actual budgets resulting in fiscal uncertainty. Furthermore, the trillions of dollars spent fighting two major counter insurgency campaigns has diverted resources from optimizing the military to fight within heavily contested anti-access environments. The request for 750 aircraft prior to 1991 was steadily reduced over the next decade to just 275 aircraft in 2003 before Raptor production was finally terminated by Congress in 2009. The decision to end F-22 production was lead by the venerable then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who described the F-22 as a "niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios – specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet.” In the estimation of Gates, by 2020 Washington would have over 1,100 stealth aircraft compared to Beijing's 100. While the F-35 program has made steady progress inspite of unwavering criticism from its detractors, the estimation that the United States would have 800 F-35's in operational service by 2020 remains undeniably optimistic at best. While the F-35 will fill a crucial role in the USAF, USN, and USMC inventories, it is not a dedicated air superiority platform like the Raptor.

The F-35 was designed as a multipurpose fifth generation strike fighter capable of air-to-ground and air-to-air roles. While the F-35 is clearly superior in the air-to-air role relative to any existing fourth generation plus aircraft, by Lockheed Martin's own admission the F-22 is considerably more capable in the air-to-air role. The F-35's reduced emphasis on air-to-air missions is a result of its design requirements not engineering incompetence as many have argued. The F-22 and F-35 aircraft are intended to serve inherently different roles. However, when the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was being conceptualized in the 1990s, it was assumed that hundreds of dedicated air-superiority F-22's would support the JSF in a continuation of the USAF's traditional high-low mix procurement strategy exemplified by the current fourth generation F-15 and F-16. In all or nothing terms, devoting the appropriate resources to support the F-35 program was the correct decision. However, if Congress was able to grant the USAF's request for 275 F-22's without detracting resources from F-35 production, it would certainly have been preferable to capping production at 195 units. While the basic infrastructure to restart F-22 production remains intact, it is nearly inconceivable for Raptor production to restart. Instead, the USAF will have to upgrade its legacy F-15C fleet to meet the requirements of the Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR), which calls for the USAF to maintain a minimum of 6 dedicated air-superiority wings of 72 aircraft each (432 aircraft total).     

Globalization & Coping Increased Technological Parity 

Image 6: Chengdu J-20

While the United States is widely recognized as maintaining a considerable technological advantage over its potential adversaries in several defense related technologies (robotics, aerospace, avionics, C4ISR, etc.), the existing US technological advantage encompassing nearly all Millitary systems is likely to be diminished significantly over the next 20 to 30 years. The loss of the current US technological advantage has been attributed to a variety of causes from globalization to reduced emphasis on publicly funded research and development by many authors but there is broad agreement that a state of technological parity between the major world powers will occur over the next few decades (Defense Science Board, 2013). A state of technological parity will have a major impact on US military operations:

"The U.S. has long relied on technically superior equipment and systems to counter adversaries who, in many cases, had greater numbers of people in their military, or at least in the engagement, because recent combat experience has been in forward-developed situations. Key capabilities characterized by speed, stealth, and precision have allowed largely unfettered access to the adversary's homeland where the U.S. has rapidly established air superiority. The resulting freedom of access coupled with ubiquitous observation, communications-enabled networked coordination of forces, and precision weapons, has provided the ability to conduct operations that range from massive fire power to surgical strike unprecedented in the history of warfare. 

In the future, increasingly technically capable and economically strong adversaries are likely to develop counters to some or all of the foundation technologies on which the U.S. has come to rely. The advantages provided by capabilities such as GPS, internet-based network communications, satellite reconnaissance, and stealth aircraft will be diminished, and in many cases, eliminated...In an environment where the Department of Defense no longer has assured technical leadership in all relevant defense technologies, there may be niche areas where adversaries will achieve superior capability to that of the U.S. military. This situation, should it occur, is most likely in areas such as cyber, where the barriers to entry are low and the capability development may not take massive financial resources."  - Defense Science Board, 2013

In summary, the US is likely to retain a technological advantage in a few areas over its adversaries and competitors vs. the current state of technological dominance across an entire spectrum of technical fields. Part II will outline the response of the USAF to adapt its fleet of F-22s to meet new US national security needs in a rapidly developing world.

PART II 

Sources 

1. Final Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor delivered to the USAF today, Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/05/final-lockheed-martin-f-22-rap/
2. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 2012.  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf
3. Obama Praises Senate Vote on F-22 Funding, Fred W. Baker III, 2009.  http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55210
4. IN FOCUS: USAF receives last F-22 Raptor,  Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-usaf-receives-last-f-22-raptor-371401/
5. Lockheed Martin / Boeing F-22 Raptor Air Dominance Fighter, Dan Alex, 2013.  http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=20
6. F-22 Raptor, United States Air Force, 2005.  http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104506/f-22-raptor.aspx
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8. F-22 Raptor Specifications, Global Security, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-specs.htm
9. Statement of Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs, Ronald O'Rourke, 2013.  http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-ORourkeR-20131211.pdf
10. Air Force F-22 Fighter Program, Jeremiah Gertler, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf
11. Moving Time, Marc V. Schanz, 2011. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/September%202011/0911moving.aspx
12. Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030, Defense Science Board, 2013. http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/DSB2030-TechnologyInnovationEnablers2030.pdf  
13. Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion & Scott Perdue (RAND), 2008. 
14. Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific(RAND), Eric Stephen Gons, 2010.