Image 1: F-22s from the 27th FS transit from Wake Island to Anderson AFB, Guam. Image Credit: USAF, Captain Gary Wallace.
Author's Note: This article series will discuss the anti-access threat environment the U.S. is likely to encounter post-2025 and advocates for both a near-term systems of systems (SoS) solution to bridge the gap between current 5th generation and future 6th generation fighters.
Air Superiority – A Foundational Element of American Security
Author's Note: This article series will discuss the anti-access threat environment the U.S. is likely to encounter post-2025 and advocates for both a near-term systems of systems (SoS) solution to bridge the gap between current 5th generation and future 6th generation fighters.
Air Superiority – A Foundational Element of American Security
Air superiority is
a foundational objective to not only all other United States Air Force (USAF)
core missions such as space control, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), rapid mobility, global strike, and command and control,
but also air superiority is critical to the success of the joint force and a
core tenant of the American way of war.[1][2] In the post-Cold War era,
the USAF and U.S. policymakers have become accustomed to uncontested freedom of
action across multiple domains in permissive environments such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. The lopsided success of coalition forces against the integrated
air defense systems (IADS) of Iraq in 1991 and Libya in 2011 are attributable
to both technological and training advantages of coalition forces. The
overwhelming capabilities of American airpower have become associated as a
uniquely American capability to destroy an adversary’s means to wage war at
minimal cost. The formidable reputation of American air power thereby serves as
a powerful deterrent.[3] However, the technologies
which form the basis for the U.S.’ current qualitative military edge provided
by the second offset strategy have proliferated to U.S. strategic competitors
such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats severely constrain the
U.S. ability to project power, maintain freedom of action, and secure use of
the global commons which are historically integral U.S. national security
objectives.[4]
The PRC’s A2/AD
strategy in particular threatens many of the core national military and
security objectives outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as: protecting
vital economic interests, U.S. allies, and U.S. overseas territories.[5] The
combination of the evolving threat environment and the 15 to 20 year
traditional weapons acquisition process has elevated the sense of urgency
within the USAF to rapidly field capabilities to address the threat environment
to the joint force.[6] This paper will propose (1) fielding a modular low cost
systems of systems (SoS) approach to air superiority between 2025 and 2030 and
(2) accelerating the USAF’s sixth generation F-X program to replace the fifth
generation F-22 in the dedicated high-end air dominance role with an initial
operational capability (IOC) no later than 2035. An analysis of the expected
future threat environment will be provided prior to an examination of the SoS
proposal, the F-X program, how the USAF could accelerate the program, budgetary
considerations, and relevant counter arguments.
The
A2/AD Threat Environment of 2030
Image 2: PRC A2/AD systems. Image Credit: CSBA
The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) was largely a poorly trained, Soviet equipped, and
manpower centric defense force for much of the 1970s and 1980s. The decisive
results of the Persian Gulf War surprised many PRC strategic planners and
contributed towards an internal belief within the PLA that it was
insufficiently prepared to confront the U.S. and that a conventional
force-on-force engagement with the U.S. was not a viable option.[5][6] The general deterioration
of Sino-U.S. relations following Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Third Taiwanese
Strait Crisis in 1996, and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo in
1999 all provided the impetus for China's development of its current A2/AD
strategy and transformative military modernization effort.[7] In 2015, the PRC spent
$215 billion on its military making it the second largest source of global
military expenditures after the U.S.[8]The PRC’s modernization
effort more broadly is contextualized by its national objectives set by the
Chinese Communist Party (CPP):
·
Perpetuating
CCP rule;
·
Sustaining
economic growth and development;
·
Maintaining
domestic political stability;
·
Defending
national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and
·
Securing
China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquiring regional
preeminence[9]
The PRC leadership
has clearly shown its preference for asserting regional hegemony by gradually
altering the status quo by coercing U.S. allies below the threshold of overt
military force.[10]
However, the PRC actively seeks “counter intervention” capabilities (反侵入 or 反干涉) which facilitate
PRC regional hegemony by denying the U.S. the ability to intervene on behalf of
threatened U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Japan, or Taiwan in the event
of hostilities.[11]
To constrain US power projection near its shores, the PRC has implemented a
host of A2/AD systems including: sea mines, anti-ship cruise missiles,
electronic and GPS jamming, submarines, anti-satellite weapons, conventional
land attack and anti-ship ballistic missiles, and extensive surface to air
missile systems (SAM) networked with air power.[12] These systems
collectively limit how close US forces can safely operate in proximity to the
PRC. The PRC’s acquisition of advanced SAMs such as the HQ-9 and advanced fifth
generation fighters such as the J-20 and J-31 are a particularly significant
challenge to U.S. regional air power.
While the F-22
provides unmatched air superiority capabilities, the original requirements for
the F-22 are becoming less relevant for the Asia-Pacific threat environment of
2030, particularly its limited range. The original Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF)
program requirements called for a fighter which could penetrate Soviet and
Warsaw Pact airspace from a network of nearby bases in Western Europe.[13] Any sixth generation
solution to bolster U.S. air superiority capabilities in the not too distant
future of 2030 will face the following challenges with respect to the
Asia-Pacific region in support of the Administration’s pivot:
- The PRC is expected to retain an in theater regional
numerical superiority over the U.S. in terms of deployed fighter aircraft
even with a surge force deployed from the continental U.S.[14]
- Air superiority requires secure bases close to the
desired operational area. The significant distances between U.S. and
allied facilities in the Pacific relative to key areas of interest such as
the Strait of Taiwan, East China Sea, and South China Sea will cripple
sortie generation rates and would put a tremendous strain on U.S. tanker
assets[15]
- Air bases close in proximity of China, such as Kadena,
are not only within range of China’s short to medium range conventional
ballistic missiles, but also feature few hardened aircraft shelters and
exposed above ground fuel depots[16]
- The emergence of high quality low cost digital radio
frequency memory (DRFM) jammers has significantly degraded BVR radar
guided missile probability of kill (pk) performance while U.S. fifth
generation aircraft have a reduced missile load due to their internal
carriage of weapons for the purposes of low observability
- Increasingly capable very high frequency (VHF) radars
will degrade the effectiveness of X and S-band optimized stealth aircraft,
such as the F-22 and F-35, into the late 2020s to 2030s. VHF radars do not
provide target quality track data and could at best serve as early warning
systems to cue other assets[17]
Image 3: Approximate distances of U.S. and allied air bases in the
Western Pacific relative to key areas of interest. The F-22’s unrefueled
internal stores only combat radius at is 410 nautical miles (nm) with a ferry
range of at least 820 nm: blue = locations with no inflight refueling required
per sortie, yellow = at least one per sortie, red = at least two per sortie.[18][19][i]
In response to the evolving threat environment,
the USAF continues to work with its sister services to devise means to counter
A2/AD capabilities under the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (JAM-GC) operational concept, formerly Air-Sea Battle. JAM-GC is not a war plan nor is it directed
at any one country, rather JAM-GC’s purpose is to provide an operational level
description on how the joint force will gain and maintain freedom of action
across all domains in the global commons. Attaining freedom of action is
necessary as it is the precursor to all other operations including deterrence
and power projection.[20] Under JAM-GC, the joint
force will conduct networked integrated operations capable of attacking
in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces.[21]
The USAF will comprise a core component of
the joint force’s collective capability to attack in-depth through a highly
contested A2/AD zone with a mixed force of F-35s, B-21s (LRS-B), and sixth
generation F-X fighters. Without a sixth generation F-X to provide air
superiority, the ability to attain freedom of action for the joint force is
compromised. The F-X’s extended range, deep magazine capacity, and broadband
all aspect stealth will enable the F-X to survive in the most contested A2/AD
environments and execute key air superiority and destruction of enemy air defense
(DEAD) missions. However, between late 2015 to early 2016, the USAF has grown
increasingly noncommittal towards pursuing an F-X platform given the immediate
needs of the service relative to the acquisitions process.[22] The hesitation to commit
to an F-X platform within the USAF coincides with the broader Department of
Defense’s (DoD) third offset strategy, a competitive strategy which seeks to
maintain the U.S. military’s qualitative technological superiority over
near-peer adversaries.
Author's Note: PART II: Human-Machine Combat Teaming: A SoS Solution to Air Superiority
[1] USAF, “Air Force Core Missions”,
August 15, 2013. http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/466868/air-force-core-missions.aspx
[2] Colin S. Gray, “The Air Power
Advantage in the Future”, December, 2007. http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/ap_0002_gray_airpower_advantage_future_warfare.pdf
[3] Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of
U.S. Air Power”, Foreign Affairs,
Jan. – February, 1994, pp. 109-124.
[4] William J. Perry, et al, “Ensuring
a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future – The National Defense Panel Review of the
Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2014.
[5] “Robert Farley, What Scares
China's Military: The 1991 Gulf War”, November 24, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-scares-chinas-military-the-1991-gulf-war-11724
[6] Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD
Strategies (Naval Institute Press: 2013).
[7]Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and
Strategic Implications”, May 2013.
[8] Jon Gambrell, “Global military
spending nearly $1.7T amid Mideast conflicts”, April 4, 2016. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d9a7ab6fb5f4430db369b80c696e62fb/global-military-spending-nearly-17t-amid-mideast-conflicts
[9] “Annual Report To Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2015”, Department of Defense, 2015. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[10] Truong Minh Vu and Ngo Di Lan,
“Flexible Response To Deter In The South China Sea”, April 7, 2016.
[11] Timothy Heath and Andrew S.
Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-Intervention?”, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2015. https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Heath-Erickson.pdf
[12] Matthew J. Jouppi, “America's
Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX”, February 18, 2015. http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2015/02/americas-sixth-generation-fighters-f-x_4.html
[13] Carlo Kopp, “The Advanced Tactical
Fighter [YF-22 and YF-23]”, last modified 2005. http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-ATF-91.html
[14] John Stilton and Scott Perdue,
“Air Combat Past, Present, and Future”, August 2008. https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17]
Dave Majumdar, “Chinese and Russian Radars On Track To See Through U.S.
Stealth”, July 2014. https://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chinese-russian-radars-track-see-u-s-stealth
[18] Google Maps Data, 2016.
[19] Department of Defense, “Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Mary 18, 2015. http://fas.org/man/eprint/F35-sar-2016.pdf#page=16
[20] Terry S. Morris, et al., “Securing
Operational Access: Evolving the Air-Sea Battle Concept”, February 11, 2015
[21] CDR John Callaway, “THE
OPERATIONAL ART OF AIR-SEA BATTLE”, July 18, 2014.
[22] James Drew, “USAF backs off
sixth-gen 'fighter' in quest for air supremacy”, April 2016. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-backs-off-sixth-gen-fighter-in-quest-for-air-423994/
[i] Total trip distance is twice the
distance from the area of interest relative to the base. The number of full
aerial refueling required is calculated by dividing total trip distance by
ferry range. This is an approximate figure as the aircraft will have extra fuel
upon reaching its maximum combat radius to conduct its mission i.e. patrol an
area before returning to base.
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