Threat Analysis of Foreign Stealth Fighters Part I: Chengdu J-20

In early 2011 China shocked the world by unveiling its first stealth aircraft, the Chengdu J-20. From publicly disclosed statements, it became evident that few individuals within U.S intelligence community thought that China would possess a stealth fighter this early in the decade. The debut of the J-20 came only a year after The Russian Federation publicly unveiled its own stealth fighter, the PAK FA T-50, for the first time. The unveiling of the J-20 and PAK FA T-50 speak volumes of the pace of technological advancement within their respective countries in relation to the United States. The United States can no longer take its head start and former monopoly on stealth aircraft for granted. This will be a two part article that will assess the capabilities and the U.S military policy ramifications of the J-20 and PAK FA.

Image 1: Artistic rendering of Chengdu J-20 destroying a Japanese F-2 fighter. Note how the J-20 in the illustration retains the data probe on the nose of the aircraft despite the fact that the aircraft shown is in service. Data probes are only featured on prototypes or test aircraft (Image credit: Chinese Military Review)

In terms of empirical facts, very little is actually known about the Chengdu J-20. Much of the publicly available information on the J-20 is not based on hard evidence. Endless speculation abounds on seemingly basic information: How did the Chinese develop a stealth aircraft so fast?  How stealthy is the J-20? What its intended role of the J-20 as an aircraft? How much of a threat does the J-20 actually pose for U.S fighter aircraft and installations as well as the fighter aircraft of neighboring countries?  This article will seek to answer these questions with FACTS and the very best estimates made by unbiased reputable aviation experts rather than the patriotic musings of Chinese internet fanboys.

Figure 2: Crew inspecting first J-20 prototype

How Did China Obtain a Stealth Fighter So Quickly? 

“'Between legal, quasi-legal [diverted], and espionage-based tech transfer, I'm sure that China has obtained most of the data available on how we build our stealthy aircraft structures and the materials involved,' the intelligence official says. 'They also have taken full advantage of our open patent system, our open engineering undergrad and grad schools, our publish-or-perish academic promotion process, and the ease with which an integrated, centralized [government] can thwart artificial, social-democratic distinctions between military, police, civil and commercial data.'” - Anonymous intelligence official reporting to Aviation Week, 2012 

The exact origins of the J-20 are shrouded in secrecy. However, it is likely that at least some aspects of the J-20's design are the result of multiple attempts at reverse engineering U.S stealth technology. China's obsession with reverse engineering has an established historical precedent dating back to the origin of the nation itself. (see blog article: Made in China? A History of Reverse Engineering for examples) In 1999 during the NATO mission within Serbia, a single F-117 Nighthawk was shot down by a surface to air missile. Following the crash, Chinese agents were dispatched to recover parts from the wreckage. 

"At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the plane from local farmers," - Croatian Adm. Davor Domazet-Loso

With one glance it becomes inherently obvious that the J-20 does not look like the Lockheed built F-117 Nighthawk. The two planes utilize a different method of incorporating stealth within the airframe. (REF. NOTE 1) However, the stealth coatings found on the wreckage of the F-117 would be invaluable in determining the composition of the highly classified RAM (radar absorbent material) coatings. Another source of information regarding stealth technology came from former Northrup Grumman engineer Noshir Gowadia. Gowadia provided information relating to his work on the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber and other classified projects to a host of foreign governments including: Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and China. (ABC News, 2006) Lastly, Lockheed Martin and even the Pentagon itself are the constant victim of highly organized and sophisticated Chinese hacking attempts. It is probable that information regarding American stealth technology was obtained through Chinese cyber attacks. For example, In 2009 information was released that indicated the Pentagon was attacked by hackers from China (Journal for Strategic Security, 2011) During 2007-2008 hackers stole information pertinent to the F-35 Lightening II, the future backbone of America's stealth arsenal. 

"The intruders appear to have been interested in data about the design of the plane, its performance statistics and its electronic systems, former officials said. The intruders compromised the system responsible for diagnosing a plane's maintenance problems during flight, according to officials familiar with the matter. However, the plane's most vital systems -- such as flight controls and sensors -- are physically isolated from the publicly accessible Internet, they said… The spies inserted technology that encrypts the data as it's being stolen; as a result, investigators can't tell exactly what data has been taken." - Wall Street Journal, 2009 

"In 2009, there was a forced electronic entry into the Joint Strike Fighter program and large amounts of data were copied.  According to present and former employees at the Pentagon, the attack can be traced to China. This could mean that it would be easy for China to defend itself  against the aircraft (which many western countries expect to acquire) and, assuming the attackers have acquired enough data, they may even be able to copy parts of it.  The American chief of counterintelligence has been reported as saying that "our networks are being mapped" with reference to American flight traffic control, and also as having warned about a situation in which "a fighter pilot can't trust his radar." - Journal of Strategic Security Volume IV Issue 2 2011

China constantly tests the envelope of what qualifies as Casus Belli, an act of war, through its repeated and invasive cyber attacks on the United States. In addition to obtaining information regarding U.S stealth technology, some analysts believe China was able to get information from the Russian Mikoyan 1.42/1.44 Multi Role Fighter (MFI) program. The Mikoyan 1.44 was designed to compete with the winner of the American Advanced Tactical Fighter competition, the YF-22. Although Russia claimed the 1.44 MFI could out preform the YF-22, virtually no foreign observers agreed with that assessment. The claim that the Mikoyan 1.44 was stealthier than the YF-22 was especially dubious.

"The conclusion which can be drawn is that the MFI may outperform the Eurocanards for RCS performance if radar absorbent materials are used generously, the nose chined, the fuselage wing interface and spine blended, and internal weapons carried. It will never be competitive with the edge aligned, faceted, and chined F-22A design (or the chined and blended YF-23 ATF demonstrator). The statements emanating from Russia clearly contradict the technically evident and have been described as a transparent marketing ploy, in the context of the somewhat byzantine post Soviet defence acquisition system." - Air Power Australia, 2005

Despite the MFI's shortcomings, the J-20 bears an uncanny resemblance to the abandoned MFI prototype. Adil Mukashev, an expert on Chinese-Russian ties, asserts that Russia likely sold MFI fighter parts to China. Sources within Russia suggest that China might have gotten access to key information on the MFI design. (The Guardian, 2011)

"It looks like they got access... to documents relating to the Mikoyan - the aircraft that the Ministry of Defense skipped over in its tender to create a stealth fighter" - Anonymous Russian source reporting to The Guardian, 2011

Although both aircraft share a number of design similarities such as the tail, there are important differences between the MFI and J-20. The chined nose employed on the J-20 is characteristic of the F-22A. The trapezoidal engine inlets are also "borrowed" from the F-22A and are utilized in conjunction to the enlarged Diverterless Supersonic Inlet features from the F-35. The flat lower fuselage is also remarkably similar to the F-22A design. (APA, 2011)

Image 3: Mikoyan 1.44 MFI aircraft on debut in 1998

Image 4: The first Chengdu J-20 undergoing flight testing

It is important not to dismiss the J-20 as purely the product of fruitful reverse engineering attempts. While China has no doubt at least obtained some elements or techniques used in the J-20's design from the United States and even Russia, China's ability to create new technological solutions has rapidly improved over the last few decades. Although China's domestic ability to innovate lags behind the United States and Russia, China continues to invest heavily in its science and engineering programs. The theory that China utilized at least some degree of reverse engineering helps answer how China was able to design a stealth fighter quicker than anyone expected.  

How Stealthy is the J-20? 

The hottest point of contention between aviation experts on the J-20 is how stealthy the airframe actually is. Official radar cross section (rcs) figures for the J-20 are impossible to find due to the fact that it is in China's best interest not to release such information. That said, a massive disparity exists between the different rcs estimates for J-20. On the high rcs side estimates, some argue that the J-20 features a merely reduced radar cross section similar to 4.5 generation fighters. Comparatively, some  argue that the J-20 design boasts a very low observable designation similar to the F-22A. In order to understand how stealthy the J-20 airframe is, a better understanding of stealth is required. An aircraft given a stealth designation means that the given airframe will reflect the vast majority of radar waves away from the source and hence has a low radar cross section. It gets more complicated when multiple bands or frequencies utilized in radars are factored into the equation. (e.g. I, J, H, X band radars, etc.) Calculating the rcs of an object is a very complicated and arduous process. 

"The radar cross section (RCS) of a target is defined as the effective area intercepting an amount of incident power which, when scattered isotropically, produces a level of reflected power at the radar equal to that from the target. RCS calculations require broad and extensive technical knowledge, thus many scientists and scholars find the subject challenging and intellectually motivating. This is a very complex field that defies simple explanation, and any short treatment is only a very rough approximation...The units of radar cross section are square meters; however, the radar cross section is NOT the same as the area of the target. Because of the wide range of amplitudes typically encountered on a target, RCS is frequently expressed in dBsm, or decibels relative to one square meter. The RCS is the projected area of a metal sphere that is large compared with the wavelength and that, if substituted for the object, would scatter identically the same power back to the radar." - Global Security, 2011

The radar cross section of an aircraft is different for each side of the airframe facing the radar source. In order to qualify as an all aspect stealth aircraft (e.g. F-22A, B-2) the airframe must not reflect radar waves from all sides of the airframe. The stealth designation is variable and does not mean all stealth aircraft have the same radar cross section. Here are some examples of aircraft and their frontal radar cross section figures and estimates. 

Estimates taken from Global Security (2011 and 2012) and Illinois State University (1997) 

Conventional and reduced radar cross section aircraft 

B-52 radar cross section = 40-50 m^2

B-1B radar cross section = 1m^2

F-15C radar cross section = 5m^2

Stealth aircraft 

B-2 Spirit radar cross section =  .01m^2 (mid range estimate, lowest rcs estimate .0001m^2)

F-35A radar cross section = .0013 m^2

F-22A radar cross section =  .0001 m^2 (-40 dBSM) 

Note: size has nothing to do with an rcs figure. The 51.4 ft long F-35 has an rcs 13 times larger than the highly refined 62ft long design of the F-22A. Yet, both aircraft qualify for the stealth designation. It is also worth noting that there are other components to stealth aside from an aircraft's radar signature. Stealth aircraft also have to reduce their include infrared (IR), radio frequency, and even visual signatures.

Image 5: This image highlights the extensive stealth features Incorporated within the J-20 design. (more details given below)


Now that a better definition of stealth has been provided, an analysis of the J-20's stealth potential can be given. First and foremost it should be noted that the J-20 design features canards. With the exception of the J-20, no verified full aspect stealth aircraft design features canards e.g. F-22A, YF-23, F-35, PAK FA. Russian and American Aerospace companies choose not to incorporate canards for a simple reason, they have terrible stealth characteristics. (Sweetman, 1997) Incorporating canards inherently limits the J-20's stealth qualities from a frontal aspect. Despite the fact that planform alignment is used in regards to the canards and extensive RAM coatings are no doubt utilized, it does not change the fact that canards yield terrible stealth results. Given the usage of the two techniques listed above, the poor rcs qualities of the canards will be mitigated but not completely eliminated. Thus, any estimates that claim the J-20 is stealthier or comparable to the F-22A can be outright eliminated.

Aside from the canards however, the J-20 design retains a stealthy frontal rcs. The design of the engine inlets,  chined  nose, flat lower fuselage, sawtooth design incorporation on internal bays, and extensive use of planform alignment should reduce the airframe's frontal radar signature considerably. It is hard to say if the J-20 design qualifies for the very low observable designation of -30 dBSM or lower because of its incorporation of canards. Dr. Carlo Kopp of the Australian based think tank, Air Power Australia, conducted a very thorough analysis of the J-20. He concluded that the J-20 qualifies as a very low observable aircraft. Other aviation experts such as Bill Sweetman are more reserved. Overall, the frontal aspect of the  J-20 design has a good chance of qualifying for low observable (-20 dBSM or .01m^2) designation. It is unlikely that it is any stealthier than -20 dBSM because of its incorporation of canards.

Although the frontal aspect of the J-20 qualifies as at least for the low observable designation, the rear of the aircraft is a completely different story. The engine nozzles are completely exposed to both radar and IR detection methods. True all aspect stealth aircraft such as the F-22A shield the rear of the aircraft from detection. Unless the J-20 wants an AIM-9X shot strait up its tail pipe, China better remedy this problem.

Image 6: Rear of J-20. Note the exposed engine nozzles.

Image 7: Rear of F-22A Raptor. Note the protected 2-D thrust vectoring nozzles that both reduce the raptor's rear rcs signature as well as its IR signature.

Because the current J-20 in flight testing is likely a prototype, it is possible that the airframe will undergo numerous design changes. For example, the YF-22 went through numerous design alterations to become the F-22A. It is possible that the rear of the J-20 will be better protected on the final production version of the J-20.  Sawthooth engine nozzles will better protect the J-20 from enemy radars from the rear aspect but will not provide the same level of protection as the 2-D nozzles mounted on the F-22A.

“The biggest uncertainty about the design concerns the engine exhausts, which as seen on the prototype are likely to cause a radar cross-section (RCS) peak from the rear aspect. One possibility is that a stealthier two-dimensional nozzle will be integrated later in the program:  however, the nozzles on the current aircraft show some signs of RCS-reducing saw-tooth treatment, suggesting that the PLA has accepted a rear-aspect RCS penalty rather than the much greater weight and complexity of 2-D nozzles.” - Bill Sweetman and David Fulghum, 2011 

"The rear-aspect view of the aircraft is not as stealthy, a feature also seen on the Sukhoi T-50. This is clearly an intentional trade, eliminating the heavy 2D nozzles of the F-22. In this respect, both the T-50 and J-20 reflect the philosophy behind the pre-1986 Advanced Tactical Fighter studies that preceded the F-22, based on the theory that a fast, high-flying, agile aircraft is relatively immune from rear-quarter attacks." - Bill Sweetman, 2012

What its intended role of the J-20 as an aircraft? 

The most mysterious questions regarding the J-20 is what is its purpose? China has not provided an answer as to what the J-20's intended role is. The most compelling theory as to what the role of the J-20 will be is provided by Dr. Kopp. Kopp believes that the J-20 will act as a theatre range strike bomber similar to the proposed FB-22 while maintaining the ability to dogfight. The J-20 is an extremely large aircraft relative to other 5th generation fighters. No official spesifications have been released but estimates suggest the aircraft is nearly 70 feet long. (Some estimates put the J-20 at 75 feet long)

"The J-20 is a single-seat, twin-engine aircraft, bigger and heavier than the Sukhoi T-50 and the F-22... which would suggest a takeoff weight in the 75,000-80,000-lb. class with no external load. That in turn implies a generous internal fuel capacity. The overall length is close to that of the 1960s General Dynamics F-111, which carries 34,000 lb. of fuel." -Global Security 2011

Image 9: With such a large supply of internal fuel, the J-20 could have an unrefueled range of 1,000-1,500 nautical miles. If the J-20 features supercruise, in addition to its high fuel capacity, its combat radius will be extensive. According to the DOD, in a war with the United States, China would likely seek to maintain control over areas up to the second island chain shown on the map. An extended range stealth strike aircraft like the J-20 would fit well into this role. The J-20 would penetrate U.S integrated air defense systems (IADS) and hit U.S installations using its stealthy frontal rcs.  (Image credit: Air Power Australia, Kopp, 2011)

Although the J-20 will likely preform bombing missions, it retains the ability to dogfight. The J-20's incorporation of canards suggests that maneuverability was a key requirement of the design. Although canards will damage the J-20's stealth prospects as mentioned earlier, the J-20 will have excellent angle of attack capabilities and turning abilities because of the incorporation of canards.

How much of a threat does the J-20 actually pose for the United States and its allies? 

With the J-20 likely to enter service between 2017-2019, the United States must be prepared. Before possible and active U.S responses are analyzed its worth mentioning several key potential problems Chengdu is likely to face in the development of the J-20. First an foremost the biggest concern with the J-20 lies in its engines, the Russian designed AL-31F. The AL-31F was designed for use in the Su-27. China has struggled to domestically produce capable jet engines for its growing fighter fleet and heavily relies on Russian exports. The second prototype currently undergoing flight testing, the 2002 aircraft, is said to feature the domestically produced WS-10 which is a copy of the AL-31F. Its unclear if the WS-10 is capable of super cruise or produces enough thrust to keep the large J-20 airframe maneuverable. What is clear is that the WS-10 has experienced numerous performance issues. (Axe, 2011)  

Another key problem with the J-20 and Chinese fighters in general lies in the lack of capable avionics. Chinese built avionic systems are woefully far behind their American and Russian counterparts. Its unclear if the Chinese have actually been able to produce a capable active scanned electronic array (AESA) radar. The domestically produced J-10 features a mechanically scanned radar comparable to U.S fighter radars used in the early 1990s. (Sinodefense, 2009). For example, the radar used in the J-10 can track 10 targets while engaging 4 targets vs the F-15's AN/APG-63 (V) 1 radar built in the 1990s can track 14 and engage 6) Although stealth is the primary qualifier for the designation of a 5th generation fighter, other important qualifiers such as avionics matter. Without a capable AESA radar system, sensor fusion, or and HMD the J-20 will not be able to fullly capitalize on its stealth design. With those limitations in mind, a threat analysis of the J-20 will follow. 

U.S Military Recommendation I: Harden Pacific Airbases 

With a stealthy frontal rcs of around -20 dBSM (.01m^2), the J-20 will likely be able to avoid detection long enough for it to come into weapons range of U.S bases. Given its range and considerable payload capacity, the J-20 could pose a major threat to U.S airbases. If the J-20 is outfitted with long range low observable air to surface missiles the J-20 could pose an even greater security risk.  At the moment, few U.S airbases within the area are hardened (with the exception of Kadena AFB which has limited protection of 30 hardened aircraft shelters). This means that U.S airbases are vulnerable to attack if U.S fighters on patrol fail to intercept an incoming J-20 strike force. The largest U.S airbase in the Pacific region, Anderson AFB, is particularly noteworthy. Anderson AFB is barren in terms of hardened aircraft shelters and runways. Although it's more than 1,500 nautical miles from China, it is no longer safe from attack due to the extended range of the J-20. If flight operations are no longer possible from Anderson AFB, any war effort with China would be severely crippled from the U.S perspective. Due to its poor rear stealth characteristics, the J-20 might be open to reprisal after striking U.S bases but by that point the damage has already been done. 


The United States MUST harden the runways and install hardened aircraft shelters on all of its airbases within the Pacific region: Osan (SK), Kunsan (SK), Misawa (Japan), Yokota (Japan), Iwakuni (Japan), Kadena (Japan), and Anderson (Guam). Hardening U.S airbases in the region would not only mitigate the damage from a J-20 strike force, but also it would make U.S airbases more resistant to the hundreds of medium range and theatre range ballistic missiles China is deploying in the region. GPS jamming equipment is also suggested to deny usage of China's GPS system as to reduce the effectiveness of Chinese GPS precision guided munitions. 

Image 10: B-2 Spirit escorted by F-22A raptors from Anderson AFB Guam 

U.S Military Recommendation II: Improve IADS systems in Pacific Region

The United States must continue to upgrade and deploy Patriot missile batteries and other capable surface to air missiles in the Pacific region to protect its land based assets. Upgrades to enhance the Patriot PAC-2 system's effectiveness towards low observable targets are already underway with the GEM-T upgrades (Raytheon, 2011). Further upgrades to assist in the targeting of low observable aircraft should be considered for the PAC-2 system. PAC-3 Patriot batteries should be deployed in conjunction with the upgraded PAC-2 systems to protect U.S Pacific airbases from Chinese deployed medium range ballistic missiles.

Image 11: The MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2 is the principle surface to air missile system of choice for several western nations. Over the years the Patriot has undergone several upgrades and modifications to keep the system relevant and increase its lethality. Current PAC-2 Patriot missiles have a range of 160 km (100 miles). However, keep in mind the J-20 has a lower frontal rcs, its unlikely that the PAC-2 would be able to detect and engage the J-20 until it was a great deal closer e.g. ~30-40 miles out. The system would have a better chance in shooting down a J-20 once its rear faces the Patriot's radar array. (Image Credit: Global Security)

U.S Military Recommendation III: Deploy more Raptors to the Pacific 

Image 12: The most lethal fighter aircraft ever produced, the Lockheed F-22A Raptor.


Arguably the best defense against the Chengdu J-20 is the Lockheed F-22A Raptor. From what we know of the J-20 in terms of its stealth capabilities, avionics, engine troubles, available surface to air munitions, and Chinese pilot training programs, using the technical term, the J-20 is "toast" against the Raptor. It is also worth noting that only the very best USAF pilots are selected to fly F-22A. In every category comparable, the Raptor exceeds the J-20. [Onboard oxegen generating (OBGS) issues aside of course; OBGS problems should be remedied upon the installation of back-up onboard oxygen generating systems. The entire F-22A fleet will be upgraded with the new system by 2014 at the cost of $44 million USD] - Daily Press, 2012

Currently the United States operates 184 Lockheed F-22A Raptors in active duty. A sizable portion of America's available Raptors should be permanently based in the Pacific region. From time to time Raptors train at Kadena AFB and Anderson AFB but arrangements should be made to increase the number of permanently stationed Raptors in the Pacific. I believe the 36th Operations group based at Anderson AFB fly's Raptor's but I'm not entirely certain. Raptors should be given priority for the proposed hardened aircraft shelters due to their high unit cost and low numbers.

Despite the Raptor's remarkable abilities, the USAF only has 184 Raptors and production of the Raptor has ended. Until the political motivation and financial situation changes, the U.S military will have to make due with what it has already procured. That means ingratiating and improving current 4th generation platforms such as the F-15C and F-16C into operation with 5th generation aircraft e.g. F-22A. Arrangements to upgrade the F-15C and F-15E are already underway with the installation of the new APG-63 (V) 4 radars. Because of its usage of planform alignment, the Raptor has a finite space available in its nose cone for radar upgrades. (Axe, 2012) The non-stealthy F-15C and F-15E is favorable to the F-22A in upgrade mod-ability. These new and improved F-15C's and F-15E's will work in teams with the stealthier F-22A to secure U.S interests in the region.

As currently envisioned, the F-15s would fly with extra fuel tanks and AMRAAM missiles and with radars blaring, while the F-22s, carrying less gas and fewer missiles, would turn off their radar and sneak up on the enemy for ninja-style jabs. 'Our objective is to fly in front with the F-22s, and have the persistence to stay there while the [F-22s] are conducting their [low-observable] attack,' Maj. Todd Giggy, an F-15 pilot, told  ." - Axe, 2012

Note: The reason the Raptors would turn off their radars is to insure that they cannot be jammed and tracked by enemy planes. Even with low probability intercept modes featured on the AN/APG-77 AESA radar (utilized by the Raptor), it does not provide complete protection from jamming and detection. By utilizing this innovative method, Raptor pilots can take full advantage of the stealthiness of the F-22A airframe and remain completely undetectable while F-15E and F-15C pilots with upgraded radars provide targeting information for the Raptors.

Image 13: F-15E flying in formation with F-22A at Anderson AFB.

Military Recommendation to U.S Allies: Purchase the F-35

Image 14: F-35A roll out ceremony at Eglin AFB Flordia. (Image Credit: Samuel King Jr, retrieved from Defense Media Network 2012) 

The United States Government has banned the possibly of exporting the F-22A Raptor. The next best aircraft available to U.S allies is the F-35 Lightning II. Despite the whole host of problems Lockheed is experiencing in the development of the jet, F-35 remains the best bet for U.S allies. Japan has already announced that it plans to acquire 42 F-35A's in its F-X competition. Japan might seek to order more than 100 F-35's if the jet wins its J-XX competition to replace Japan's aging fleet of F-15J's. In terms of standing on even footing with the J-20, no other aircraft currently in the competition even comes close to the F-35A. Given what we know about the J-20, a full production J-20 would likely make short work of 4 and 4.5 generation fighters without the aid of 5th generation fighters. A dogfight between the F-35 and the J-20 would be closer than a dogfight between the F-22A and the J-20. However, the F-35 is still stealthier and features better avionics and sensors than the J-20. Though it is likely less maneuverable than the J-20 (assuming China gets a capable engine for the J-20). It would be prudent of South Korea to order the F-35 for its F-X phase 3 competition. If the F-35A won, South Korea would likely order dozens of jets to supplement its F-15K "Slam Eagles" (upgraded derivative of F-15E Strike Eagle).

In conclusion, the United States and its allies should not fear the deployment of the J-20 a great deal. If the proposed U.S Military recommendations are put into effect,  the United States and its allies will be in a good position to deny Beijing  air control over the Pacific region.

RELATED READING: Threat Analysis of Foreign Stealth Fighters Part II: Sukohi PAK FA 

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18.)http://www.dailytech.com/Reports+Hackers+Use+Stolen+RSA+Information+to+Hack+Lockheed+Martin/article21757.htm

19.) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204336104577094690893528130.html

20.) http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=jss

21.) http://books.google.com/books?id=eeWcitAiSBUC&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q=canard&f=false

22.) http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3ac1b7659b-259c-4bc6-8a50-0bd230e66b8c

23.) http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/china%20report%202006.pdf

24.) http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1217.pdf

25.) http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-05-18/news/dp-nws-raptor-changes-20120518_1_flight-restrictions-hypoxia-backup-oxygen-system

26.) http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/old-school-jet/

27.) http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%253A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%253A39df4196-72dd-4601-b2ec-7784bff0ffc6

28.) http://www.offiziere.ch/?p=7804
29.) http://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_american_missile_system_vehicle_uk/patriot_mim-104_surface-to-air_defense_missile_data_sheet_specifications_information_description.html
30.) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/
31.) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/koreas-fx-multirole-fighter-buy-phase-2-the-race-is-on-02966/
32.) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f22-raptors-to-japan-01909/
33.) http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/asian-skies/2011/07/japans-f-x-and-f-xx-two-separa.html

34.) http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/photos/f-35-joint-strike-fighter-lightning-strikes/

Notes

Note 1: The F-117 utilized first generation stealth technology composed of flat geometrically arranged panels to deflect radar waves. This method was effective in reducing the F-117's radar signature but resulted in an aerodynamically unstable airframe. The J-20 utilizes the planform alignment method of reducing an aircraft's radar signature.  Planform alignment is a more advanced method of stealth technology that allows one to construct an aerodynamically feasible airframe while deflecting radar waves. Planform alignment is achieved through arranging the flight surfaces of the aircraft in such a way that they have identical angles that reflect incoming radar waves away from the source. This technique was pioneered on the YF-22 and YF-23 designs in the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition of the 1990s. 

Image 15: F-35A with F-22A flying behind. The USAF plans to acquire a total of 1,763 F-35A aircraft to supplement its force of 187 F-22A Raptors. The USAF will maintain the largest fleet of highly capable 5th generation aircraft in the world even if a few hundred F-35A's are cancelled due to budget cuts. (Image Credit: Darin Russel, retrieved from Defense Media Network 2012)

Should the U.S Sell Taiwan New F-16's?

Image 1: Hellenic Air Force F-16D Block 52+  

For years Taiwan has urgently requested the sale of new F-16C/D Block 50/52+ aircraft to supplement its aging fighter force of 145 older F-16A/B block 20 aircraft first ordered in 1992. The Taiwanese air force is incredibly outnumbered.  In total the Republic of China Air Force operates 359 fighter aircraft including the soon to be phased out F-5 Tiger II. Comparatively, the aerial armada assembled by The People's Liberation Army Air Force consists of nearly 1,300 fighter aircraft. Although China still operates fighters designed in the 1960s (J-8 is copy of Soviet designed Mig 21), recently China has spent tens of billions of dollars developing and acquiring advanced 4th generation fighter designs. In response to the increased capabilities of the Chinese Air Force, Taiwan has submitted a proposal in which it would purchase 66 of the new Lockheed F-16C/D Block 50/52+ fighters. The Obama Administration deemed such a sale impossible. Given the recent $6.4 billion dollar arms sale between the U.S and Taiwan in 2009, another sale of new equipment of this magnitude would not be tolerated by Beijing. Ties between the United States and China are delicate as strategic dialogue between the two nations has finally resumed. (China typically cuts strategic dialogue with the U.S in response to arms sales to Taiwan such was the case in 2009) However, under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is obligated to provide Taiwan with adequate defensive equipment (e.g. "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" - Taiwan Relations Act, 1979) Thus, the Obama Administration decided to compromise. Under the Obama Administration's proposal, Taiwan's fleet of 145 F-16A/B Block 20 fighters would receive numerous upgrades worth $5.3 billion dollars. Although China naturally condemned the proposed upgrades, they haven't taken serious action as with previous arms sales. This hints that Beijing has been placated for the moment. Ultimately, the decision to upgrade Taiwan's current fighters rather than allowing the purchase of new jets is the right call. Not only will the United States not loose the recent diplomatic gains made with China, but also the Taiwanese will be in a better position to defend themselves. The new upgrades for Taiwan's jets will be explained in detail along with a military recommendation that helps ensure Taiwan's continued autonomy.

Image 2: Chinese built J-10 fighters shown below. As with most Chinese designs they are heavily "influenced" by foreign designs. The tail section of the J-10 draws upon the F-16 design (Pakistan likely let China examine some of its F-16s which is yet another reason not to sell Pakistan more high grade arms) while many other aspects of the plane have been taken from the Israeli designed IAI Lavi fighter.

Proposed F-16 Upgrades

Although Taiwan is not receiving any new jets, the proposed upgrade package will essentially grant the Taiwanese F-16s comparable capabilities to the Block 50/52+ variants they originally requested. The proposed upgrades include:

"176 sets of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars; Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems (GPS_INS) and 128 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS) and Night Vision Goggles ...140 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles and support systems. Upgrades to the APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) combined interrogator transponders and HAVE GLASS II which includes the ‘golden canopy’ derived from the F-22 Raptor and other treatments for radar and thermal signature reduction...U.S. offers a significant weapons package for the upgraded Viper, including GPS guided bombs (GBU-31v1 and GBU-38 JDAM), Laser JDAM (GBU-56) or GPS Enhanced Laser Guided Weapons (GBU-10 Enhanced Paveway II) and Enhanced Paveway III 200 pound laser guided bombs. Also included are CBU-105 sensor fused weapons...Part of the upgrade will also include the modernization of the aircraft electronic warfare and self protection systems, to include the ALQ-213 Electronic Warfare Management systems...Taiwanese Vipers will be equipped are 86 tactical data link terminals, deliver 26 advanced targeting pods – both the AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER  from Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman’s AN/AAQ-28 LITENING. In addition, Taiwan’s existing 28 Sharpshooter electro-optical infrared targeting pods will be upgraded. The new supply of targeting systems will double the number of Taiwan’s air force fighters carrying advanced targeting systems for use with precision guided weapons...Through the modernization process the aircraft could also be fitted with improved engine, replacing the original F100-PW-220 powerplant with the latest model F100-PW-229 engines. Other upgrades could include the replacement of Modular Mission Computers, cockpit multifunction displays, communication equipment, Joint Mission Planning Systems." (Defense Update, 2012)  

With these upgrades, Taiwan's F-16s will become unrecognizable compared to their previous form. These enhancements represent a monumental increase in capability for Taiwan's F-16s and will make the improved F-16s the deadliest fighter operating within the Taiwanese strait until the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter enters service. The most notable upgrade within the package is the inclusion of an unspecified AESA radar. 

Image 3: A Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) in use on a Belgian Air Force F-16AM (upgraded F-16A with similar capabilities of F-16C Block 50) is shown below. With A JHMCS system, off bore sight capable infrared guided missiles, e.g. AIM-9X, can be used. Essentially with a JHMCS a pilot can look at an enemy aircraft and achieve missile lock. Aside from targeting enemy aircraft, the JHMCS displays relevant fight data such as altitude, airspeed, etc. The overall effect of easily accessible information displayed on a JHMCS is heightened situational awareness the of pilot. 

Taiwan's upgraded F-16s will also feature HAVE GLASS II radar reduction treatments which consist of radar absorbent material (RAM) coatings applied to the airframe and an improved canopy which will reflect fewer radar waves. Overall, the HAVE GLASS II treatments will lower the F-16's radar cross section (rcs) and make the F-16's more capable in jamming enemy radars through "reducing the burn-through range (the point at which a radar defeats jamming because the reflection is stronger than the jamming signal)." (Avation Week, 2009)  It should be noted that the RAM coatings hardly make the upgraded F-16s qualified as genuine stealth aircraft. To the extent in which the HAVE GLASS II treatments reduce the F-16's rcs are unknown. Official rcs figures for military aircraft are extremely hard to come by if not nonexistent to the public domain. However, what is known is that stealth can only be achieved through both shaping techniques to an aircraft's airframe (e.g. planform alignment design technique) and RAM. Lockheed engineers have stated that stealth is achieved by 80% shaping techniques and 20% by RAM coatings. The fundamental non-stealthy airframe of the F-16 remains unchanged, thus the upgraded F-16s will not be qualified as stealth aircraft. However, these treatments will reduce the detection range of the aircraft to enemy radars in addition to assisting in jamming other radars.  In total, at least 1,700 F-16s have undergone HAVE GLASS II treatments.  (Lockheed Martin)

Image 4: HAVE GLASS II canopy with signature orange tint 

Image 5: F-16 with HAVE GLASS II RAM coating shown below. F-16s with HAVE GLASS II can be identified by its unique rough texture and visual appearance resembling a paint with metallic flakes throughout.

Military Recommendation I to Taiwanese Armed Forces 

The new upgraded Taiwanese F-16s will be indispensable in holding off any potential Chinese invasion assuming they aren't all destroyed on the ground. The new fighter aircraft will be of little value in the face of hundreds of cruise missiles and conventional ballistic missiles that would likely be launched in the opening hours of the conflict. Missiles such as the DF-3, DF-21, DF-11, and DF-15 would likely be utilized by Chinese forces. RAND predicts that such missiles would target Taiwanese early warning radars, SAM sites, and airfields. A single cruise missile carrying cluster munitions could easily disable dozens of unprotected aircraft left on a run way. The solution is to build hardened aircraft hangars that would resist a cluster munition strike. Although powerful, many of the ballistic missile types listed above have a low degree of accuracy. In their current form, only a few of China's ballistic missiles would be capable of hitting the proposed hardened shelters. The rest would be used to target run ways which can be easily repaired if airbase personnel have prepared accordingly. (APA, 2011) However, China has been breaking ground on its new GPS system known as the Beidou navigation system. As of 2011, the Beidou allows the Chinese military to use GPS within China and the surrounding area including Taiwan. With such a system, much more accurate ballistic missile warheads and access to precision guided munitions becomes possible. The Beidou is expected to provide global coverage by 2020. Taiwan has two options to deal with the newer GPS munitions. One, construct underground hangar facilities like China or develop GPS jamming abilities to deny usage of the Beidou system over the Taiwanese strait as suggested by RAND. Underground hangars provide unparalleled protection from bombardment but remain incredibly expensive and are only practical if geography permits. The more economically feasible solution is to utilize hardened aircraft shelters in conjunction with GPS jamming equipment. It should be noted however that any GPS jamming system would be of little use against other types of precision guided munitions such as laser guided munitions. 

Image 6: Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS) utilized by USAF at Kadena AFB Japan (Image credit USAF)

Image 7: Underground Hangar Facility used by Chinese forces. China operates 40 underground aircraft hangar facilities (Air Power Australia, 2011) Such a facility would grant protection from all but the heaviest bunker buster bombs e.g. the 20 foot long 30,000lb Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). China currently has no equivalent of the U.S designed MOP. (Image taken from APA) 

Image 8: Massive Ordnance Penetrator bomb. The MOP contains 5,300 pounds of high explosives and can penetrate 60 feet of 5,000 psi rated concrete or 25 feet of 10,000 rated concrete. (Global Security,  2012)

Military Recommendation II to Taiwanese Armed Forces

The first proposal helps ensure the survivability of Taiwanese airbases in the case of a sustained major attack. The second proposal further improves the survivability of the Taiwanese armed forces. Even with a GPS jamming system in addition to hardening airbases, the survivability of Taiwan's airbases is far from assured. In some cases, the best way to ensure an asset's continued survivability is to keep it hidden rather than protecting it in the open. Submarines are the principle example of this philosophy in warfare. In many ways, submarines are like stealth aircraft. They require meticulous attention to every detail in their design as to minimize the chance of detection, both are incredibly expensive, and both require a large number of immensely talented and experinced engineers to build. In total the Taiwanese Navy operates 4 submarines. The Trench class submarines sold from the U.S and given to the Taiwanese Navy were designed and built between 1944 and 1951. The other two submarines currently in service are the Zwaardvis class submarines bought from the Netherlands in the 1980s. David Axe argues that "The best weapons for delaying a Chinese attack are ones that can’t be targeted by ballistic missiles – and that could confront a Chinese invasion fleet far from Taiwan's shores. That means submarines." (Axe, 2011).  

Image 9: One of Taiwan's only capable attack submarines, the Hai Lung class submarine. The Hai Lung are Netherlands built diesel electric attack submarines based off of the last diesel electric submarine design  used by the U.S, the Barbel class submarine. 

Taiwan MUST purchase high quality attack submarines. The Taiwanese Navy effectively operates two submarines compared to China's 60 submarines. Taiwan's lack of submarine's poses a much more serious security concern than the rising gap between the Taiwanese and Chinese air forces. A fleet of upgraded F-16s could harass a Chinese Navy invasion force with anti ship-missiles but a force of submarines would be more effective as they would be harder to find and destroy. Therefore, in terms of which submarines to acquire there are many options. Domestically producing high quality attack submarines is not an option. As stated previously, engineering and building a high quality submarine is a daunting task. Even nations with robust military budgets like Russia have trouble designing stealthy submarines e.g. Yasen class submarine. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Taiwan would be able to develop its own high quality class of attack submarines. Purchasing submarines from the United States is not an option for main two reasons. Politically, such a sale would be impossible given both the $5.3 billion dollar proposed upgrades for F-16s and the $6.4 billion 2009 sale. Although the United States arguably builds the best submarines in the world, the United States only operates nuclear submarines. Obviously, the sale of nuclear powered attack submarines to Taiwan would be impossible. Taiwan needs a diesel electric submarine that can operate within the strait and surrounding area (no need for global range e.g. nuclear) and they ability to remain undetected by Chinese forces. An added benefit of diesel electric submarines is they typically quieter and less expensive than their nuclear powered counterparts. (Though they lack the extended endurance and speed of nuclear submarines) 

The Type 209 class submarine built by the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft ship building company fulfills all the requirements listed above. HDW has a history of providing the most capable exported diesel electric submarines in the world including the Type 209 and Type 2014 submarines. The Type 209 has been sold to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, India, Indonesia, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Venezuela.  The standard Type 209 model can be purchased at $285 million dollars which is a very reasonable price in comparison to other similar submarine models. The Dolphin class submarines (upgraded & heavily modified Type 209) used by the Israeli Navy should be of particular interest to Taiwan. Although much more expensive than the standard Type 209 submarines (roughly $700 million dollars a submarine), the Dolphin class is much more capable. (Defense Industry Daily, 2012) Using its larger 650mm torpedo tubes, the Dolphin class submarines can launch cruise missiles such as the 1,500 km range capable Popeye turbo. If Taiwan purchased the Dolphin class, not only would it be in a better position to deny easy access to Taiwan but also Taiwan would have a "second strike" capability if missiles based on mainland of Taiwan are destroyed. However, Taiwan would likely have to develop its own cruise missile which is doable. Taiwan has already developed Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III missiles. Taiwan might be able to extend the range and payload of the Hsiung Feng II while making it submarine launched capable. Israel went through a similar process when the Clinton Administration denied the sale of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Israel. Israel took the Popeye land attack missile and heavily modified it into a nuclear capable 1,500 km range cruise missile. Despite the fact that Israel has much more experience in designing missiles than Taiwan, RAND astutely noted in their report that Taiwan can learn a great deal from Israel. Both nations are in similar situations with hostile neighbors that threaten their security. As for the plausibility of Taiwan purchasing a submarines from Germany, I am not an expert in German-Chinese relations so I do not know if such a sale is possible. From the limited amount I do know on German-Chinese relations, it would be difficult to secure a sale. If Taiwan cannot get a Type 209 directly from Germany it might be able to acquire a used Type 209 from one of the nations that have already bought the Type 209 e.g. South Korea. If this option is not possible, Taiwan might be able to buy the French built Scorpene class  diesel electric submarines. France has historically sold Taiwan high quality equipment but has not done so for the last decade due to increased pressure from Beijing. 

Image 10: Dolphin class submarine

Image 11: Submarine launched Tomahawk cruise missile 

In any event, Taiwan must make the acquisition of capable diesel electric submarines a priority. The acquisition of even 3 or 4 standard Type 209 submarines would greatly enhance Taiwan's security. Any attempt to land troops into Taiwan would become exponentially more difficult for China if Taiwan had more attack submarines. If funds from the proposed F-16 upgrades need to be diverted to purchasing submarines than so be it. Taiwan is already struggling to pay for all of its recent defense acquisitions but Taiwan's need for attack submarines is very real. 

Sources:

Rand report: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1217.pdf

http://www.usaf-sig.org/index.php/reference/41-research-material/82-f-16-viper-faq-stuff-you-wanted-to-know-about-the-f-16cd

http://defense-update.com/20110921_taiwan-air-force-modernization.html

http://evangelidis.gr/embry/F35LO-ShortReport-HTML.htm

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120505/DEFREG03/305050002/Taiwan-Might-Delay-F-16-Upgrade?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/April/Pages/AntiSub2301.aspx

http://defense-update.com/20120503_ins_tanin_dolphin_delivered.html

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/dolphin/

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2011-01.html 

http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/09/26/russias-submarine-woes/

http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/07/11/why-taiwan-needs-submarines/

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/germany-may-sell-2-more-dolphin-subs-to-israel-for-117b-01528/

http://www.warisboring.com/2011/12/16/taiwans-submarine-fantasy/

Image 11: Hellenic Air Force F-16D Block 52+

Image 12:  F-16s preforming an elephant walk at Kunsan AFB in South Korea

Entire F-22A Fleet at Major Risk

The 195th and final F-22A Raptor rolled off of Lockheed's Marietta plant on May 2nd. (187 in service with the rest as test planes or crashes) With the final Raptor soon to be entering service, major problems concerning the F-22's on board oxygen generating system still loom over the jet. In a recent interview with 60 Minutes, two raptor pilots shed light on the ongoing problems pilots have been experiencing with the on board oxygen generating system provided by Honeywell. (link to interview provided bellow) Around 18% of pilots have been experiencing hypoxia like symptoms resulting from a lack of oxygen. America's entire raptor fleet was grounded for a period of 5 months in order to find a solution to the problem. Even with some of this nation's best engineers and outside collaboration with NASA the USAF was unable to find the "smoking gun". Raptor pilots have since returned to service and are still at risk. Raptor pilots have been restricted from flying above 25,000 feet.

This situation is completely unacceptable. Although the Raptor force is small, it constitutes a major part of America's overall Air to Air combat capabilities. Lockheed Martin has a history of manufacturing and designing some of the finest aircraft ever built e.g. U-2, SR-71, F-117, C-130, etc. This fact makes the current problem all the more infuriating. Lockheed has failed to deliver on the product it adverted and U.S national security has been jeopardized as a result. Lockheed must pursue the solution to the OBOGS on its own funds (US Government  gave Lockheed $24 million dollars to find the cause of the problem). The USAF has taken apart the Raptor piece by piece in order to find the problem and has come up empty handed.

One of the many mysteries of this problem lies in the fact that the OBOGS system utilized by the F-22A is a proven system using technology that has been in use for decades. Honeywell has provided similar systems for the B-1B, B-2, F-35, F/A-18E, Eurofighter Typhoon, SAAB Gripen, etc. In fact, Honeywell has provided over 10,000 OBOGS systems to air forces world wide. No other OBOGS problems within the USAF have been reported recently from other jets. At this point, the only solution might be to scrap the current OBOGS in the Raptor entirely and replace it with a new system in the hopes that the problem is with the current system.

This entire spectacle points to unmanned systems being the future of combat aircraft. The biological human component is the weak link in the system. Inherent biological limitations prevent pilots from taking full advantage of what the F-22 has to offer and even operating the F-22 effectively in the first place.


Sources

60 Minutes F-22A pilot interview (I highly recommend watching this clip):
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7407680n&tag=contentBody;storyMediaBox

More information on Honeywell On board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS)

http://www51.honeywell.com/aero/common/documents/myaerospacecatalog-documents/Defense_Brochures-documents/Life_Support_Systems.pdf


http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120502/DEFREG02/305020006/U-S-Air-Force-Receives-Final-Raptor?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

http://defense-update.com/20120502_last_raptor_delivere.html

Image Credit: https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhODZr4lRRZxGN7mKP5bD8K4pKBsaoKT1WORaHr5Zyx0cdy5Aokt-da-3cL1sVxh4fy2TnqjiRhm81jrD3p4Fn2neIUKT61t4UQZ4RSVYSEYas2lEkLCQfy4Dq6qcSgftpHBIKo5TYblgWm/s1600/f22-raptor-sonic-boom-001.jpg

MMRCA Competition: Did India Make the RIght Choice? Part I

The Indian Air Force Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) Competition set out to choose the best 4.5 generation fighter for India’s Air Force. The MMRCA contract became the largest Indian defense contract in its history with an estimated value of over $20 billion dollars after final negotiations. (The Times of India, 2012) Defense contractors from all over the world put forward their best designs with the hope of winning the monumental contract. American aerospace defense giants such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing entered the competition along with a multitude of international competitors such as Dassault Aviation, Saab, Mikoyan, and the eurofighter consortium (BAE, EADS, and Alenia Aeronautica). The following 4.5 generation fighters entered the contest: F-16IN, F/A-18E, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Mig 35, and JAS 39 Gripen. After a multiyear selection process, the Indian Air Force (IAF) shortlisted the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon as the finalists in the competition.

After further evaluation, the Rafale was declared the winner of the MMRCA competition in January of 2012. The decision to choose the Rafale came as a shock to many within the Defense community. Prior to the MMRCA the French Rafale had failed to win a single defense contract with any foreign nation despite the fact the Rafale had been submitted to at least 5 competitions by this point. Particularly, the inability for the F/A-18E to even reach the shortlist process puzzled many Defense analysts. Did the Indian Air Force really choose the best aircraft? In order to fully assess the validity of the IDF’s decision, a brief background of the Rafale will be given. A technological and performance evaluation between the Rafale and the most promising aircraft candidates within the competition will be given In part II of this article. (Rafale pictured bellow)

The Defense Industry Daily provides an excellent summary of the creation of the Rafale development program. “It all began as a 1985 break-away from the multinational consortium that went to create EADS’ Eurofighter. The French needed a lighter aircraft that was suitable for carrier use, and were reportedly unwilling to cede design authority over the project. As is so often true of French defense procurement policy, the choice cane down to one of paying additional costs for full independence and exact needs, or loosing key industrial capabilities by partnering or buying abroad. France had generally opted for expensive but independent defense choices, and the Rafale was no exception. “(Defense Industry Daily, 2012) Aside from the B,C, and M variants the Rafale is built to 3 different standards F1, F2, and F3. The F1 variant is only capable of conducting air to air operations while the F2 can conduct both air to ground and air to air missions. The majority of Rafale’s in use by French forces are of the F2 standard. (Defense Industry Daily, 2012) Since 2008 all Rafales have been built to the F3 standard which includes various improvements the most important of which is the ability to carry tactical nuclear weapons.

The Rafale features a delta wing canard design (an increasingly common trait among modern European developed fighters). The advantage of the delta wing canard design is it allows for a higher angle of attack and improved turning abilities (APA, 2012) at the cost of some controllability. However, most modern aircraft featuring the delta wing canard design employ software that mitigates control issues stemming from canards. As per most 4.5 generation fighter designs, the Rafale makes use of design shaping techniques (e.g. serrated patterns on trailing edge of wings and canards), and composite materials to lower its radar cross section. Estimates of the Rafale’s frontal rcs are hard to come by given the exact number is classified; the best estimates are around 2m^2. In addition to featuring a reduced rcs, the Rafale’s survivability is enhanced further by the use of the Thales and MBDA SPECTRA system. “The SPECTRA system for the Rafale combat aircraft operates in electromagnetic, laser and infra-red domains. Using sophisticated techniques, such as interferometry for high precision DOA and passive ranging, digital frequency memory for signal coherency and active phased-array transmitters for maximum effectiveness and covertness, the highly advanced multi-sensors and artificial intelligence data fusion capabilities of SPECTRA provide the Rafale aircraft with the best chance to survive in harsh and lethal environments…Offering unique high sensitivity detection and multiple threat capability, and operating smart data fusion between multi-spectral sensors, it provides identification, location, jamming and decoying against an extensive range of electromagnetic, infra-red and laser threats… By virtue of its fully passive situational awareness capability, SPECTRA is a major contributor to the low observability concept of Rafale.” (Thales, 2012) The SPECTRA system was instrumental to the Rafale’s operational success in Opération Harmattan over Libya. (Briganti, 2011) The image bellow shows two Rafale's preparing to launch on board the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and partake in operation Harmattan over Libya. The Rafale in the foreground is equipped for aerial refueling. Note: all picture credits are shown at the conclusion of this article.

Part II of the article will be posted shortly and will examine the other aircraft involved and how they compare to the Rafale. The question of if the Rafale is right for India will be answered in Part II. 

Sources

1.)    http://www.ausairpower.net/air-superiority-3.html

2.)    http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-MiG-MFI.html

3.)    http://www.dassault-aviation.com/fileadmin/user_upload/redacteur/AUTRES_DOCS/Fox_three/Fox_Three_nr_8.pdf

4.)    http://www.thalesgroup.com/Portfolio/Defence/Aerospace_Product_SPECTRA/?pid=1568

5.)    http://www.mbda-systems.com/mediagallery/files/spectra_ds.pdf

6.)    http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/optimized-airframe.html?L=1

7.)    http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/rafale.htm

8.)    http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Frances-Rafale-Fighters-Au-Courant-in-Time-05991/

9.)    http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/06/15/indias-fighter-fetish/

10.) http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/05/10/america%E2%80%99s-indian-rebuff/

11.) http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/01/31/india-picks-rafale-fighter/

12.) http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/125860/rafale-in-combat%3A-%E2%80%9Cwar-for-dummies%E2%80%9D.html

Image Credits

1.)    http://www.wallpapersbrasil.com/wallpapers/1600x1200/aviao-dassault-breguet-mirage.jpg 
2.)   http://www.airplanepictures5.info/i/dassault-rafale-cockpit-9810.jpg 

3.)    http://www.airplanepictures5.info/i/dassault-rafale-cockpit-9810.jpg

Black Widow II vs Raptor

Did the USAF Choose the Wrong Jet?


The Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program began in 1981 amidst fears of the increased lethality of the newest generation of Russian fighters, the Su-27 and Mig-29. Soviet integrated air defense systems made intrusion into Soviet airspace by non-stealthy aircraft like the F-15 extremely difficult. Thus, the USAF decided it needed a new generation of air superiority fighters to overcome these challenges. The Advanced Tactical Fighter program was born.

"In 1981, the Air Force developed a requirement for an Advanced Tactical Fighter as a new air superiority fighter. It would take advantage of the new technologies in fighter design on the horizon including composite materials, lightweight alloys, advanced flight control systems, higher power propulsion systems and stealth technology. Air Force leaders believed these new technologies would make aircraft like the F-15 and F-16 obsolete by the early 21st century. " - Global Security

Eventually Northrop and McDonnell Douglas teamed up to design the YF-23 for the competition while Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics designed the YF-22. By the time the USAF requested a proposal from Northrup in 1985, it was arguably the most experienced company (along with Lockheed) in designing low observable aircraft. Northrup had already started work on the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. McDonnell Douglas was one of the most respected names in the aerospace industry. McDonnell Douglas was responsible for the creation of some of the finest military equipment in use such as the F-15 Eagle, AH-64 Apache, and Tomahawk cruise missile. The YF-23 design reflects the immense skill of the Northrup and McDonnell Douglas design teams.



Interview with ATF test pilot Paul Metz, first pilot to fly the YF-23

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQi-IaFO3kk

Head to Head comparison YF-22 vs YF-23



Both airframes have advantages and disadvantages over one another in the case of the YF-22 and YF-23. One of the main advantages the YF-23 held over the YF-22 was that it was stealthier. But, to the extent of which its rcs is smaller is not public information. It is known that the YF-23 has a smaller rcs than .0001m^2 (40 dBSM) as that is the Raptor's frontal rcs. However, I would guess that the YF-23 was stealthier by a wide margin due to its unique tail design.

"The YF-23 was stealthier than the F-22 Raptor. The two ruddervators reduce the Radar Cross Signature of the YF-23 significantly. This is because instead of having four extremely large control surfaces on the tail, there are only two. The F-22 Raptor design utilizes the traditional configuration of two rudders, which are canted outward, and two elevators. This make the RCS larger. Another RCS reducing feature is the engines. These are mounted in nacelles in the wing that blend gracefully into the wing on the top, and form an extension of the fueslage on the bottom. The larger bottom fuselage lets it pack more missiles and other expendable weapons. The intake duct is angled up and inward to reflect radar beams and keep them from hitting the fast moving compressor face. The intake duct starts on the lower edge of the wing and moves through it onto the top of the wing. This feature can also reduce the RCS signature from a look down-shoot down radar from an aircraft flying overhead. Also reducing the RCS, is the way the leading and trailing edge of all surfaces are angled. All of the leading and trailing edges are angled the same. Therefore, the front of the right wing is parallel to the left wing's trailing edge, and the left section of the nose. For example, the leading edge of the wing is parallel to the trailing edge of the wing on the other side. " - Global Security



Because of its substantial stealth capabilities, Northrup named the YF-23 Black Widow II. The name "Grey Ghost" also become associated with the YF-23. However, this increased stealthiness came at a cost, agility.

"The YF-23 was optimized for speed, range and stealth at some expense in agility, compared to its rival. The general layout is unique and exploits much of the design technique developed in the B-2A ATB program. RCS is reduced through careful planform shaping and blending, with a unique low drag tail which conceals dorsal exhausts in troughs to reduce both RCS and IR emissions" - Air Power Australia, 1991

The YF-23 design DID NOT feature thrust vectoring as the Northrup design team did not want to add extra weight to the aircraft or increase its radar signature. (National Museum of the Air Force, 2009) Even without thrust vectoring, the YF-23 was incredibly agile as it was able to reach all of the ATF maneuverability qualifications. Something the YF-22 could not do without the aid of thrust vectoring. (Air Power Australia, 2005)

On April 23rd 1991, Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice announced the YF-22 was the winner of the competition. So did the Air Force pick the wrong jet? To answer this question, one must understand why the YF-22 won the competition. The USAF chose the YF-22 because of its incredible maneuverability. Although the YF-23 was stealthier, the YF-22 was already incredibly stealthy relative to anything else in service. The F-22A is still the stealthiest aircraft in the USAF inventory and the stealthiest aircraft in service in all the world's air forces' for the foreseeable future. Another selling point to the YF-22 was that its design was more compatible for the Navy's own Advanced Tactical Fighter program, the NATF. However, the Navy cancelled the NATF in 1992, a year after the ATF ended.



In my opinion, the YF-22 won the competition narrowly but fairly. However, Lockheed's victory does not diminish the fact that the YF-23 is still an extraordinary and incredibly innovative airframe. I think BOTH airframes should have been utilized in a similar fashion as to what happened after the conclusion of the Lightweight Fighter program. The Lightweight Fighter program produced such outstanding jets that both of them were eventually utilized albeit the YF-17 altered. Although the YF-16 defeated the YF-17,McDonnell Douglas saw the potential in the YF-17 design and eventually designed the F/A-18 Hornet, one of the most successful naval aircraft in modern history. The F/A-18 eventually fulfilled the Navy's requirement for a new fighter. In the same way, the YF-23 can fulfill the USAF's requirement for the interim bomber program. The program called for a medium range stealth bomber operational by 2018. With some adjustments, the YF-23 could easily be suited for this role. In fact, Northrup tried just that. Unfortunately for Northrup, the DOD latter concluded that it need a bomber with a much greater range. Thus, the USAF created the Next Generation Bomber project.




References
1.) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-23-specs.htm
2.) http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7152
3.) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-23.htm
4.) http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-ATF-91.html

On another note, this illustration shows what design changes Lockheed made from the YF-22 to the F-22A. Among the changes is a reduction from 25,000 pounds of internal fuel to closer to 21,000 pounds. (Air Power Australia, 2005)

The following image is from Defense Industry Daily

US Navy vs PLA Navy

China's new carrier. Although its not without its fair share of problems.

Relax: China’s First Aircraft Carrier is a Piece of Junk, By David Axe
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/relax-chinas-first-aircraft-carrier-is-a-piece-of-junk/all/1

"Shi Lang will sail into a Pacific Ocean teeming with carriers. First, there are the American carriers: five nuclear-powered supercarriers home-ported in California, Washington and Japan, plus six assault ships in California and Japan. Between them, the American carriers displace no less than 700,000 tons and can carry 600 aircraft." -David Axe

“Our Navy can carry twice as many aircraft at sea as all the rest of the world combined” - Robert Gates, former US Defense Secretary

Short tons
US Navy
1,197,284(11) Super Carriers
402,280 (9) Assault Ships
393,032 (54) Nuclear Powered Attack Submarines
337,500 (18) Nuclear Powered ICBM Submarines
241,472 (22) Guided Missile Cruisers
581,720 (60) Destroyers
137,760 (19) Frigates
Total
3,241,536 204

PLA Navy
70,000 (1) Carrier
61,600 (8) Nuclear Powered Submarines
156,778 (58) Diesel-Electric Submarines
229,262 (26) Destroyers
108,612 (51) Frigates
Total
626,252 144

The U.S Navy maintains dominance over the World's ocean with a fleet displacement as large as the next 13 nation's under it combined. I did not even include the support and resupply ships in the calculation of tonnage. If I did, it would be even larger. The US Navy operates a total of 286 ships.

USAF vs PLAAF

The PLAAF has many "showy" items such as fighter aircraft but lacks the support and logistics units that make the rest of the force formidable. For example, China only has 10 tanker aircraft as opposed to the USAF's 477. This severely limits the range of PLAAF aircraft and restricts them from operating beyond their region. Additionally, the PLAAF lacks widespread AWACS capabilities. Meaning that their command and control capabilities as well as battle field awareness is severely hindered. The U.S has 59 as opposed to China's 4. One aspect missing from this chart I created is intelligence assets such as UAVs and reconnaissance planes. A contingent of U.S RQ-4B Global Hawks has been recently stationed in Guam. These reconnaissance aircraft can keep vigil for over a day at a time while scanning thousands of miles of ocean.
"In a world where knowledge equals power, the RQ-4 is among the most powerful aircraft ever." -David Axe

China lacks these immense intelligence gathering capabilities that the USAF posses. You can't hit what you can't see. China also lacks the unparalleled satellite coverage the U.S maintains. The US has over 400 military satellites which is four times the amount maintained by the runner up, Russia. Despite China's modernization program and and unveiling of the J-20, the PLAAF remains undeveloped and immature in comparison to the USAF. America may be in a state of decline, but the skies are firmly in our grasp.



References
1.) http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/secret-space-arsenal/
2.) http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/default.asp

F-35 Maneuverability Woes

The JSF program was envisioned to create a multi-role combat aircraft capable of both air-to-ground and air interdiction missions, a "strike fighter". This emphasis in dual role capabilities is directly reflected in the F-35's airframe. The F-35 lacks the maneuverability of a purebred fighter such as the F-22A or F-15C. To judge the effectiveness of the F-35 in air-to-air combat, examples from history provide insight.

The aircraft most similar to the F-35 in service with the USAF today is the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. The F-16 has been used to great effect in air-to-ground missions during Operation Dessert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the USAF has drawn blood for F-16, most of the 67 kills achieved the F-16 have been done under the command of skilled Israeli pilots. The F-16 has achieved an impressive 47-0 kill ratio under the IAF. Many of these kills were achieved because of the F-16's dazzling maneuverability. This is a key difference between the F-16 and F-35.



Although the F-16 was intended to be a dual role aircraft, one of the stringent requirements of the F-XX program was for the new aircraft to feature high trust-to-weight ratio. This resulted in the F-16 being one of the earliest fighter aircraft to enter service with a thrust-to-weight ratio exceeding 1.0. The F-16's already spectacular maneuverability was enhanced further with the implication of revolutionary fly-by-wire technology. This degree of maneuverability provides the Falcon with lethal visual range combat capabilities. In contrast, the F-35 was rated as "Double Inferior" in regards to both vertical and horizontal maneuvering capabilities relative to modern Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft such as the Su-27, Su-30, Su-35, Mig-29M and Pak Fa. In fact, the RAND report went as far to say the F-35 has "Inferior acceleration,inferior climb,inferior sustained turn capability" relative to the compared aircraft. This lack in maneuverability is not something that incremental upgrades can solve over the F-35's service life. Rather, they are the permanent result of the F-35's design. Airframe design cannot be changed.


Thrust-to-weight ratios of fighter aircraft; 100% fuel followed by 50% internal fuel
All following calculations assume aircraft thrust using afterburner

F-35A .87 -> 1.07
Su-27K 1.07 -> 1.21
PAK FA* 1.19 (exact figures unknown as final version will feature different engines)
F-16C 1.095 -> 1.25
F-22A 1.08 -> 1.26


Instead of giving the F-35 a high thrust-to-weight ratio and high maneuverability, the design team at Lockheed placed their faith in Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) technology. The HMD allows pilots to literally look at a target to achieve missile lock. With the advent of off-boresight capability missiles such as the AIM-9X, pilots can look at aircraft up 90 degrees away, gain missile lock, and score a kill. If the HMD works as advertised  it could revolutionize the dogfight. However, if the HMD is not able to mitigate the extreme maneuverability of its opponents, that the F-35 is at disadvantage. The last time this much faith was placed on new technology without any back up plan was during the Vietnam War.




In the years prior to the Vietnam War the USAF developed a new theory that beyond visual range (bvr) missiles would be the future of the dogfight and that the traditional weapon of air superiority platforms, the gun, was obsolete. (RAND, 2008)It was also believed that aircraft did not need to be maneuverable as the missile would do most of the maneuvering from range.(APA, 2010) As a result, the F-4 Phantom was not maneuverable and did not feature a gun. Two missile designs were fielded by the USAF during the Vietnam War. The radar guided AIM-7 Sparrow which had a range greater than 20 miles was built for bvr engagements. The AIM-9 Sidewinder missile was designed for visual range combat and had a range of 2.5 miles. The USAF put their faith in guided missile technology and did not equip the F-4 Phantom with guns. The Pk (probability kill) of AIM-7 Sparrow missiles during tests was .70 but during combat the Sparrow had a Pk of .08. Thus, Vietnamese Migs were 100 times more likely to get within visual range and initiate a dogfigt than expected. (RAND, 2008)The Sidewinder did not fare much better with a combat Pk of .15. This spectacular lack of foresight lead to pilots being defenseless without any back up. As a result, pilots had gun pods attached to the F-4 latter in the war. In essence, the lesson learned was that new technology and tactics should always be used in conjunction with older proven technology and tactics in the event that Murphy's law comes to fruition.






The counter point to the argument that the F-35 needs maneuverability is that the F-35 is stealth and enemy fighters would not be able to get within visual range. This assumption is unrealistic. The F-35 will be able to destroy 4.5 generation threats from the comfort of bvr in all likelihood. However, the real threat for the F-35 is against other 5th generation stealth fighters such as the Pak Fa. Because of its stealth, the Pak Fa would not be detectable by the F-35 until it was within 30 nautical miles (estimate using frontal rcs) while the Pak Fa would detect the F-35 at 28 nautical miles. (APA, 2009)If both aircraft are speeding towards each other at mach 1.5 they would be on top of each other in just over 50 seconds. Visual range dogfights are MUCH more likely in the event the JSF is faced with a 5th generation opponent. In which case HMD technology better work. It would also not be out of the question for the Pak Fa to feature an HMD of its own, operational Mig-29's and Su-27's already do. The F-35 has the potential to win the fight but its going to be a lot closer than it needs to be. The F-22A has BOTH high maneuverability PLUS it will be upgraded with HMD technology.

A fight with the F-35 vs the Pak Fa will be close and will likely come down to the skills of their respective aircraft. There is one major component that rests in the F-35's favor and that is avionics, specifically the radar arrays. The Pak Fa is in all likelihood going to use a 1,500 TR AESA array. The new array will likely be an improvement of the NIIP Irbis-E or some evolution of the system in conjunction with other secondary radars. The Irbis-E has 1,500 TR nodes effectively meaning it has more "detection power" than the 1,200 TR F-35 AN/APG-81 AESA.  The vulnerability of the Irbis-E is compounded further by the fact that it is not a low-probability-of-intercept radar(LPIR). Russian engineers do not have a comparable the level of experience in designing LIP radar modes using emission control principles. In tests the APG-81 was able to jam and track even the LPIR of the F-22A (AN/APG-77)

In a series of tests at Edwards AFB, Calif., in 2009, Lockheed Martin’s CATbird avionics testbed—a Boeing 737 that carries the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s entire avionics system—engaged a mixed force of F-22s and Boeing F-15s and was able to locate and jam F-22 radars, according to researchers. - Aviation Week, 2011

If an F-22A with LPIR is vulnerable to the F-35 jamming it, essentially greatly reducing detection abilities, than the Pak Fa without LPIR is that much more vulnerable. As for vulnerability to jamming, the AN/APG-81 has an extremely high resistance to being jammed. In fact, the AN/APG-81 won the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award because of its performance against jamming. This ability to jam and track a Pak Fa might end up being what gives the F-35 the edge. Either way, it will be too close for comfort.

Further Reading (links)

Canada and the F-35
Murphy's Law: F-35 Development and Performance Concerns




References

1.) http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/awst/2011/01/17/AW_01_17_2011_p20-281824.xml&headline=null&next=0

2.)http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article7.html

3.)http://www.qualitymag.com/Articles/Industry_Headlines/BNP_GUID_9-5-2006_A_10000000000000943597

4.)http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html

5.)http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-JSF-Analysis.html

6.) http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker-Radars.html#mozTocId533477

7.) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/

8.) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35.htm

9.) http://reporter.kro.nl/downloads/rand_pacific_view.pdf

"Hornet Buffs Up"

Check out Bill Sweetman's article on Aviation Week about new F/A-18E Super Hornet upgrades. These new upgrades include:
-enhanced Electric F414 engines with 20% more thrust
-infrared search-and-track system
-spherical-coverage missile-approach warning system
-further reduced radar cross section (before upgrade 1m^2 est)

LINK: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2011/07/01/DT_07_01_2011_p28-337526.xml