Author’s Note: For the purpose of this article, the majority of analysis
will concern the role of carrier based fighter aircraft. For a quick primer on
the roles of other carrier based aircraft, please refer to Sam LaGrone’s “Inside
the Carrier Air Wing”.
In
response to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise as a near-peer
competitor, bipartisan support continues to grow in support of rebuilding the
American Navy. However, the U.S. Navy (USN), Congress, and the Administration
officials continue to neglect modernizing the carrier air wing (CVW) as part of
any major naval build-up. The current CVW is smaller than any deployed since
the USN’s first super carrier in 1955 and consists of short range aircraft
ill-suited for sea control and power projection operations against high-end
adversaries. The F-35C is a critical component to the future CVW as the
Lightning II greatly extends the reach, survivability, and lethality of the
entire carrier strike group. Despite suggestions by the President that the
F-35C could be replaced by a “comparable” F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, both the
F/A-18E/F and F-35C will serve complementary roles as part of a high-low mix
force structure. In order to demonstrate the necessity of funding the full
procurement of 260 F-35Cs for the USN, an analysis of how the threat environment
in the Western-Pacific challenges the modern CVW will be provided in parts I
and II. Part III will discuss the unique capabilities of the F-35C and how its
presence on USN carriers will multiply the effectiveness of other USN assets. Lastly,
the fourth article in the series will conclude with a list of recommendations on
the future structure of the CVW such as the role and ideal requirements for the
Carrier Based Aerial Refueling System (CBARS) and the need for a carrier based
long-range anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability to replace the S-3 Viking.
Future Threat Environment & the Role of Carrier Based Fighters
Chart 1: Planned CVW in the mid to late 2020s.
With the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the USN obtained uncontested dominion
over the world’s oceans for the first time since the end of World War II. The
USN no longer needed to prioritize sea control assets, munitions, and doctrines
such as the F-14D, the anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile, and
the Outer Air Battle concept. Given the permissive operational environment, the
USN gradually tooled the CVW to provide persistent presence and air power
against non-state actors following 9/11. The USN will have to relearn the
institutional knowledge, skills, and doctrines associated with sea control in
addition to procuring new ships and aircraft to face the modern threat
environment. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines sea control as:
…operations designed to secure
use of the maritime domain by one’s own forces and to prevent its use by the
enemy. Sea control is the essence of seapower and is a necessary ingredient in
the successful accomplishment of all naval missions…Such operations include
destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce,
protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority
in areas of naval operations.[1]
CVW
fighters are an indispensable means towards establishing sea control in terms
of providing defensive counter air (DCA) cover for the strike group, conducting
anti-surface warfare (ASuW) operations, denying an adversary’s air and maritime
use of a particular geographic region, and securing freedom of action for maritime
forces. Once sea control is established, carrier based fighter aircraft facilitate
power projection operations in the offensive counter air (OCA), suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD)/destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD), interdiction,
and strike roles. Given the sparse availability of land bases in the
Western-Pacific, USN carrier based aviation will play an indispensable role in any
U.S.-PRC conflict.
Image 2:
SAM coverage of Type 052 destroyer. Image Credit: Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI), 2015.
The PRC
is quickly fielding anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems such as anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, sea mines, and anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) which will force carrier strike groups to operate hundreds of
miles from directly contested regions at the start of a major conflict. However,
PRC ASCMs and ASBMs will be heavily reliant on a mix of space, sea, and air
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide
over the horizon (OTH) targeting information. The PRC is also fielding an
increasingly potent mix of integrated air defense systems (IADS) such as the
HQ-16, S-300PMU, HQ-9, and S-400 surface to air missile (SAM) systems cued by a
mix of VHF search radars and passive electronically scanned array (PESA) as
well as active electronically scanned array (AESA) fire control radars.
These
systems will pressure non-stealthy U.S. aircraft to operate at greater
distances from A2/AD zones thereby greatly diminishing the utility of short
range weapons. For example, adversary aircraft conducting DCA missions have the
option of staying within the protective cover of their own IADS which limits
the ability of non-stealthy CVW fighters armed with medium range air-to-air
missiles (AAMs) to conduct OCA missions. Long-range SAMs will also degrade the
utility of direct attack munitions, air-to-surface weapons with a range less
than 50 nautical miles (nm) such as the 13 nm range Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), in the strike and interdiction roles.[2] In terms of both munitions
and aircraft, the current CVW is ill-suited to execute sea control and power
projection missions against high-end A2/AD adversaries. Both the current and
planned CVW will be assessed with respect to sea control capabilities (ASuW,
DCA) as well as power projection in a contested environment (OCA, SEAD/DEAD,
strike, and interdiction).
Current CVW Sea Control
Image 3:
Exploitation of critical sea lines of communication and geographic features
will be crucial towards successful carrier operations in any U.S.-PRC conflict.
Image Credit: RAND.
Image 4:
PLAN fleet distribution. Image Credit: ONI, 2015.
The sea
control mission will greatly vary depending upon the nature of the PRC-U.S.
conflict in terms of objectives and geography. Namely if the conflict occurs in
the South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea (ECS), or is part of a broader
Indo-Asia Pacific regional contingency. For example, the PRC would not be able
to mass and sustain the same degree of air and sea power in the SCS as the ECS
given its greater distance from the Chinese mainland.[7] However, across all
plausible contingencies the PRC will retain an in theatre numerical advantage
in combat aircraft and aggregate sortie generation rates; the PLAAF and PLANAF field more than 800 modern fighter aircraft including 400 J-10s and approximately 400 Flankers across all variants. In order to obtain
sea control, CVW fighters must:
1.
Establish localized
air superiority while maintaining a heavily favorable exchange ratio against
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy
Air Force (PLANAF) fighter aircraft given the numerical advantage of PRC forces
and the difficulty in resupplying the carrier with new aircraft in the midst of
a conflict.
2.
Disrupt or destroy PRC
OTH sensors enabling long-range employment of ASBMs and ASCMs
3.
Target PLAAF and
PLANAF aircraft and surface combatants caring ASCMs-ideally before they are
able to engage the strike group thereby reducing the cruise missile defense
burden of the surface combatants
4.
Fleet anti-air warfare
(AAW) assets must ensure the survival of special mission aircraft such as the
EA-18G and E-2D as well as USN land based ISR and ASW assets supporting the
strike group such as the P-8A and MQ-4C
5.
Facilitate collection
of OTH targeting information for the strike group such that USN surface
combatants can conduct long-range ASuW
6.
Destroy or disable
enemy surface combatants as part of a broader ASuW effort.
Image 5: Carrier strike group composition. Image Credit: NAVSEA.
Defensive Counter Air
Even
without the F-35C, current CVW fighters will be able to achieve high exchange
rates against PLAAF and PLANAF fighters within the defensive cover of the
strike group. The USN has heavily invested in its AAW capabilities with the
development of Aegis baseline 9.0 combat system, E-2D Airborne Early Warning
and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) for the
DDG-51 Flight III, 200 nm + range SM-6 SAM, 90 nm range SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 27
nm + range Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) SAM, SeaRAM, and upgraded CWIS
Block 1B. A strike group typically consists of four DDG-51 guided missile
destroyers and one CG-47 guided missile cruiser which collectively have 506
vertical launch cells (VLS); the USN is considering expanding the number of
surface combatants per strike group up to seven or eight for a total capacity
of 698 to 794 VLS cells (not including the SSN which is typically assigned to
the strike group but in practice often operates autonomously).[8]
The USN
has been proactive investing in its F/A-18E/F fleet with its spiral upgrade
flight plan which will add additional APG-79 AESA capabilities, enhanced
electronic warfare (EW) and self-protection capabilities, IR search and track
(IRST) pods, and improved software to support sensor fusion as well as network
centric warfare and multi-missile shot capability.[9][10] Furthermore, the USN has
been procuring AIM-120D and AIM-9X AAMs at an accelerated place with 1,170 and
758 missiles requested in the five year defense plan (FYDP) respectively.[11] Within the short-term,
F/A-18C/Ds and F/A-18E/Fs will maintain a significant qualitative edge over
PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft in beyond visual range (BVR) combat engagements. The
vast majority of current PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft utilize mechanically scanned
array radars such as the indigenous Type 1473 and Type 1474 for the J-10A and
J-11B which are further constrained by obsolescent fire control computers and
networking capabilities. Therefore, most current PRC fighter can only engage
one to two aircraft simultaneously at BVR which mitigates their numerical
advantage in contrast to the Hornets and Super Hornets which can engage
multiple targets at longer ranges simultaneously.[12] Over the next decade, the
PRC will field increasingly capable Flanker variants such as the Su-35, J-11D,
and J-16 as well as the fifth generation J-20 which will significantly erode the
quality advantage of current CVW fighters.
Detection
of low observable aircraft such as the J-20 will present a significant
challenge for the current CVW and AAW assets within the strike group. The
unique design traits of the J-20 airframe suggest it is a low observable
interceptor designed to destroy the enablers of U.S. power projection such as
AEW&C, EW, ISR, and tanker aircraft.[13] All of these aircraft
have minimal maneuvering capabilities, with the exception of the EA-18G, which
thereby increases the no escape zone of long-range AAMs launched against them. The
E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C’s APY-9 VHF AESA radar is likely the asset best suited
to locate PLAAF stealth aircraft given that the J-20’s use of planform alignment
is optimized against the X and S-bands. The APY-9 has a maximum detection range
of over than 300 nm and a 250% greater surveillance envelope compared to the
legacy APS-145 on the E-2C.[14] The SPY-6 AMDR may be
able to locate and track stealth aircraft at tactically significant ranges
despite operating in the S-band; the AMDR is composed of thousands of gallium
nitride (GaN) transmit receiver modules which grant the AMDR 30 times the detection
capability of the legacy SPY-1 on the DDG-51 Flight I and IIs. It is worth
noting that both the APY-9 and SPY-6 were built to aid in the defense against
cruise missiles which feature a comparatively low RCS. Alternatively, EA-18Gs
may be able to locate J-20s with their emission location equipment or
F/A-18E/Fs would be able to detect the J-20 with their IRST pods at relatively
short ranges.
Even if
the current CVW is able to detect low observable aircraft, the USN’s current
qualitative edge in fighter aircraft is significantly declining. Without the
F-35C, the current CVW will increasingly have to rely upon support from surface
combatants and shore based USAF aircraft to establish localized air superiority.
CVW fighters will eventually have to leave the protective cover of the strike
group to target PRC OTH sensors, ASCM carrying aircraft, and PLAN surface
combatants at extended ranges. Even with extensive EA-18G EW support, current
CVW fighters will struggle to accomplish the aforementioned missions without
high attrition rates.
Anti-Surface Warfare
The
current CVW is armed with two principal anti-ship weapons, the AGM-154 C-1 JSOW
and the AGM-84D (Block 1 C) Harpoon both of which have a range of approximately
70 nm.[15][16] In the fourth quarter of
FY 2017, the USN will begin fielding the upgraded AGM-84N Block II + which
includes a two-way data link, GPS guidance, and enhanced electronic counter
measure performance.[17] However, U.S. CVW
aircraft will be significantly outranged in the ASuW mission when compared to
their PLAAF and PLANAF equivalents. The most numerous air launched ASCMs in
service with the PRC are the subsonic YJ-83 (70 nm), YJ-63 (108 nm), YJ-83A
(135 nm), and YJ-62A (215 nm) as well as the supersonic YJ-12 (135 nm).[18][19] PLAN surface combatants are
also fielding increasingly longer range ASCMs such as the YJ-62A and supersonic
YJ-18 (97 nm +); the PLAN’s Russian acquired Sovremenny-class destroyers are
armed with 3M54E Klub (108 nm) and SS-N-22 Sunburn (130 nm) ASCMs.[20] Nearly every PLAN surface
combatant is armed with ASCMs and at SAMs including smaller corvettes and
frigates which greatly increases the number of targets CVW aircraft must engage
i.e. the PLAN has been practicing “distributed lethality” for years while the
USN continues to make meager process enacting distributed lethality.
The
limited standoff ranges of the AGM-84N Block II + and JSOW C-1 degrade the
survivability of current CVW fighters in the ASuW role. PLAN surface combatants
will continue to improve their own AAW capabilities with continued production
of the Type 052D which incorporates the Type 346 Dragon Eye AESA radar and
extended range HQ-9 (80 nm). Furthermore, PLAN surface combatants may choose to
stay within the protective cover of land based SAMs depending upon the nature
of the conflict and resulting geography which would further degrade CVW
survivability. In order to successfully conduct ASuW missions with the current
AGM-84N and JSOW C-1, current CVW fighters will require substantial MALD/MALD-J
decoy and EA-18G EW support. The interim fielding of the 300 nm + range capable
Lockheed Martin AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) in 2019 as part
of Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) increment 1 will greatly improve the survivability
of the current CVW in the ASuW role.
The
AGM-158C features a low observable air frame, jam resistant two way data link,
semiautonomous targeting modes, 1,000 pound warhead, and multi-mode seeker.[21] Despite the significant
capabilities of the AGM-158C, the USN has only requested 60 AGM-154Cs in its
FYDP as of FY 2017 with procurement ending in 2019.[22] The limited procurement
quantities likely reflect the interim nature of the OASuW program prior to
OASuW increment 2 which will field a larger number of ASCMs across the fleet starting
in 2024. The main competitors of OASuW increment 2 are the LRASM, an advanced
active seeker equipped derivative of Raytheon’s Tomahawk Block IV, and possibly
Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM).[23]
[1] “Command and Control for Joint
Maritime Operations”, Joint Staff, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_32.pdf
[2] “United States Navy Fact File: Joint
Direct Attack Munition”, USN, last accessed February 2017. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=400&ct=2
[3] “The Carrier Air Wing of the
Future”, David Barno, Nora Bensahel and M. Thomas Davis, February 2014. https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CarrierAirWing_white.pdf
pp. 8
[4] “The Basics: Inside the Carrier
Air Wing”, Sam LaGrone, April 2014.
[5] “F/A-18 Hornet Specifications”,
Global Security, last updated July 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18-specs.htm
[6] “CNO: Navy Should Quickly Field
CBARS To Ease Tanking Burden on Super Hornets”, Megan Eckstein, February 2016.
[7] “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017”, Eric
Heginbotham, et al., 2015. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf
pp. xxx
[8] “Navy Wants to Grow Fleet to 355
Ships; 47 Hull Increase Adds Destroyers, Attack Subs”, Sam LaGrone and Megan
Eckstein, December 2016.
[9] “FY 2015 Programs: F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet and EA-18G Growler”, DOT&E, 2016. http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/navy/2015fa18ef.pdf
[10] “RDT&E Budget Item
Justification: PE 0204136N / F/A-18 Squadrons”, USN, February 2016.
[11] “Highlights of the Department of
the Navy FY 2017 Budget”, DON, 2016. http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/Highlights_book.pdf
[12] Modern Chinese Warplanes, Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper pgs. 66,
72, 81
[13] “PLAAF Fighter Modernization &
J-20 Updates”, Matt, October 2015. https://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2015/10/plaaf-fighter-modernization-j-20-updates.html
[14] “Lockheed Martin AN/APY-9”,
Scramble, last updated July 2011. http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/Lockheed_Martin_AN/APY-9
[15] “Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)”,
NAVAIR, last accessed February 2017. http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=9097785F-B258-46B6-8474-20A48B820898
[16] “Harpoon”, NAVAIR, last accessed February
2017. http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=534C209F-1DD4-497C-B119-2ED33ED34DF7
[17] Ibid.
[18] “A Potent Vector Assessing Chinese
Cruise Missile Developments”, Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and
Jingdong Yuan, 2014.
[19] “YJ-63”, Deagle, last accessed February
2017.
[20] “A Potent Vector Assessing Chinese
Cruise Missile Developments”, Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and
Jingdong Yuan, 2014.
[21] “Offensive AsuW Weapon Capability”,
Lockheed Martin, 2015. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/mfc/pc/lrasm/mfc-lrasm-pc.pdf
[22] “Highlights of the Department of
the Navy FY 2017 Budget”, pp. 4-7, DON, 2016. http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/Highlights_book.pdf
[23] “Navy: Raytheon Tomahawk Likely to
Compete in Next Generation Anti-Ship Missile Contest“, Sam LaGrone, August
2015.
