Links of the Week

U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to PLA Naval Forces Modernization  House Armed Services Committee  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Four of arguably the most knowledgeable US experts on China including Dr. Andrew Erickson testify before Congress on China's Naval modernization. Some of Erickson's testimony:  

"Washington must be careful not to compete with Beijing in excessively expensive and ultimately ineffective arms competitions. It should not counter China’s A2/AD weapons by attempting to acquire a more sophisticated, expensive counter in each and every instance...Instead, as China works to deny U.S. forces an ability to operate close to the mainland, the U.S. aim at a minimum should be to deny China the ability to resolve territorial and maritime disputes by the use of force. To resolve disputes conclusively, China would have seize and hold territory and also resupply its forces. This is inherently difficult on small islands, where geography imposes vulnerability. To demonstrate that China cannot achieve this, and thereby deter it from ever trying, the U.S. and its allies should maximize disruption capabilities—their own form of A2/AD....U.S. submarines can oppose any Chinese naval forces engaged in invasion, resupply, and protection. Long-range air or missile delivery can blow any lodgment off disputed islands or rocks. To be sure, both U.S. SSNs and LRASMs and Chinese A2/AD forces could achieve denial effects. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air missiles from both sides might hold operations in the air over the features in question at risk, prevent continuous operations, or even fully create a 'No Man’s Land'. U.S. forces, other than SSNs, might not be able to operate without assuming great risk, and hence be denied unfettered access. But Chinese forces would also not have access, and would also be denied their objective of seizing and holding disputed territory. It might not be necessary to defeat China militarily; preventing it from achieving its objectives would suffice. Demonstrating this to China would be an effective deterrent: Beijing could not afford to risk the likelihood of not achieving its objective." - Dr. Andrew Erickson, 2013 

Testimony (Video): http://armedservices.granicus.com/ViewPublisher.php?view_id=2

- video name U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to P.L.A. Naval Forces Modernization (Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces) 12/11/13

Written statements: http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=FA9EE283-A136-4C44-B489-F1814AFAB9EA

U.S. Navy-China showdown: Chinese try to halt U.S. cruiser in international waters - By Bill Gertz 

While conducting surveillance of the Liaoning in international waters, the guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens was ordered to stop by Chinese naval vessels. As the Cowpens was in international waters, US sailors ignored PLAN demands. A PLAN vessel abruptly moved in front of the Cowpens resulting in a near collision.

From Russia without Love: Russia Resumes Weapons Sales to China - By Loro Horta

A detailed examination of why Russia is willing to sell some of its most advanced weaponry to China despite the risk of reverse engineering. 

North Korea: The Dramatic Fall of Jang Song Thaek - By Alexandre Mansourov

A detailed look at how Jang Song Thaek, the former second highest ranking North Korean official, was likely ousted from power and subsequently executed. 

The Chilling Geometry of Every US Military Base Seen From Space - By Mario Aguilar

New Russian Air-to-Air Missiles Will Field Almost Perfect Accuracy - By Ankit Panda

“An active phased array antenna consists of a large number of cone-shaped cells installed under a transparent-to-radio-waves cap on the nose of the missile. Each cell receives only a part of the signal, but once digitally processed, the information from all cells is summarized into a ‘full picture,’ enabling the K-77M missile to immediately respond to sharp turns of the target, making interception practically inevitable.”

With no disrespect to my Russian colleges, this seems like a pipe dream and this is certainly not an actual revolutionary capability.  In order to successfully complete an air-to-air intercept, the missile must first successfully find and the desired target. Secondly, the missile kinetically intercept it. Nearly all methods of defeating a air-to-air missile involve disrupting the two aforementioned processes e.g. maneuvering and chaff or a towed decoy system like the AN/ALE-55. Missiles have become increasingly adept at the kinetic intercept aspect with the addition of thrust vectoring nozzles (e.g. jet vane control AIM-9X) but the guidance area is where missiles can still be routinely defeated. My understanding of the K-77M is it is more adept at the kinetic intercept aspect but just as vulnerable to failure if the Missile is jammed with an AESA or the aircraft uses a towed decoy, etc.

Chinese unmanned spacecraft lands on moon - By Pete Sweeney

On a not so serious note: While China may have just landed a rover on the moon, the US has them beat by about half a century. Some sweet footage from Apollo 16...MURICA.