Updates April 2014

Author's Note: As a college student, I occasionally am unable to post articles on a regular basis due to an influx of school related work. I will be working on papers and finals for the next two weeks so I don't expect to post too many articles over the next two weeks. Thank you for your continued patience. In the meantime, here are a few interesting articles I recommend:

[UPDATE: I finished finals and have begun work on Part II of the LCS article, I expect it to be done shortly]

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress -By Ronald O'Rourke, 2014

Once I finish the LCS series, I plan to write on the DDG-51 Flight III program. The procurement of the DDG-51 Flight III would be a significant mistake that would compromise the ability of the Navy to defend its carrier groups decades from now. Essentially the Flight III is meant to replace the CG-47 Ticonderoga class missile cruisers by providing enhanced fleet defense capabilities with the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Flight III is based upon the Flight IIA design but requires significant engineering and technical work to successfully install the AMDR as it requires five times the power and ten times the cooling required when compared to the original SPY-1V(D) array. The issue isn't so much that its impossible to integrate AMDR into the Flight III successfully, its the capability for future growth within the Flight III will be severely constrained as a result of the modifications. Ronald O'Rourke describes many of the issues within the Flight III program in Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress: 

"...the Flight III DDG-51 will not feature a fully restored growth margin, will not be equipped with an integrated electric drive system or other technologies that could provide ample electrical power for supporting future electrically powered weapons, and will not incorporate features for substantially reducing ship crew size or for otherwise reducing ship O&S costs substantially below that of Flight IIA DDG- 51s." - O'Rourke, 2014

The Navy needs to plan for these ships to serve for the next thirty to forty years in heavily contested anti-access environments where future threats will no doubt require the Navy to make significant upgrades to its ships. Solid-state lasers and rail guns may seem far fetched to some but the technology maturity of these systems has progressed to the point at which they will be deployed within this decade. I'll get into specifics in future articles but I would recommend the Navy design a new ship based upon the DDG-1000 design with modifications for cost reduction done in a similar manner as the Seawolf-class was canceled for the more affordable to Virginia-class submarine. An emphasis would be put on maximizing off the shelf technology, leveraging existing systems such as Aegis over the Total Ship Computing Environment on the DDG-1000, and similar power requirements to the DDG-1000 which has 78 Megawatt (MW) capacity to the Flight III's 12 MW. O'Rourke discusses the option of designing a new class of ship on pages 19-20 within the report.

The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft Carriers - By Bryan McGrath & Seth Cropsey, 2014

Bryan McGrath & Seth Cropsey wrote an interesting article highlighting the purpose of China's plans to acquire carriers, to disrupt US allies in the region:

"...the strategic target of the PLAN in building a carrier force is not the U.S. Navy, but the network of alliances that longstanding U.S. economic and security interests in the region aim to preserve.  Creating uncertainty and doubt in the minds of regional governments that the United States can continue to assure their security is at the heart of China’s desire to see the U.S. diminished in the region...The PLAN is on solid strategic ground in pursuing carrier-based power projection, and while their approach is not a direct threat to U.S. forces (or is not likely to be a threat in the foreseeable future), it serves as a long-term, slowly metastasizing threat to the most significant competitive advantage the U.S. enjoys in the region – its network of friendships and alliances." - McGrath & Cropsey, 2014

Pentagon: Sequestration to result in 17 fewer F-35s, fewer soldiers, smaller navy fleet 

By Daniel Wasserbly, 2014

Daniel Wasserbly examines some of the least desirable aspects of sequestration in FY 2016 and beyond. The decisions to reduce R&D, initiate an early retirement of the USS George Washington, and cut a Virginia-class submarine in the FY2016 budget is particularly worrisome: 

"Under sequestration the USAF would have to abandon its Adaptive Engine project meant to develop a next-generation military aircraft engine, as the effort's slated USD1.3 billion 'would be eliminated', the Pentagon said....the report also mentioned that the navy would not fund nuclear refuelling and overhaul for USS George Washington (CVN 73), which is scheduled to begin that process in FY 2016, and would retire the carrier and its associated air wing...There would also be insufficient funding to buy a second Virginia-class attack submarine (SSN) in FY 2016. 'Eliminating this submarine from the shipbuilding plan would reduce the submarine force to 40 SSNs in 2029 and extend the period that the SSN force level is below the desired 48 fast attack submarines by four years'" - Wasserbly, 2014

Stealth Vs. Electronic Attack- Dave Majumdar, 2014

Majumdar discusses the merits of dedicated electronic warfare aircraft (e.g. EA-18G) working with stealth aircraft like the F-35C: 

"...officials from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps agreed that while aircraft like the F-35 or F-22 are not solely relying on low observables for survivability—stealth is an absolute requirement to survive in an A2/AD environment even with airborne electronic attack support.  As one Air Force official explained, stealth and electronic attack always have a synergistic relationship because detection is about the signal to noise ratio. Low observables reduce the signal, while electronic attack increases the noise. 'Any big picture plan, looking forward, to deal with emerging A2/AD threats will address both sides of that equation'" -Majumdar, 2014

America's Littoral Combat Ships - Part I

The US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is easily among the most strenuously debated US Navy procurement efforts in recent years. The US Navy originally planned to purchase a total of 52 Independence and Freedom Class ships to significantly augment its ability to operate within littoral waters i.e. comparatively shallow areas of water close to land (O'Rourke, 2014). Critics argue the durability of the LCS hull and its comparatively limited armament ensure it cannot even meet its intended purpose and the need for a strong littoral presence is ultimately of little strategic significance. In support of the broader US Pivot to the Pacific, spending billions of dollars on small surface combatants specialized for littoral combat against low-end threats rather than high-end blue water capable combatants (such as the DDG-51Arleigh Burke or SSN-774 Virginia class submarines) is a waste of vital resources. Senator John McCain summarized many of the frequent critiques of the LCS program before Congress:

"In LCS, we have (1) a supposed warship that apparently can’t survive a hostile combat environment; (2) a program chosen for affordability that doubled in cost since inception and is subject to the risk of further cost growth as testing continues; (3) a ‘revolutionary’ design that somehow has managed to be inferior to what came before it on important performance measures; and (4) a system designed for flexibility that cannot successfully demonstrate its most important warfighting functions."

Years of persistent criticism from both Congress and a number of vocal Navy officials coupled with the budget cuts from sequestration have reduced the Navy's purchase to 32 ships. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel directed the newly formed Small Surface Combatant Task Force to find a suitable replacement for the LCS. The new small surface combatant (SSC) is planned to feature higher durability, more capable weapons, and is likely to serve in a more traditional role as a frigate (LaGrone, 2014). Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's decision to limit LCS orders to 32 ships and to pursue a more capable SSC adequately addresses US strategic objectives over the long term provided major upgrades to the planned LCS mission modules. The aforementioned grievances against the LCS program are only partially justified but the US Navy also requires a capable SSC for sea control in blue water environment against a capable near peer adversary. An analysis of the merits of the LCS program will follow in Part I before an examination of the most likely SSC candidates will be examined in Part II.

Image 2: DDG-51 Destroyer squadron with Ticonderoga class missile cruiser escort

It is important to recognize that the LCS was never intended to partake in large scale high intensity conflicts against large surface combatants such as destroyers. As part of its broader set of objectives in peacetime, the Navy allows the United States to both passively and actively influence regions of the world by providing training opportunities for US allies, routine maritime patrols, anti-piracy operations, and a forward deterrence capability against potential US foes. The Navy classifies these types of peacetime missions as phase 0 and phase 1 operations. These aforementioned activities can often be conducted much more cost effectively by a small $450 million dollar LCS than a $1.8 billion dollar Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. More importantly, by assigning LCS to routine peacetime duties in Africa and South America, the more capable surface combatants such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers or Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers can transferred to the Pacific.

"These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military; that’s not what they’re made for...Littoral Combat Ships will tend to displace amphibious ships and destroyers in Africa and South America. That will free up surface combatants, more high-end ships [for Asia]" -Adm. Jonathan Greenert, 2012

Many of the Navy's most important procurement and basing decisions either directly or indirectly affect the Pivot. The Navy will station 60% of its US based ships on the West Coast in addition to maintaining a large forward deployed presence of 67 ships in Asia (Greenert, 2014). By 2020, Pacific stationed ships will be the newest and most capable ships within the Navy and will revive priority for several of the Navy's upgrade programs. Notable examples include: all three DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyers will be stationed San Diego and the DDG-51 ships based in the Western Pacific are prioritized to revive the enhanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities via the Multifunction Towed Array (MFTA) by 2018. As important as the Pivot is, the US will continue to maintain strategic obligations toward its European and Middle-Eastern allies which is reflected by the map below detailing the future deployment of US ships worldwide in 2020 by region.  

Image 3: US Navy ship deployment by region

From a conceptual planning perspective, a low cost flexible surface combatant that allows the US Navy to send its more capable destroyers and missile cruisers to the Pacific while simultaneously still maintaining a sizable presence in other areas of the would prove to be a great asset. In order to be successful in displacing a variety of larger surface combatants in the aforementioned peacetime duties, the LCS has to be flexible and able to undertake several types of missions. The solution was to create the mission modules/packages system in which each LCS could be easily given a new set of equipment to meet three common mission types: surface warfare (SuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine countermeasure (MCM) missions. 

The mission module concept is a conceptually innovative approach that, in theory, would allow a limited fleet of LCS to undertake a disproportionately larger number of missions when compared to a more conventional alternatives such as patrol boats, missile corvettes, coast guard cutters, etc. However, the mission module concept has been plagued with numerous design difficulties in recent years. Many of the originally planned weapon and electronic systems within the mission packages have been canceled or delayed by several years. For example, the SuW mission package originally included a navalized variant of the Army's Non Line-of-Sight – Launch System (NLOS-LS) which would have granted the LCS a capable anti-patrol boat swarm capability out to 24 nautical miles (Defense Industry Daily, 2014). Many nations such as Iran and North Korea field large numbers of fast missile craft and patrol boats in swarms as a cost effective means to engage larger surface combatants. Without a capable medium range missile system, the LCS' longest range weapon system is its 57mm cannon which is has a maximum range of 3.5 nautical miles. 

Image 4: The Navy has chosen the radar guided AGM-114L Hellfire to replace the NLOS-LS in the SuW module. While, the AGM-144L is a salvo capable fire and forget missile, its limited by a maximum range of just 3.5 nautical miles (Defense Industry Daily, 2014).

The need for a longer range SuW weapon system on board the LCS is critical to the future deterrence capability of the 5th fleet. The LCS will comprise a significant portion of the number of planned US Navy ships forward deployed within the Persian Gulf under the command of the 5th Fleet. The Navy is in the midst of a $580 million dollar construction effort to expand its 5th Fleet headquarters, Naval Support Activity Bahrain (Defense News, 2014). A total of eight LCS ships will be forward deployed to Bahrain alongside ten upgraded Cyclone-class patrol craft. As capable as the Cyclone and LCS are at short range combat against small surface combatants, they lack the range of Iran's increasingly capable fast attack craft armed with long range anti-ship missiles such as the Chinese supplied Type-021 missile boats. Previous naval engagements between the US and Iranian navies have underscored the importance of long-range over the horizon missile capabilities: 

"Operation Praying Mantis, the last major surface engagement in the Persian Gulf, took place on April 18, 1988; this event also marked the surface Navy’s first exchange of long distance anti-ship missiles fired over the horizon and without a line of sight...In one day, the US Navy crippled or destroyed three of Iran’s principal fighting ships because they could fight ‘over the horizon’ and coordinate with lethal air power." - Luke Tarbi, 2014

In a similar manner to the SuW module, both the planned ASW and MCM modules have experienced numerous development issues which will limit their operational effectiveness, the following is from Defense Industry Daily: 

ASW Module: 

"So far, the ability to carry a pair of MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters is the only thing that distinguishes an ASW-equipped LCS from a small corvette, and even there, LCS performance is likely to suffer by comparison. The towed sonars have depth limitations that may prevent their use in shallow water, and the LCS waterjets are so noisy that unlike an ASW corvette, a bow sonar isn’t really an option." - Defense Industry Daily, 2014

MCM Module: 

"A number of current and previous MIW systems have failed outright or performed poorly in tests. Despite more than 6 years of development, the US Navy is still fielding older minesweeping systems and ad-hoc UUV/USV options like Seafox and Remus 600/ Kingfish  to confront a serious mine threat around the Strait of Hormuz." - Defense Industry Daily, 2014

Image 5: MQ-8B & MQ-8C Fire Scout. Image Credit: US Navy

Despite the many problems with the base LCS hull and the development of its mission modules, the ship has the potential to meet its originally envisioned goals provided upgrades are made to the mission modules. Furthermore, not all of the developments relating to LCS are negative. For example, the ability both the Freedom and Independence-class LCS to carry either two MH-60R or three MQ-8B Fire Scout or two of the much more capable MQ-8C Fire Scout UAVs will provide the Navy with invaluable ISR and targeting capabilities (Freedberg, 2014). Initially the LCS' mission modules will be limited but the design of the mission module system inherently makes any future modernization program easier to implement. The SuW module will receive an upgrade after 2019 which will likely include a longer range missile than the AGM-114L (Defense Industry Daily, 2014).

In summary, the concept of for the LCS is well founded but the implementation of the concept has been hampered by numerous technical issues. After 2020, it is likely that the upgrades to the LCS' mission modules will allow it to preform as originally intended. The Navy's decision to cap LCS buys at 32 ships is justified given that the service still requires a more durable surface combatant to support blue water operations in the Pacific. The Small Surface Combatant task force has been assigned with reviewing upgraded LCS designs, foreign frigate designs, and entirely new US made frigate designs to succeed the LCS (LaGrone, 2014). The task force will submit their findings to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on July 31st 2014. The next part of this series will examine the most probable candidates for the 20 ship buy and the relative merits of the contenders.

Sources

1. Statement of  Adm. Jonathan Greenert Chief of Naval Operations, Jonathan Greenert, 2013.   http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130918/101291/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-GreenertUSNJ-20130918.pdf 
2. Statement of  Adm. Jonathan Greenert Chief of Naval Operations, Jonathan Greenert, 2014. http://www.navy.mil/cno/12MAR14_DON_Posutre_CNO_Final_HASC.pdf
3. After 32 Ships, Future of LCS Program Unclear, Christopher Cavas, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014303020016
4. It’s All in the Package: the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mission Modules, Defense Industry Daily, 2014. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/its-all-in-the-package-the-littoral-combat-ships-mission-modules-016450/ 
5. USN memo directs task force to study LCS alternatives, Grace Jean, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/35733/usn-memo-directs-task-force-to-study-lcs-alternatives
6. Some Unsolicited Input on the Small Surface Combatant, Bryan McGrath, 2014. http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/03/some-unsolicited-input-on-small-surface.html
7. What’s Next After LCS?, Sam LaGrone, 2014.                                   http://news.usni.org/2014/02/25/whats-next-lcs
8. LCS Mission Packages: The Basics, Sam LaGrone, 2013.                     http://news.usni.org/2013/08/21/lcs-mission-packages-the-basics
9. Expansion of 5th Fleet base underscores long-term gulf presence, By Awad Mustafa and Christopher P. Cavas, 2014.                                                                      http://www.navytimes.com/article/20140327/NEWS/303270034/Expansion-5th-Fleet-base-underscores-long-term-gulf-presence
10. Navy Moves Smaller Coastal Craft To Persian Gulf As We Pull Big Ships, Sydney Freedberg, 2013. http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/navy-moves-smaller-coastal-craft-to-persian-gulf-as-we-pull-big-ships/ 
11. Iran's Doctrine of Asymmetric Naval Warfare, Fariborz Haghshenass, 2006. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-doctrine-of-asymmetric-naval-warfare 
12. Iran's fast attack craft fleet: behind the hyperbole, Berenice Baker, 2013.                         http://www.naval-technology.com/features/featureiran-fast-attack-craft-fleet-behind-hyperbole/ 
13. EXCLUSIVE: Navy Still Thrashing Out LCS Tactics, Design, Top Admiral Acknowledges, Sydney Freedberg, 2012.                                                               http://breakingdefense.com/2012/05/exclusive-navy-still-thrashing-out-lcs-tactics-design-top-adm/
14. Littoral Combat Ship Cut Plan Reopens Navy Rift: Build ‘Em Fast Or Rugged, Sydney Freedberg, 2014.                                                                                          http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/littoral-combat-ship-cut-plan-reopens-navy-riff-build-em-fast-or-rugged/
15. LCS Lives! Mabus, Hamre Argue Littoral Combat Ship Will Survive Cuts, Sydney Freedberg, 2014.  http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/lcs-lives-mabus-hamre-argue-littoral-combat-ship-will-survive-cuts/
16. Marine Official To Helm Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Panel, Sydney Freedberg, 2014.         http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/marine-official-to-helm-navys-littoral-combat-ship-panel/
17. U.S. Navy Weighs Halving LCS Order, Christopher Cavas, 2013.          http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130317/DEFREG02/303170001/U-S-Navy-Weighs-Halving-LCS-Order?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE
18. LCS Couldn’t Survive War With China, But It Could Help Prevent It: CNO, Sydney Freedberg, 2012.                                                                                                                                                  http://breakingdefense.com/2012/04/cno-lcs-couldnt-survive-war-with-china-but-it-can-prevent-one/
19. CNO Greenert: ‘We’re Not Downsizing, We’re Growing’ – Especially In Pacific, Sydney Freedberg, 2012.                                                                                                                                                  http://breakingdefense.com/2012/11/cno-greenert-were-not-downsizing-were-growing-especially/
20. Pentagon Caps LCS at 32 Hulls, Hagel Directs Navy to Evaluate ‘Capable and Lethal’ Frigate Designs, Sam LaGrone, 2014.                                                    http://news.usni.org/2014/02/24/pentagon-caps-lcs-32-hulls-hagel-directs-navy-evaluate-capable-lethal-frigate-designs
21. Opinion: Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Challenges the Status Quo, Dale Heinken, 2013.  http://news.usni.org/2013/09/23/opinion-navys-littoral-combat-ship-challenges-status-quo 
22. The Littoral Combat Ship: Give it time, Rear Admiral John F. Kirby, 2013.  http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/06/the-littoral-combat-ship-give-it-time.html
23. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:   Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, 2014.                                                                                                                               http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

Quick Thoughts: Geopolitical Lessons From The Ukrainian Crisis

Image Credit: Politico

Evolution of Russian Forces Since the 2008 Ossetia War

The sophistication of the Russian annexation of Crimea represents a significant advancement for the Russian military. Compared to the 2008 Ossetia War which was marked by a poorly coordinated Russian invasion with hundreds of Russian and Georgian casualties, the Russian approach in Crimea utilized highly refined non-lethal methods of coercion:

"The most distinctive feature of the Russian operation was its emphasis on economy of effort. Unlike previous interventions in Afghanistan in the Soviet era, or Chechnya and Georgia more recently, where Russian commanders relied on mass employment of tanks and artillery, the Crimea intervention featured fewer than 10,000 assault troops lined up against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel...Once Russian troops had moved to blockade Ukrainian military personnel in their bases, psychological warfare, internet/media propaganda, intimidation, and bribery were their main weapons to undermine their opponents' will to resist". - Tim Ripley, London and Bruce Jones, 2014

The 45th Spetsnaz regiment, operating for the GRU, is credited with orchestrating the Russian take over of Crimea.

US Strategic Priorities 

Image Credit: USN

Despite the bellicose actions of Vladimir Putin, the limited response by the United States was largely appropriate. The United States still requires Russian cooperation with respect to Iran, Syria, and its exit strategy out of Afghanistan (supply routes). Compromising all of the aforementioned interests for the purpose of being perceived as "tough" on Russia is short sighted and ultimately does not serve the long term interest of the United States. Contrary to public opinion, Russia's annexation of Crimea largely shows the limits of Russian power rather than its strength.

Putin's broader ambition for Ukraine and the former Soviet satellite states  is to form the Eurasian Union (in some respects it has been compared to the former Soviet Union). The failure of Russia to secure its original trade pact with Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea ensures further Russian-Ukrainian integration is unlikely. Several former Soviet satellite states have also voiced concern over Russia's actions in Crimea meaning further expansion of the Eurasian Union is unlikely within the short term.  

The map above is from testimony by Admiral Jonathan Greenert in Congress and it shows the future deployment of US Navy ships by region in 2020. The map essentially provides a glimpse of the strategic value placed upon of each region by the United States: South America, Europe, and Africa are of reduced significance when compared to the Middle East and Asia. US strategic planners are correct to focus on China over Russia: the demographic outlook of Russia is poor and its economy is commodity dependent. By comparison, China is the only nation that could credibly complete with the United States economically and military on a near equal basis over the coming decades. As a caveat, its important to stress than neither the US-China rivalry nor the growing feud with Russia qualifies as a new "Cold War".


Author's Note: Sorry for the long delay in blog posts, as a student my course work often occupies a great deal of my time when I have midterms. I am considering posting a few articles about the naval aspect of the Pivot in order to diversify this blog a little (e.g. DDG-51 Flight III, LCS, DDG-1000, etc.) let me know your thoughts in the comments.

Sources and Recommended Readings 

1. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140327/DEFREG02/303270034/Spotlight-Back-US-European-Command
2. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/01/how-to-understand-putins-ukraine-strategy/
3. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/21/u-s-eyes-russian-spies-infiltrating-ukraine.html
4. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/articles/20140325.aspx
5. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/new-cold-war-russia-104954.html?hp=pm_1#.UzTnSPldUrX
6. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579417531612266214
7. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/europe/ukraine.html?hpw&rref=world
8. http://www.janes.com/article/36143/update-analysis-crimea-intervention-the-increasing-sophistication-of-russia-s-military-resurgence 

News March 2014

Department of Defense FY 2015 budget in a nutshell

Image Credit: Jack Ohman

The Department of Defense's fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget is among the most complex budget proposals submitted within recent years. The Pentagon's base FY 2015 budget of $495.6 billion dollars is supplemented with the $79 billion dollar oversea's contingency operations (OCO) budget and possibly an additional $26 billion from the Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI). Despite the steady progress of troop reductions in Afghanistan, the OCO budget remains largely unaltered from the FY 2014 budget. The DOD is essentially using the OCO budget as a means to mitigate some of the effects of sequestration. The funding from OGSI is unlikely to materialize as support from Congress is minimal.

To sum the "theme" of the YF2015 budget in a single sentence, the DOD is making significant cuts to its short term capabilities in order to preserve and develop future programs. Its easy to criticize the YF 2015 budget given the significant cuts to legacy platforms such as the U-2, A-10, KC-10, temporarily mothballing 11 missile cruisers, substantial troop reductions, and possibly retiring the USS George Washington. Without tangible action from Congress to either end sequestration or to grant the DOD greater discretion to with regards to implementing the mandated cuts, the FY 2015 budget proposal is approximately the best one could expect from the DOD given the circumstances. Many defense analysts have claimed that the Pivot is no longer viable given the cuts in the YF 2015 budget. In reality, the process of re-balancing the Pacific is likely to require several decades of active US engagement. The new R&D investments in DARPA, cyber warfare, adaptive engine technology, UCLASS, AMDR, and the long-range strike bomber prepare the US for a Pacific oriented defense posture. As a result of prioritization of R&D, the post 2020 US military will be able to counter a wide range of expected national security threats for decades to come.

Recommended Budget Related Articles:

In R&D Budget, Pentagon Focuses on Risk - by Zachary Fryer-Biggs
US Navy Budget Plan: Major Questions Abound - by Christopher Cavas
US Budget Request Focuses on Leaner, High-Tech Future - by Marcus Weisgerber and Zachary Fryer-Biggs
Carriers, Cruisers, & LCS: CNO Speaks - by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr
Pentagon proposes buying fewer fighters, unmanned aircraft in FY2015 budget - by Jon Hemmerdinger
Pentagon seeks to invest billions in next-generation programmes - by Jon Hemmerdinger
US Navy Budget Takes Bite Out of Aircraft, Weapons - by Christopher Cavas

J-20 Upgrades

The third J-20 prototype designated "2011" has been making major headlines in aerospace publications for the last two weeks. I am in the process of writing a new article detailing the features of the 2011 aircraft in addition to updated background information. The article, threat analysis of foreign stealth fighters part I: Chengdu J-20, needs comprehensive revisions to keep the article relevant. Thus, it is more feasible to write an entirely new article. 

The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part III Upgrades

The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part I Introduction

The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II Adaptations to Budget Cuts

Upgrades 

Image 1: F-22 test aircraft firing a AIM-9 X Block II missile

As Part I discussed, the F-22 is largely a product of  late 1980s Cold War requirements and doctrines. However, the F-22's unmatched air-to-air capabilities make it relevant to the Pacific more than 20 years after the creation of the original Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program requirements but lingering issues as a result of new technology and new objectives remain undressed with the current F-22A fleet. The USAF plans to spend $11.7 billion on F-22 upgrade programs through 2020. The entire combat coded F-22 fleet of 143 aircraft (including backup inventory airframes) will be upgraded to the Block 35 standard incorporating the latest increment 3.2B upgrades. The combination of the increment 3.1, 3.2A, and 3.2B upgrade programs will greatly enhance the F-22's ability to effectively engage expected air-to-air and air-to-ground threats from near peer to peer level adversaries over the next two decades. Each upgrade will be thoroughly examined before the aggregate effect of these upgrades on USAF capabilities is discussed in subsequent articles.

Image 2: Since 2004, requirements for specific capabilities within the increment series of upgrades have frequently changed over time. For example, increment 3.2B included an auto-GCAS system but it was subsequently removed. Image Credit: Government Accountability Office, 2012

Increment 3.1 - Block 30 Standard Airframes

Image 3: F-22A with increment 3.1 upgrade

The increment 3.1 upgrade adds significant destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD) capabilities to the Raptor and is the process of being fielded with all 149 aircraft will receive increment 3.1 by 2016 (GAO, 2012). The main elements of increment 3.1 include: synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes to the AN/APG-77, electronic attack capabilities, geo-location of electro-magnetic emitters, and GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB I) integration (Defense Industry Daily, 2013). Block 30 and Block 35 aircraft will receive increment 3.1 upgrades for a total of 149 F-22A's with increment 3.1 capabilities (Carlisle, 2011). The combination of increment 3.1 capabilities makes the F-22 arguably the most capable DEAD asset within the USAF.

A four-ship of Increment 3.1 aircraft can successfully find, fix, track, target and engage targets in the most challenging of anti-access environments...Stealth and speed, combined with an advanced electronic attack capability, allow pilots to operate with impunity while achieving their mission objectives. - Lt Colonel Paul Moga, 2012

Increment 3.1 capabilities will prove to be invaluable in dismantling  hostile integrated air-defense systems (IADS) on a large scale, especially in the Pacific. The PRC is procuring increasingly capable arsenal of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the HQ-9, S-300 and possibly the S-400. The F-22's exceptionally small radar cross section (rcs) coupled with geo-location and GBU-39 capability makes the aircraft uniquely suited to cost effectively counter SAM systems. The minimum safe distance between a stealth aircraft and a radar site is usually determined by the aircraft's rear rcs, which is almost always larger than the frontal rcs, as the aircraft has to turn around to head back to base or pursue a new target. In the case of the F-22A, the frontal rcs is  between 0.0001m^2 and 0.0002m^2 while the rear rcs is between .01-.001m^2 (Global Security & Kopp, 2012). The S-400 uses the 92N2E "Grave Stone" AESA engagement radar which would detect the F-22's rear rcs between 40 to 30 nautical miles away as shown on the Air Power Australia image below. The GBU-39 has a maximum stand off range of 60 nautical miles which would enable the F-22 destroy S-400 sites with impunity (Boeing, 2013).

Image 4: Detection ranges for Russian SAM engagement radars. The 92N2E is arguably the most capable X-band SAM radar developed outside of the United States or Europe. The HT-233 PESA engagement radar used by the HQ-9 system is a derivative of the Russian 30N6E1 Tomb Stone (Kopp, 2014).

Block 35 Standard Airframes- Increment 3.2A & 3.2B 

Increment 3.2A

Arguably one of the most significant shortcoming of the current F-22 fleet is its limited compatibility with other systems in terms of communication and data-link capabilities. The F-22 is currently equipped with the minimally detectable intra-flight datalink (IFTL) to share information between other F-22's. The use of conventional data links and communication systems could betray the location of the aircraft to hostile forces equipped with emission locator systems such as the Chinese CETC YLC-20.  However, IFTL can only transmit information between F-22s and not to other assets such as the F-35 or F-15. When IFTL was originally designed, this was a perfectly acceptable as the USAF was originally going to replace its entire F-15C and F-15E inventory with 750 F-22A's.

The F-22 was designed to communicate covertly, only with other F-22s , using the intra-flight datalink (IFDL). Today, the thought of developing a stovepiped system seems unfathomable. But in the 1980s, designers envisioned a massive force of hundreds of F-22s that would maintain stealth in hostile airspace in part by not emitting communications that could be detected. These aircraft would handle the frontline mission of destroying enemy air defenses and establishing air superiority behind hostile lines in an air campaign by communicating only with one another over the IFDL. The original F-22 designers never envisioned the need for the fighter to communicate with legacy fighters, because what was thought to be hundreds of F-22s would be combined with the F-35 to constitute the combat Air Force of the future after older models retired.  - Amy Butler, 2013

Image 7: Operation Western Zephyr. Image Credit: USAF, 2013.

With such a limited force of F-22's, Raptor pilots urgently need to be able to operate seamlessly with older 4th generation aircraft and the F-35. The current fleet of F-22's can receive Link-16 data but cannot transmit  via Link-16 and the data it does receive through Link-16 is not fused with information from its on board sensors (Majumdar, 2012). The limits of the F-22's compatibility with other systems were fully apparent in Operation Western Zephyr conducted in 2013. Raptor pilots had to resort to communicating through unsecured radio channels to British Eurofighter pilots as they were unable to communicate though Link-16 (Axe, 2013). Without increment 3.2A, the USAF has fielded a number of interim solutions such as the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) which has been fitted to a few RQ-4 Global Hawk and  heavily modified BD-700 Global Express aircraft (E-11). BACN effectively translates incompatible communication systems:

[BACN] provides a high-speed, Internet protocol (IP)-based airborne network infrastructure that that extends communications ranges, bridges between radio frequencies, and “translates” among incompatible communications systems – including both tactical and civil cellular systems. Using BACN, a Special Forces soldier on the ground could use a civil cell phone to speak to a fighter pilot in the cockpit. - Defense Industry Daily, 2014

Image 8: BACN payload on board an E-11 aircraft.

While BACN allows the F-22 to communicate in the short term, the USAF possess a limited number of BACN equiped aircraft. Increment 3.2A will serve as a suitable long-term solution as it grants the F-22 two-way Link-16 capabilities and integrates received Link-16 data with on board sensors.

Because sensor fusion does not ‘read’ Link-16 tracks for own-ship solutions, the Raptor will display two tracks – one is own-ship derived from sensor fusion, the other is the Link-16 track – for the same given target,” Getgood says. 'The pilot can declutter the scope should he chose to view only own-ship tracks to reduce pilot workload.'  The Inc 3.2A upgrade fixes that by seamlessly correlating all of the data coming in via the Link-16 with the F-22’s other sensors and datalinks. 'What Increment 3.2A does is that it allows sensor fusion to bring information from those tracks into the solution – it provides just one track now with that data supply' - Majumdar, 2012.

While the Link-16 system will allow the F-22 to operate effectively alongside fourth generation aircraft, the system is not considered to be a  low-probability-intercept system like the multifunction airborne data link (MADL). Until recently, increment 3.2A included provisions to install MADL into the F-22 airframe which would allow it to safely communicate to F-35 aircraft in anti-access environments (Trimble, 2010). The USAF was correct in its decision to choose Link-16 capability over MADL integration for the F-22 given the low number of F-35 aircraft being fielded in the short term (increment 3.2A will be fielded from 2014 to 2016). Furthermore, Link-16 would enable the F-22 to communicate with a much greater range of aircraft including the F-35. However, the lack of LPI in Link-16 is a significant drawback especially if the F-22 is operating in a hostile anti-access environment. Lockheed Martin is currently in the process of working with L-3 Communications to develop a minimally detectable method to allow the F-22 to communicate through Link-16 under "Project Missouri":

The company [Lockheed Martin] recently showcased a new datalink capability for the fighters through Project Missouri, a proprietary program. Lockheed validated the use of a Link 16 transmit capability from the twin-engine F-22 Raptor as well as showcased a waveform developed by L-3 Communications and optimized for low-probability-of-intercept/low-probability-of-detection transmissions (LPI/LPD)...The trials required the use of an Air Force Raptor as well as the F-35 Cooperative Avionics Testbed (CATbird), a 737-based flying laboratory that is used to test F-35 software standing in as a Joint Strike Fighter surrogate. The F-22 was able to transmit to a Link 16 terminal on the ground. - Amy Butler, 2014

The Air Force does not currently have a requirement for a LPI waveform integration for the F-22 but such a capability would prove to be very convenient. Although the main element to increment 3.2A is Link-16 capability, increment 3.2A will also increase the F-22's electronic protection measures as well as adding new combat identification and targeting capabilities (GAO, 2012).

Increment 3.2B 

 

Image 9: AIM-120C-7 launch from F-22A

The increment 3.2B  largely focuses on increasing the F-22's air-to-air capabilities and will be fielded between 2017 and 2020. The upgrade allows the F-22 to utilize the AIM-120D, AIM-9X Block I, and AIM-9X Block II missiles as well as adding improved IFTL capabilities, improved geo-location capabilities, and enhanced electronic protection features (GAO, 2012). At the moment, the F-22 is limited to using older versions of the USAF's main radar guided and IR guided missiles, the AIM-120C-7 and the AIM-9M missiles respectively.

The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAM) is the F-22's main air-to-air weapon and enables the F-22 to engage targets a beyond visual range. In air superiority missions, the F-22 typically carries six AMRAM's which are carried by LAU-142/A pneudraulic hydraulic launchers in its main weapon bay. The latest variant of the AMRAM, the AIM-120D, offers a host of improvements over the current AIM-120C-7 including a two-way data link, high angle off-bore sight capability, global position system-enhanced Inertial Measurement Unit, expanded no escape zone, and 50% greater range (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2012). Although the F-22 is currently capable of firing an AIM-120D as of Update 4 to the Raptor fleet, without the new hardware from increment 3.2B the F-22 will be unable to make use of the AIM-120D's data-link.

Image 10: AIM-9X Block II


The inclusion of the AIM-9X Block I & Block II will significantly increase the F-22's within visual range combat capabilities. The AIM-9X Block I is already in use with 4th generation aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 but it has yet to be fielded on the F-22. The Block I includes a thrust vectoring engine nozzle, improved flare rejecting IR seeker, autopilot, and a new digital processor (Defense Industry Daily, 2014). The combination of these features enables the AIM-9X Block I to preform off-bore sight shots (capable of helmetless high off-boresight shots) and intercept highly agile targets. Block II further improves upon the Block I design:

The 2-way datalink is the most significant single Block II change, as it allows the missile to fly toward targets its seeker can’t yet see, using target position tracking from its fighter. Improved seeker lock-on-after-launch and re-acquisition makes the missile harder to evade, and the new ‘lofting’ fly-out profile boosts the Block II enough to give it some capabilities beyond visual range. - Defense Industry Daily, 2014

Although increment 3.2B will not be fielded on Raptor units until 2017, the USAF will be able use some of the AIM-9X Block II's capabilities by 2015 due to Update 5 software:  

In an effort to get the missile to operational units quickly, the USAF is essentially jury-rigging the AIM-9X on to the F-22. The current aircraft stores management system will recognize the missile as an AIM-9X, but the USAF could not change the missile launch engagement zone displays on the jet given in the time available given the forthcoming ESMS installation. 'A pilot can shoot that as a 9X, however, the aircraft systems, as far as the pilot vehicle interface and things like that display targeting information, will be as if it were a 9M'...Pilots will have the flight envelope to launch the AIM-9X at higher angles-of-attack as well as the ability to cue the missile to its expanded field of view compared to the AIM-9M. What they will lack are the in-cockpit displays, which reflect the increased range and maneuverability of the new weapon. That means that operational testers will have to develop 'rules of thumb' for when frontline pilots should decide to launch the missile. - Dave Majumdar, 2012

The Lock on after launch (LOAL) feature of the Block II will help reduce the potential draw backs stemming from the LAU-141/A trapeze system utilized on the F-22's side weapon bays. The process of opening the side weapon bay doors and launching the AIM-9 from the trapeze system takes several seconds longer to preform when compared to launching an AIM-9 from a conventional wing mounted pylon. In a dogfight, a few seconds can be crucial. With LOAL, the F-22 can preemptively launch the Block II before acquiring the target to expedite the process.

Image 11: AIM-9M-9 mounted on a LAU-141/A hydraulic launcher. From Global Security: "This launcher, which uses some components from the existing LAU-128/A launcher, is basically the wingtip launch rail from an F-16 with a swing out mechanism that extends rapidly. The LAU-141/A is also fitted with a missile motor plume deflector, which prevents damage to the side weapons bay as the missile launches off the rail. Each missile is loaded by opening the doors, extending the rail, sliding it on the rail, retracting the missile, and closing the doors."

Even with the full 3.2B hardware and software modifications, the F-22 will not be able to make full use of the Block II's capabilities without a helmet mounted display like the joint helmet mounted cueing system JHMCS or the Scorpion system. The USAF originally planned to integrate the Scorpion HMD system with the F-22 but the program was cancelled as a result of sequestration (more info about HMD's in Part V).

Sources 

1. F-22, Defense Update, 2008.                                                                                                     http://defense-update.com/features/2008/may08/F22_datalink_gateway.htm
2. Lockheed Secretly Demonstrates New Stealthy Fighter Comms Amy Butler, 2014. http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_02_25_2014_p0-666721.xml&p=1
3. HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM System Battery Radars, Kopp, 2014.                   http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-HQ-9-12-Battery-Radars.html
4. PLA Air Defence Radars, Kopp, 2014.                                                           http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-IADS-Radars.html#mozTocId564962
5. Search and Acquisition Radars  (S-Band, X-band), Kopp, 2014.                 http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Acquisition-GCI.html
6. U.S. Air Force Extends BACN Com-Relay Biz Jets Operations in Kandahar, Tamir Eshel, 2011. http://defense-update.com/20110921_u-s-air-force-extends-bcan-com-relay-biz-jets-operations-in-kandahar.html
7. Top U.S. Stealth Jet Has to Talk to Allied Planes Over Unsecured Radio, David Axe, 2013. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/incompatible-comms-stealth/
8. F-22 Raptor  Air Dominance Fighter, Defense Update, 2009.                                                     http://defense-update.com/products/f/f-22.htm
9. AIM-9X Block II & Beyond: The New Sidewinder Missiles, Defense Industry Daily, 2014. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/aim-9x-block-ii-the-new-sidewinder-missile-011572/
10. USAF F-22 Raptors participate in Trident Warrior 2013, Dave Majumdar, 2013.  http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2013/07/usaf-f-22-raptors-participate-in-trident-warrior-2013/
11. Final Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor delivered to the USAF today, Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/05/final-lockheed-martin-f-22-rap/
12. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 2012.  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf
13. Obama Praises Senate Vote on F-22 Funding, Fred W. Baker III, 2009.  http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55210
14. IN FOCUS: USAF receives last F-22 Raptor,  Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-usaf-receives-last-f-22-raptor-371401/
15. Lockheed Martin / Boeing F-22 Raptor Air Dominance Fighter, Dan Alex, 2013.  http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=20
16. F-22 Raptor, United States Air Force, 2005.  http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104506/f-22-raptor.aspx
17. Economic Club of Chicago Speach, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2009. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1369
18. F-22 Raptor Specifications, Global Security, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-specs.htm
19. Statement of Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs, Ronald O'Rourke, 2013.  http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-ORourkeR-20131211.pdf
20. Air Force F-22 Fighter Program, Jeremiah Gertler, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf
21. Moving Time, Marc V. Schanz, 2011.   http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/September%202011/0911moving.aspx
22. Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030, Defense Science Board, 2013. http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/DSB2030-TechnologyInnovationEnablers2030.pdf  
23. Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion & Scott Perdue (RAND), 2008. 
24. Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific(RAND), Eric Stephen Gons, 2010. 
25. Current/Projected F-22 inventory, BDF, 2009.                                                                       http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=11789
26. Don't scoff the duck: Adversary Air conducts key role in air dominance training, Jeffrey Vanderbilt, 2013.                                                                                                                         http://www.tyndall.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123366527 
27. Reduced Flying Hours Forces USAF To Ground 17 Combat Air Squadrons, Brian Everstine & Marcus Weisgerber, 2013.   http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130408/DEFREG02/304080011/Reduced-Flying-Hours-Forces-USAF-Ground-17-Combat-Air-Squadrons 
28.  Raptors for the Long Haul, Marc V. Schanz, 2012. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/April%202012/0412raptor.aspx
29. T-38s resurrected as aggressors for F-22s, Paul Koscak, 2011.  http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20110123/NEWS/101230314/T-38s-resurrected-aggressors-F-22s 
30. USAF activates new F-22 squadron at Tyndall AFB, Dave Majumdar, 2013.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-activates-new-f-22-squadron-at-tyndall-afb-391658/ 
31. T-38 Talons help keep Raptors sharp in training, Hugh Lessig, 2012.   http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-04-29/news/dp-nws-cp-f22-training-20120429_1_raptor-pilot-training-exercises-27th-fighter-squadron
32. F-22 Raptor Deployment, Global Security, 2011.  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-deploy.htm
33. F-16 Fighting Falcon Service Life, Global Security, 2012.        http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-life.htm
34.  How many Raptors does the USAF have left?, Dave Majumdar, 2012.    http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/11/how-many-raptors-does-the-usaf/
35. Air Force to consolidate F-22 depot maintenance at Hill AFB, AFNS, 2013.                                      http://www.f-16.net/f-22-news-article4743.html
36. F-22 Weapons, Global Security, 2011.                                                                                             http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-weapons.htm
37. Lockheed Martin eyes common architecture for F-35, F-22; Stephen Trimble, 2010.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-eyes-common-architecture-for-f-35-f-22-349062/

The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II Adaptations to Budget Cuts

Image 1: Rapid deployment of F-22's to Wake island. Image Credit: Connie Reed

Author's Note: I had hoped to combine the segment discussing cost saving measures with other content as it it is quite dry but for the sake of brevity, what originally was supposed to be one article turned into three. Part III will contain information about current upgrades and part IV will discuss new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) being developed for the F-22. As compensation for the shorte article, I can guarantee articles will be published every Monday for at least the next two weeks and likely the next three weeks.

The USAF has daunting task of adapting its limited Raptor fleet to meet the national security challenges posed by an assertive near peer adversary in an environment of constrained fiscal resources. Fortunately, the USAF has formulated a number of intelligent strategies to keep its Raptor force relevant well into the 2030s on a limited budget. The main elements to the USAF's effort to sustain its force of F-22's under sequestration are base restructuring, cost-effective training measures, and consolidation of F-22 maintenance facilities.

Adaptations to Budget Cuts 

Base Restructuring 

Image 2: F-22A's from Holloman AFB

Prior to sequestration, a total of five bases housed active F-22 fighter squadrons:  Langley- Eustis Virginia, Tyndall Florida, Holloman New Mexico,  Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska, and Pearl Harbor-Hickam Hawaii. A small number of aircraft are also stationed at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) in California and Nellis AFB in Nevada for test and evaluation and training purposes. As a result of the Raptor base restructuring plan, all F-22A aircraft from both the 7th and 8th FS at Holloman were reassigned. F-22's from the 7th FS were transferred to Tyndall AFB Florida which now hosts the largest number of F-22's within the USAF at 56 aircraft. However, 34 of the 56 aircraft at Tyndall will serve in the Tyndall school house and are not scheduled to receive further upgrades or serve in a combat capacity. Finding the exact inventory of F-22's per base is difficult due to the early termination of raptor production, three F-22 crashes, and the new base restructuring plan. Typically, 24 fighter aircraft comprise a full fighter squadron and three squadrons comprise a full fighter wing of 72 aircraft (Global Security, 2011). Global security explains how combat designated F-22's would have originally been organized:

"Each of the three squadrons would be composed of 24 PAI [Primary Aircraft Inventory] F-22s plus 2 BAI [Backup Aircraft Inventory] F-22s. As such, the Initial F-22 Operational Wing would include 72 PAI and 6 BAI aircraft. PAI consists of the aircraft authorized and assigned to perform the squadron's missions in training, deployment, and combat. BAI includes those aircraft additional to the PAI that are used as substitutes for PAI aircraft undergoing maintenance, repairs, or inspections. BAI aircraft, as substitutes, permit the squadron to be at its fully authorized strength (24 aircraft). All training, deployment, and other mission activities are based on the number of PAI aircraft in a squadron." - Global Security, 2014

However, due to production shutting down upon reaching 195 aircraft with 187 aircraft delivered to the USAF, the current USAF inventory of 184 aircraft (three crashes) does not neatly break down into standard 24 aircraft squadrons. For example, the 199th FS based at Hickam only operates 18 F-22A aircraft (Global Security, 2011). When attrition reserve/BAI, test and evaluation, and training aircraft categories are included, it becomes even more difficult to discern the precise allocation of F-22s. The following are three sources which detail the existing USAF F-22A inventory.

Air Combat Command 2012:               Air Force Times (Schanz) 2011:           CRS 2013

123 combat-coded                             149 combat-coded  (including BAI)            177 production aircraft
27 training                                           34 training Tyndall                                 15 PRTV* aircraft
16 test and evaluation                           (?)                                                        1 replacement test aircraft
20 attrition reserve                                                                                            2  EMD* aircraft

Total: 186                                           Total: 183+                                            Total: 195

* PRTV - Production Representative Test Vehicle
*EMD - Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Note: CRS data does not factor in crashes.

With the deactivation of the 7th and 8th FS based at Holloman, Langley- Eustis and Elmendorf-Richardson currently maintain the largest inventory of PAI F-22's. Both Langley- Eustis and Elmendorf-Richardson received six aircraft originally from the 8th FS for a total of more than 40 PAI F-22's each. (Schanz & Global Security, 2011). The remaining two F-22's from the 8th FS were sent to Nellis. Although the decision to consolidate the USAF Raptor fleet was principally driven by limited financial resources, the new restructuring plan also was affected by the extensive training infrastructure of Tyndall AFB and the relative age of the airframes.

Image 3: F-22's from the 90th FS based at Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska.

The restructuring of the fleet was conducted in a manner as to consolidate the most modern airframes at Langley and Elmendorf and the older aircraft at Hickam and Tyndall (Schanz, 2011). This ensures that the most modern aircraft are evenly distributed across the huge geographical distances between F-22 bases.  

"The fleet is not monolithic, and another factor involved in moving around F-22s is to consolidate more-capable Block 30s and 35s at certain locations to make sure they can be utilized to their full extent...Newer aircraft arrive and older aircraft, some delivered five years ago, go to Hickam or Holloman [now Tyndall]. This is part of the fleet management plan. It 'also deals with newer versus older jets,' Akers said, noting there is a broader effort to put most of the Block 30 and 35 aircraft at Langley and Elmendorf, to make sure the capability is evenly bedded down." - Schanz, 2011

The current fleet is comprised of 34 Block 20, 63 Block 30, 86 Block 35 aircraft (Block details explained in upgrades section Part III).

Cost Effective Training 

Image 4: T-38 trainer with F-22 near Tyndall AFB Florida

Fighter pilots in the USAF regularly fly 250 to 300 hours each year in order to remain proficient with their aircraft (Global Security, 2012). F-22 airframes in particular are utilized frequently in exercises relative to other fighter aircraft within the USAF given the limited F-22 fleet size and the nature of its capabilities (Schanz 2012). However, the F-22 is the most expensive fighter aircraft in the USAF inventory to maintain at approximately $44,250 dollars spent in maintenance costs for each hour spent in the air. In a hostile fiscal environment, high maintenance and sustainment costs dramatically affect unit readiness. When the USAF's budget for flying hours was reduced by $591 million dollars from April to September of 2013, F-22 units were allotted less flying hours in order to find savings (Brian Everstine & Marcus Weisgerber, 2013). The 94th FS based in  Langley was grounded and the 27th FS (also based at Langley) was reduced from combat mission ready to basic mission capable status. The combination of sequestration and frequent wear on the airframes has forced the USAF to find alternate cost effective techniques to maintain the skills of its Raptor pilots.

"They began to take steps to reduce Raptor hours; these included supplementing pilots’ reduced F-22 time with flying hours in a T-38 companion trainer as well as heavier simulator use and other substitutes." - Schanz 2012

The 325th Fighter Wing based at Tyndall has 20 T-38 trainers which provide a cost effective means of providing adversarial training for Raptor pilots. The T-38's maintenance costs are an entire order of magnitude lower than the Raptor's at approximately $3,300 an hour.

"While the T-38 is no match for the F-22, it offers the Air Force a relatively cheap way to keep fighter pilots sharp...Using T-38s as aggressors saves fuel and gives F-22 pilots experience in being attacked by multiple aircraft rather than dueling among themselves, Wyler said. 'It's highly desired to be outnumbered'". - Koscak, 2011

In most conceivable scenarios, F-22 pilots will be significantly outnumbered by enemy forces as a result the limited F-22 fleet size. Thus, it is standard practice for multiple T-38s to engage a single F-22 pilot at visual range. In order to add another level of difficulty for Raptor pilots, the 325th's T-38 are painted in a black camouflage scheme which in conjunction with its small size makes it difficult to visually detect over the dark background of the open ocean where many training exercises take place (Lessig, 2012).

Consolidation of Maintenance Facilities

Image 5: Airman 1st Class Freddie Newman applying coatings to an F-22 at Tyndall. Image Credit: Alex Echols, 2013).

In a similar manner to the base restructuring plan, the USAF has had to consolidate its heavy maintenance facilities related to the F-22 to a single facility. Heavy maintenance work on the F-22 has traditionally been preformed at either Lockheed Martin's facilities in Palmdale California or Ogden Air Logistics Complex at Hill AFB Utah. The USAF determined by consolidating maintenance work to Ogden it could save $16 million dollars annually (Majumdar, 2013). The transition from Palmdale to Ogden is expected to take 31 months.

PART III

Sources

1. Final Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor delivered to the USAF today, Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/05/final-lockheed-martin-f-22-rap/
2. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 2012.  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf
3. Obama Praises Senate Vote on F-22 Funding, Fred W. Baker III, 2009.  http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55210
4. IN FOCUS: USAF receives last F-22 Raptor,  Dave Majumdar, 2012.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-usaf-receives-last-f-22-raptor-371401/
5. Lockheed Martin / Boeing F-22 Raptor Air Dominance Fighter, Dan Alex, 2013.  http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=20
6. F-22 Raptor, United States Air Force, 2005.  http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104506/f-22-raptor.aspx
7. Economic Club of Chicago Speach, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2009. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1369
8. F-22 Raptor Specifications, Global Security, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-specs.htm
9. Statement of Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs, Ronald O'Rourke, 2013.  http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-ORourkeR-20131211.pdf
10. Air Force F-22 Fighter Program, Jeremiah Gertler, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf
11. Moving Time, Marc V. Schanz, 2011.   http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/September%202011/0911moving.aspx
12. Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030, Defense Science Board, 2013. http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/DSB2030-TechnologyInnovationEnablers2030.pdf  
13. Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion & Scott Perdue (RAND), 2008. 
14. Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific(RAND), Eric Stephen Gons, 2010. 
15. Current/Projected F-22 inventory, BDF, 2009.                                                                       http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=11789
16. Don't scoff the duck: Adversary Air conducts key role in air dominance training, Jeffrey Vanderbilt, 2013.                                                                                                                         http://www.tyndall.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123366527 
17. Reduced Flying Hours Forces USAF To Ground 17 Combat Air Squadrons, Brian Everstine & Marcus Weisgerber, 2013.   http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130408/DEFREG02/304080011/Reduced-Flying-Hours-Forces-USAF-Ground-17-Combat-Air-Squadrons 
18.  Raptors for the Long Haul, Marc V. Schanz, 2012. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/April%202012/0412raptor.aspx
19. T-38s resurrected as aggressors for F-22s, Paul Koscak, 2011.  http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20110123/NEWS/101230314/T-38s-resurrected-aggressors-F-22s 
20. USAF activates new F-22 squadron at Tyndall AFB, Dave Majumdar, 2013.  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-activates-new-f-22-squadron-at-tyndall-afb-391658/ 
21. T-38 Talons help keep Raptors sharp in training, Hugh Lessig, 2012.   http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-04-29/news/dp-nws-cp-f22-training-20120429_1_raptor-pilot-training-exercises-27th-fighter-squadron
22. F-22 Raptor Deployment, Global Security, 2011.  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-deploy.htm
23. F-16 Fighting Falcon Service Life, Global Security, 2012.        http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-life.htm
24.  How many Raptors does the USAF have left?, Dave Majumdar, 2012.    http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/11/how-many-raptors-does-the-usaf/
25. Air Force to consolidate F-22 depot maintenance at Hill AFB, AFNS, 2013.                                      http://www.f-16.net/f-22-news-article4743.html