Department of Defense FY 2015 budget in a nutshell
Image Credit: Jack Ohman
The Department of Defense's fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget is among the most complex budget proposals submitted within recent years. The Pentagon's base FY 2015 budget of $495.6 billion dollars is supplemented with the $79 billion dollar oversea's contingency operations (OCO) budget and possibly an additional $26 billion from the Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI). Despite the steady progress of troop reductions in Afghanistan, the OCO budget remains largely unaltered from the FY 2014 budget. The DOD is essentially using the OCO budget as a means to mitigate some of the effects of sequestration. The funding from OGSI is unlikely to materialize as support from Congress is minimal.
To sum the "theme" of the YF2015 budget in a single sentence, the DOD is making significant cuts to its short term capabilities in order to preserve and develop future programs. Its easy to criticize the YF 2015 budget given the significant cuts to legacy platforms such as the U-2, A-10, KC-10, temporarily mothballing 11 missile cruisers, substantial troop reductions, and possibly retiring the USS George Washington. Without tangible action from Congress to either end sequestration or to grant the DOD greater discretion to with regards to implementing the mandated cuts, the FY 2015 budget proposal is approximately the best one could expect from the DOD given the circumstances. Many defense analysts have claimed that the Pivot is no longer viable given the cuts in the YF 2015 budget. In reality, the process of re-balancing the Pacific is likely to require several decades of active US engagement. The new R&D investments in DARPA, cyber warfare, adaptive engine technology, UCLASS, AMDR, and the long-range strike bomber prepare the US for a Pacific oriented defense posture. As a result of prioritization of R&D, the post 2020 US military will be able to counter a wide range of expected national security threats for decades to come.
The third J-20 prototype designated "2011" has been making major headlines in aerospace publications for the last two weeks. I am in the process of writing a new article detailing the features of the 2011 aircraft in addition to updated background information. The article, threat analysis of foreign stealth fighters part I: Chengdu J-20, needs comprehensive revisions to keep the article relevant. Thus, it is more feasible to write an entirely new article.
Image 1: F-22 test aircraft firing a AIM-9 X Block II missile
As Part I discussed, the F-22 is largely a product of late 1980s Cold War requirements and doctrines. However, the F-22's unmatched air-to-air capabilities make it relevant to the Pacific more than 20 years after the creation of the original Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program requirements but lingering issues as a result of new technology and new objectives remain undressed with the current F-22A fleet. The USAF plans to spend $11.7 billion on F-22 upgrade programs through 2020. The entire combat coded F-22 fleet of 143 aircraft (including backup inventory airframes) will be upgraded to the Block 35 standard incorporating the latest increment 3.2B upgrades. The combination of the increment 3.1, 3.2A, and 3.2B upgrade programs will greatly enhance the F-22's ability to effectively engage expected air-to-air and air-to-ground threats from near peer to peer level adversaries over the next two decades. Each upgrade will be thoroughly examined before the aggregate effect of these upgrades on USAF capabilities is discussed in subsequent articles.
Image 2: Since 2004, requirements for specific capabilities within the increment series of upgrades have frequently changed over time. For example, increment 3.2B included an auto-GCAS system but it was subsequently removed. Image Credit: Government Accountability Office, 2012
Increment 3.1 - Block 30 Standard Airframes
Image 3: F-22A with increment 3.1 upgrade
The increment 3.1 upgrade adds significant destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD) capabilities to the Raptor and is the process of being fielded with all 149 aircraft will receive increment 3.1 by 2016 (GAO, 2012). The main elements of increment 3.1 include: synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes to the AN/APG-77, electronic attack capabilities, geo-location of electro-magnetic emitters, and GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB I) integration (Defense Industry Daily, 2013). Block 30 and Block 35 aircraft will receive increment 3.1 upgrades for a total of 149 F-22A's with increment 3.1 capabilities (Carlisle, 2011). The combination of increment 3.1 capabilities makes the F-22 arguably the most capable DEAD asset within the USAF.
A four-ship of Increment 3.1 aircraft can successfully find, fix, track, target and engage targets in the most challenging of anti-access environments...Stealth and speed, combined with an advanced electronic attack capability, allow pilots to operate with impunity while achieving their mission objectives. - Lt Colonel Paul Moga, 2012
Increment 3.1 capabilities will prove to be invaluable in dismantling hostile integrated air-defense systems (IADS) on a large scale, especially in the Pacific. The PRC is procuring increasingly capable arsenal of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the HQ-9, S-300 and possibly the S-400. The F-22's exceptionally small radar cross section (rcs) coupled with geo-location and GBU-39 capability makes the aircraft uniquely suited to cost effectively counter SAM systems. The minimum safe distance between a stealth aircraft and a radar site is usually determined by the aircraft's rear rcs, which is almost always larger than the frontal rcs, as the aircraft has to turn around to head back to base or pursue a new target. In the case of the F-22A, the frontal rcs is between 0.0001m^2 and 0.0002m^2 while the rear rcs is between .01-.001m^2 (Global Security & Kopp, 2012). The S-400 uses the 92N2E "Grave Stone" AESA engagement radar which would detect the F-22's rear rcs between 40 to 30 nautical miles away as shown on the Air Power Australia image below. The GBU-39 has a maximum stand off range of 60 nautical miles which would enable the F-22 destroy S-400 sites with impunity (Boeing, 2013).
Image 4: Detection ranges for Russian SAM engagement radars. The 92N2E is arguably the most capable X-band SAM radar developed outside of the United States or Europe. The HT-233 PESA engagement radar used by the HQ-9 system is a derivative of the Russian 30N6E1 Tomb Stone (Kopp, 2014).
Block 35 Standard Airframes- Increment 3.2A & 3.2B
Increment 3.2A
Arguably one of the most significant shortcoming of the current F-22 fleet is its limited compatibility with other systems in terms of communication and data-link capabilities. The F-22 is currently equipped with the minimally detectable intra-flight datalink (IFTL) to share information between other F-22's. The use of conventional data links and communication systems could betray the location of the aircraft to hostile forces equipped with emission locator systems such as the Chinese CETC YLC-20. However, IFTL can only transmit information between F-22s and not to other assets such as the F-35 or F-15. When IFTL was originally designed, this was a perfectly acceptable as the USAF was originally going to replace its entire F-15C and F-15E inventory with 750 F-22A's.
The F-22 was designed to communicate covertly, only with other F-22s , using the intra-flight datalink (IFDL). Today, the thought of developing a stovepiped system seems unfathomable. But in the 1980s, designers envisioned a massive force of hundreds of F-22s that would maintain stealth in hostile airspace in part by not emitting communications that could be detected. These aircraft would handle the frontline mission of destroying enemy air defenses and establishing air superiority behind hostile lines in an air campaign by communicating only with one another over the IFDL. The original F-22 designers never envisioned the need for the fighter to communicate with legacy fighters, because what was thought to be hundreds of F-22s would be combined with the F-35 to constitute the combat Air Force of the future after older models retired. - Amy Butler, 2013
Image 7: Operation Western Zephyr. Image Credit: USAF, 2013.
With such a limited force of F-22's, Raptor pilots urgently need to be able to operate seamlessly with older 4th generation aircraft and the F-35. The current fleet of F-22's can receive Link-16 data but cannot transmit via Link-16 and the data it does receive through Link-16 is not fused with information from its on board sensors (Majumdar, 2012). The limits of the F-22's compatibility with other systems were fully apparent in Operation Western Zephyr conducted in 2013. Raptor pilots had to resort to communicating through unsecured radio channels to British Eurofighter pilots as they were unable to communicate though Link-16 (Axe, 2013). Without increment 3.2A, the USAF has fielded a number of interim solutions such as the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) which has been fitted to a few RQ-4 Global Hawk and heavily modified BD-700 Global Express aircraft (E-11). BACN effectively translates incompatible communication systems:
[BACN] provides a high-speed, Internet protocol (IP)-based airborne network infrastructure that that extends communications ranges, bridges between radio frequencies, and “translates” among incompatible communications systems – including both tactical and civil cellular systems. Using BACN, a Special Forces soldier on the ground could use a civil cell phone to speak to a fighter pilot in the cockpit. - Defense Industry Daily, 2014
Image 8: BACN payload on board an E-11 aircraft.
While BACN allows the F-22 to communicate in the short term, the USAF possess a limited number of BACN equiped aircraft. Increment 3.2A will serve as a suitable long-term solution as it grants the F-22 two-way Link-16 capabilities and integrates received Link-16 data with on board sensors.
Because sensor fusion does not ‘read’ Link-16 tracks for own-ship solutions, the Raptor will display two tracks – one is own-ship derived from sensor fusion, the other is the Link-16 track – for the same given target,” Getgood says. 'The pilot can declutter the scope should he chose to view only own-ship tracks to reduce pilot workload.' The Inc 3.2A upgrade fixes that by seamlessly correlating all of the data coming in via the Link-16 with the F-22’s other sensors and datalinks. 'What Increment 3.2A does is that it allows sensor fusion to bring information from those tracks into the solution – it provides just one track now with that data supply' - Majumdar, 2012.
While the Link-16 system will allow the F-22 to operate effectively alongside fourth generation aircraft, the system is not considered to be a low-probability-intercept system like the multifunction airborne data link (MADL). Until recently, increment 3.2A included provisions to install MADL into the F-22 airframe which would allow it to safely communicate to F-35 aircraft in anti-access environments (Trimble, 2010). The USAF was correct in its decision to choose Link-16 capability over MADL integration for the F-22 given the low number of F-35 aircraft being fielded in the short term (increment 3.2A will be fielded from 2014 to 2016). Furthermore, Link-16 would enable the F-22 to communicate with a much greater range of aircraft including the F-35. However, the lack of LPI in Link-16 is a significant drawback especially if the F-22 is operating in a hostile anti-access environment. Lockheed Martin is currently in the process of working with L-3 Communications to develop a minimally detectable method to allow the F-22 to communicate through Link-16 under "Project Missouri":
The company [Lockheed Martin] recently showcased a new datalink capability for the fighters through Project Missouri, a proprietary program. Lockheed validated the use of a Link 16 transmit capability from the twin-engine F-22 Raptor as well as showcased a waveform developed by L-3 Communications and optimized for low-probability-of-intercept/low-probability-of-detection transmissions (LPI/LPD)...The trials required the use of an Air Force Raptor as well as the F-35 Cooperative Avionics Testbed (CATbird), a 737-based flying laboratory that is used to test F-35 software standing in as a Joint Strike Fighter surrogate. The F-22 was able to transmit to a Link 16 terminal on the ground. - Amy Butler, 2014
The Air Force does not currently have a requirement for a LPI waveform integration for the F-22 but such a capability would prove to be very convenient. Although the main element to increment 3.2A is Link-16 capability, increment 3.2A will also increase the F-22's electronic protection measures as well as adding new combat identification and targeting capabilities (GAO, 2012).
Increment 3.2B
Image 9: AIM-120C-7 launch from F-22A
The increment 3.2B largely focuses on increasing the F-22's air-to-air capabilities and will be fielded between 2017 and 2020. The upgrade allows the F-22 to utilize the AIM-120D, AIM-9X Block I, and AIM-9X Block II missiles as well as adding improved IFTL capabilities, improved geo-location capabilities, and enhanced electronic protection features (GAO, 2012). At the moment, the F-22 is limited to using older versions of the USAF's main radar guided and IR guided missiles, the AIM-120C-7 and the AIM-9M missiles respectively.
The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAM) is the F-22's main air-to-air weapon and enables the F-22 to engage targets a beyond visual range. In air superiority missions, the F-22 typically carries six AMRAM's which are carried by LAU-142/A pneudraulic hydraulic launchers in its main weapon bay. The latest variant of the AMRAM, the AIM-120D, offers a host of improvements over the current AIM-120C-7 including a two-way data link, high angle off-bore sight capability, global position system-enhanced Inertial Measurement Unit, expanded no escape zone, and 50% greater range (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2012). Although the F-22 is currently capable of firing an AIM-120D as of Update 4 to the Raptor fleet, without the new hardware from increment 3.2B the F-22 will be unable to make use of the AIM-120D's data-link.
Image 10: AIM-9X Block II
The inclusion of the AIM-9X Block I & Block II will significantly increase the F-22's within visual range combat capabilities. The AIM-9X Block I is already in use with 4th generation aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 but it has yet to be fielded on the F-22. The Block I includes a thrust vectoring engine nozzle, improved flare rejecting IR seeker, autopilot, and a new digital processor (Defense Industry Daily, 2014). The combination of these features enables the AIM-9X Block I to preform off-bore sight shots (capable of helmetless high off-boresight shots) and intercept highly agile targets. Block II further improves upon the Block I design:
The 2-way datalink is the most significant single Block II change, as it allows the missile to fly toward targets its seeker can’t yet see, using target position tracking from its fighter. Improved seeker lock-on-after-launch and re-acquisition makes the missile harder to evade, and the new ‘lofting’ fly-out profile boosts the Block II enough to give it some capabilities beyond visual range. - Defense Industry Daily, 2014
Although increment 3.2B will not be fielded on Raptor units until 2017, the USAF will be able use some of the AIM-9X Block II's capabilities by 2015 due to Update 5 software:
In an effort to get the missile to operational units quickly, the USAF is essentially jury-rigging the AIM-9X on to the F-22. The current aircraft stores management system will recognize the missile as an AIM-9X, but the USAF could not change the missile launch engagement zone displays on the jet given in the time available given the forthcoming ESMS installation. 'A pilot can shoot that as a 9X, however, the aircraft systems, as far as the pilot vehicle interface and things like that display targeting information, will be as if it were a 9M'...Pilots will have the flight envelope to launch the AIM-9X at higher angles-of-attack as well as the ability to cue the missile to its expanded field of view compared to the AIM-9M. What they will lack are the in-cockpit displays, which reflect the increased range and maneuverability of the new weapon. That means that operational testers will have to develop 'rules of thumb' for when frontline pilots should decide to launch the missile. - Dave Majumdar, 2012
The Lock on after launch (LOAL) feature of the Block II will help reduce the potential draw backs stemming from the LAU-141/A trapeze system utilized on the F-22's side weapon bays. The process of opening the side weapon bay doors and launching the AIM-9 from the trapeze system takes several seconds longer to preform when compared to launching an AIM-9 from a conventional wing mounted pylon. In a dogfight, a few seconds can be crucial. With LOAL, the F-22 can preemptively launch the Block II before acquiring the target to expedite the process.
Image 11: AIM-9M-9 mounted on a LAU-141/A hydraulic launcher. From Global Security: "This launcher, which uses some components from the existing LAU-128/A launcher, is basically the wingtip launch rail from an F-16 with a swing out mechanism that extends rapidly. The LAU-141/A is also fitted with a missile motor plume deflector, which prevents damage to the side weapons bay as the missile launches off the rail. Each missile is loaded by opening the doors, extending the rail, sliding it on the rail, retracting the missile, and closing the doors."
Image 1: Rapid deployment of F-22's to Wake island. Image Credit: Connie Reed
Author's Note: I had hoped to combine the segment discussing cost saving measures with other content as it it is quite dry but for the sake of brevity, what originally was supposed to be one article turned into three. Part III will contain information about current upgrades and part IV will discuss new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) being developed for the F-22. As compensation for the shorte article, I can guarantee articles will be published every Monday for at least the next two weeks and likely the next three weeks.
The USAF has daunting task of adapting its limited Raptor fleet to meet the national security challenges posed by an assertive near peer adversary in an environment of constrained fiscal resources. Fortunately, the USAF has formulated a number of intelligent strategies to keep its Raptor force relevant well into the 2030s on a limited budget. The main elements to the USAF's effort to sustain its force of F-22's under sequestration are base restructuring, cost-effective training measures, and consolidation of F-22 maintenance facilities.
Adaptations to Budget Cuts
Base Restructuring
Image 2: F-22A's from Holloman AFB
Prior to sequestration, a total of five bases housed active F-22 fighter squadrons: Langley- Eustis Virginia, Tyndall Florida, Holloman New Mexico, Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska, and Pearl Harbor-Hickam Hawaii. A small number of aircraft are also stationed at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) in California and Nellis AFB in Nevada for test and evaluation and training purposes. As a result of the Raptor base restructuring plan, all F-22A aircraft from both the 7th and 8th FS at Holloman were reassigned. F-22's from the 7th FS were transferred to Tyndall AFB Florida which now hosts the largest number of F-22's within the USAF at 56 aircraft. However, 34 of the 56 aircraft at Tyndall will serve in the Tyndall school house and are not scheduled to receive further upgrades or serve in a combat capacity. Finding the exact inventory of F-22's per base is difficult due to the early termination of raptor production, three F-22 crashes, and the new base restructuring plan. Typically, 24 fighter aircraft comprise a full fighter squadron and three squadrons comprise a full fighter wing of 72 aircraft (Global Security, 2011). Global security explains how combat designated F-22's would have originally been organized:
"Each of the three squadrons would be composed of 24 PAI [Primary Aircraft Inventory] F-22s plus 2 BAI [Backup Aircraft Inventory] F-22s. As such, the Initial F-22 Operational Wing would include 72 PAI and 6 BAI aircraft. PAI consists of the aircraft authorized and assigned to perform the squadron's missions in training, deployment, and combat. BAI includes those aircraft additional to the PAI that are used as substitutes for PAI aircraft undergoing maintenance, repairs, or inspections. BAI aircraft, as substitutes, permit the squadron to be at its fully authorized strength (24 aircraft). All training, deployment, and other mission activities are based on the number of PAI aircraft in a squadron." - Global Security, 2014
However, due to production shutting down upon reaching 195 aircraft with 187 aircraft delivered to the USAF, the current USAF inventory of 184 aircraft (three crashes) does not neatly break down into standard 24 aircraft squadrons. For example, the 199th FS based at Hickam only operates 18 F-22A aircraft (Global Security, 2011). When attrition reserve/BAI, test and evaluation, and training aircraft categories are included, it becomes even more difficult to discern the precise allocation of F-22s. The following are three sources which detail the existing USAF F-22A inventory.
Air Combat Command 2012: Air Force Times (Schanz) 2011: CRS 2013
123 combat-coded 149 combat-coded (including BAI) 177 production aircraft
27 training 34 training Tyndall 15 PRTV* aircraft
16 test and evaluation (?) 1 replacement test aircraft
20 attrition reserve 2 EMD* aircraft
Total: 186 Total: 183+ Total: 195
* PRTV - Production Representative Test Vehicle
*EMD - Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Note: CRS data does not factor in crashes.
With the deactivation of the 7th and 8th FS based at Holloman, Langley- Eustis and Elmendorf-Richardson currently maintain the largest inventory of PAI F-22's. Both Langley- Eustis and Elmendorf-Richardson received six aircraft originally from the 8th FS for a total of more than 40 PAI F-22's each. (Schanz & Global Security, 2011). The remaining two F-22's from the 8th FS were sent to Nellis. Although the decision to consolidate the USAF Raptor fleet was principally driven by limited financial resources, the new restructuring plan also was affected by the extensive training infrastructure of Tyndall AFB and the relative age of the airframes.
Image 3: F-22's from the 90th FS based at Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska.
The restructuring of the fleet was conducted in a manner as to consolidate the most modern airframes at Langley and Elmendorf and the older aircraft at Hickam and Tyndall (Schanz, 2011). This ensures that the most modern aircraft are evenly distributed across the huge geographical distances between F-22 bases.
"The fleet is not monolithic, and another factor involved in moving around F-22s is to consolidate more-capable Block 30s and 35s at certain locations to make sure they can be utilized to their full extent...Newer aircraft arrive and older aircraft, some delivered five years ago, go to Hickam or Holloman [now Tyndall]. This is part of the fleet management plan. It 'also deals with newer versus older jets,' Akers said, noting there is a broader effort to put most of the Block 30 and 35 aircraft at Langley and Elmendorf, to make sure the capability is evenly bedded down." - Schanz, 2011
The current fleet is comprised of 34 Block 20, 63 Block 30, 86 Block 35 aircraft (Block details explained in upgrades section Part III).
Cost Effective Training
Image 4: T-38 trainer with F-22 near Tyndall AFB Florida
Fighter pilots in the USAF regularly fly 250 to 300 hours each year in order to remain proficient with their aircraft (Global Security, 2012). F-22 airframes in particular are utilized frequently in exercises relative to other fighter aircraft within the USAF given the limited F-22 fleet size and the nature of its capabilities (Schanz 2012). However, the F-22 is the most expensive fighter aircraft in the USAF inventory to maintain at approximately $44,250 dollars spent in maintenance costs for each hour spent in the air. In a hostile fiscal environment, high maintenance and sustainment costs dramatically affect unit readiness. When the USAF's budget for flying hours was reduced by $591 million dollars from April to September of 2013, F-22 units were allotted less flying hours in order to find savings (Brian Everstine & Marcus Weisgerber, 2013). The 94th FS based in Langley was grounded and the 27th FS (also based at Langley) was reduced from combat mission ready to basic mission capable status. The combination of sequestration and frequent wear on the airframes has forced the USAF to find alternate cost effective techniques to maintain the skills of its Raptor pilots.
"They began to take steps to reduce Raptor hours; these included supplementing pilots’ reduced F-22 time with flying hours in a T-38 companion trainer as well as heavier simulator use and other substitutes." - Schanz 2012
The 325th Fighter Wing based at Tyndall has 20 T-38 trainers which provide a cost effective means of providing adversarial training for Raptor pilots. The T-38's maintenance costs are an entire order of magnitude lower than the Raptor's at approximately $3,300 an hour.
"While the T-38 is no match for the F-22, it offers the Air Force a relatively cheap way to keep fighter pilots sharp...Using T-38s as aggressors saves fuel and gives F-22 pilots experience in being attacked by multiple aircraft rather than dueling among themselves, Wyler said. 'It's highly desired to be outnumbered'". - Koscak, 2011
In most conceivable scenarios, F-22 pilots will be significantly outnumbered by enemy forces as a result the limited F-22 fleet size. Thus, it is standard practice for multiple T-38s to engage a single F-22 pilot at visual range. In order to add another level of difficulty for Raptor pilots, the 325th's T-38 are painted in a black camouflage scheme which in conjunction with its small size makes it difficult to visually detect over the dark background of the open ocean where many training exercises take place (Lessig, 2012).
Consolidation of Maintenance Facilities
Image 5: Airman 1st Class Freddie Newman applying coatings to an F-22 at Tyndall. Image Credit: Alex Echols, 2013).
In a similar manner to the base restructuring plan, the USAF has had to consolidate its heavy maintenance facilities related to the F-22 to a single facility. Heavy maintenance work on the F-22 has traditionally been preformed at either Lockheed Martin's facilities in Palmdale California or Ogden Air Logistics Complex at Hill AFB Utah. The USAF determined by consolidating maintenance work to Ogden it could save $16 million dollars annually (Majumdar, 2013). The transition from Palmdale to Ogden is expected to take 31 months.
Image 1: Exercise Western Zephyr. Image Credit: Kayla Newman
About every month or so I try to give readers a preview of what they can expect in the next few weeks.
Upcoming Articles
(1) The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II: this article will discuss ways in which the USAF is currently seeking to adapt its Raptor force towards a Pacific oriented defense posture.
(2) The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part III: building off of part II, part III will include a list of recommendations in areas where the USAF has not addressed with regards to adapting its Raptor force.
(3) Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft Part II - The American Approach: Due to popular demand, I'll write it once I finish the Raptor series.
As always, thank you for your continued patience. As an author, I try to make this blog distinct from many other blogs by not using stream of contentiousness or making unsubstantiated claims. Unfortunately, that does come at the price of increased time spent writing and researching each article. When it comes to blogging, I've found quantity certainty does not have a quality of its own. The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II will be released in a few days, thank you.
The Advanced Tactical Fighter program (ATF), which resulted in the creation of the F-22A Raptor, was originally concerned with designing a new fighter aircraft capable of establishing air-superiority over Europe in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union. In the subsequent two decades since the conclusion of the ATF program, the United States' national security challenges have radically changed. The US has moved from a European centric defense posture to a Asia-Pacific oriented defense posture, globalization has greatly eroded the technological superiority of US forces relative to potential adversaries in a variety of defense related sectors, and the combination of the Great Recession coupled with spending trillions of dollars on two major counter insurgency campaigns has hindered the Military's ability to prepare for a high intensity conventional conflict against a near-peer adversary. In total, only 195 F-22's were produced out of the USAF's original request for 750 aircraft. Of these 195 aircraft, eight are reserved for test and evaluation purposes leaving 185 in the USAF inventory due to crashes. Of these 185 aircraft, only 143 are combat coded at any one time while the remaining 42 aircraft rotate between attrition reserve, deep maintenance, and training roles (Schanz, 2011). Part one of this article will examine the problems facing America's Raptor force in the coming decades as a result of these three factors. Part two will examine how the US military is adapting to these changing circumstances while part three will examine an number of potential proposals to further increase the relevance of the Raptor in future decades.
New US Mission Objectives
Image 2: 94th Fighter Squadron F-22 with external fuel tanks
As the War on Terror and the threat posed by rouge nation states continues to evolve but generally subside relative to the intimidate post 9/11 period, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is dictating a larger portion of the US' global defense posture. However, it is important to note the PRC is not analogous to the Soviet Union on its impact for being the single defining issue for US defense policy. Despite these reservations, the Pivot strategy and the creation of Air-Sea Battle do represent significant measures to address the national security challenges posed by a strong China. The exact objectives of the Pivot, and its overall importance within the context of US global aspirations, are frequently debated in Government but Ronald O'Rourke from the Congressional Research Service provided a coherent list of ideal or existing US objectives before the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. While these objectives are specifically related to China's naval modernization, they have broader implications for the Pivot and the Western-Pacific.
preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another;
preserving the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II;
fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations;
shaping the Asia-Pacific region; and
having a military strategy for China.
The Raptor provides a unique set of capabilities to the United States in meeting these objectives from both a passive influence perspective to providing critical air-superiority capabilities in wartime conditions. Taiwan still factors into the US' Western-Pacific strategic considerations but a potential conflict between the PRC and Taiwan is no longer the single dominant concern for both US and PRC strategic planners. Conversely, disputed territories between the PRC and US allies like the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea have become more relevant to the US Western Pacific posture. A limited conflict or skirmish over a territorial dispute, such as the Senkaku Islands, has significantly different strategic considerations than a protracted conflict between the PRC and Taiwan for the survival of the Taiwanese state.
Geographical Issues
Image 3: Central battle space vs. Pacific theater. Image Credit: RAND, 2008
The original ATF program requirements specifically tailored the to the unique circumstances of engaging the Soviet Air Force over Europe under the Air-Land Battle concept. Throughout the Cold War, the United States established a network of hardened airbases throughout Western Europe which were typically within 400-500 nautical miles of potential Warsaw Pact and Soviet targets. The proximity between the US-European airbases and potential targets would have allowed for efficient sortie generation rates while keeping the airbase out of imitate danger from the ground (RAND, 2008). The Pacific theater is between three to four times the size of the central European battle space for which the F-22 was designed to operate and the US Military's basing options are heavily constrained by the geography of the Western Pacific. Given the large distances between friendly airbases and potential targets, US tanker aircraft would be indispensable for sustaining US combat operations. RAND analyzed the prospect of deploying the entirety of the USAF's F-22A Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI) to Andersen air force base (AFB) Guam in support of Taiwan during a large scale conflict with the PRC on the graph below.
With a combat radius of only 410-470 nautical miles and maximum range of 800 miles (depending upon use of supercruise and relying upon internal fuel stores only), the F-22's would require several refueling stops before reaching the target area roughly 1,500 nautical miles from Andersen at Guam (Lockheed Martin, 2012). Under RAND's projections, given the extended distance resulting in extended time devoted to reaching the desired location for a combat air patrol near Taiwan, only six F-22's could continuously operate over Taiwan at any given time for a total of 138 Raptor sorties per day. In contrast, PLAF forces would be able to mount 1,300 sorties within the vicinity of Taiwan. If the United States were to operate closer to the Taiwanese strait, such as Kadena 486 nautical miles from Taiwan, F-22's stored or being refueled on the ground would be at significant risk from PRC conventional ballistic missiles such as the DF-11 and DF-21. Because the US prioritized the European theater for decades during the Cold War, US airbases in the Western-Pacific region remain relatively unhardened against cluster munition warheads (RAND, 2010). Andersen AFB is currently the only US airbase outside of Chinese conventional ballistic missile range.
Limited Fleet Numbers & Budgetary Austerity
Image 5: F-22 production line. Image Credit: Lockheed Martin
Despite the recent passage of the bipartisan $1.1 trillion dollar Omnibus spending bill, defense funding over the past few years has been largely marked by mandated arbitrary budget cuts and continuing resolutions instead of actual budgets resulting in fiscal uncertainty. Furthermore, the trillions of dollars spent fighting two major counter insurgency campaigns has diverted resources from optimizing the military to fight within heavily contested anti-access environments. The request for 750 aircraft prior to 1991 was steadily reduced over the next decade to just 275 aircraft in 2003 before Raptor production was finally terminated by Congress in 2009. The decision to end F-22 production was lead by the venerable then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who described the F-22 as a "niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios – specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet.” In the estimation of Gates, by 2020 Washington would have over 1,100 stealth aircraft compared to Beijing's 100. While the F-35 program has made steady progress inspite of unwavering criticism from its detractors, the estimation that the United States would have 800 F-35's in operational service by 2020 remains undeniably optimistic at best. While the F-35 will fill a crucial role in the USAF, USN, and USMC inventories, it is not a dedicated air superiority platform like the Raptor.
The F-35 was designed as a multipurpose fifth generation strike fighter capable of air-to-ground and air-to-air roles. While the F-35 is clearly superior in the air-to-air role relative to any existing fourth generation plus aircraft, by Lockheed Martin's own admission the F-22 is considerably more capable in the air-to-air role. The F-35's reduced emphasis on air-to-air missions is a result of its design requirements not engineering incompetence as many have argued. The F-22 and F-35 aircraft are intended to serve inherently different roles. However, when the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was being conceptualized in the 1990s, it was assumed that hundreds of dedicated air-superiority F-22's would support the JSF in a continuation of the USAF's traditional high-low mix procurement strategy exemplified by the current fourth generation F-15 and F-16. In all or nothing terms, devoting the appropriate resources to support the F-35 program was the correct decision. However, if Congress was able to grant the USAF's request for 275 F-22's without detracting resources from F-35 production, it would certainly have been preferable to capping production at 195 units. While the basic infrastructure to restart F-22 production remains intact, it is nearly inconceivable for Raptor production to restart. Instead, the USAF will have to upgrade its legacy F-15C fleet to meet the requirements of the Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR), which calls for the USAF to maintain a minimum of 6 dedicated air-superiority wings of 72 aircraft each (432 aircraft total).
While the United States is widely recognized as maintaining a considerable technological advantage over its potential adversaries in several defense related technologies (robotics, aerospace, avionics, C4ISR, etc.), the existing US technological advantage encompassing nearly all Millitary systems is likely to be diminished significantly over the next 20 to 30 years. The loss of the current US technological advantage has been attributed to a variety of causes from globalization to reduced emphasis on publicly funded research and development by many authors but there is broad agreement that a state of technological parity between the major world powers will occur over the next few decades (Defense Science Board, 2013). A state of technological parity will have a major impact on US military operations:
"The U.S. has long relied on technically superior equipment and systems to counter adversaries who, in many cases, had greater numbers of people in their military, or at least in the engagement, because recent combat experience has been in forward-developed situations. Key capabilities characterized by speed, stealth, and precision have allowed largely unfettered access to the adversary's homeland where the U.S. has rapidly established air superiority. The resulting freedom of access coupled with ubiquitous observation, communications-enabled networked coordination of forces, and precision weapons, has provided the ability to conduct operations that range from massive fire power to surgical strike unprecedented in the history of warfare.
In the future, increasingly technically capable and economically strong adversaries are likely to develop counters to some or all of the foundation technologies on which the U.S. has come to rely. The advantages provided by capabilities such as GPS, internet-based network communications, satellite reconnaissance, and stealth aircraft will be diminished, and in many cases, eliminated...In an environment where the Department of Defense no longer has assured technical leadership in all relevant defense technologies, there may be niche areas where adversaries will achieve superior capability to that of the U.S. military. This situation, should it occur, is most likely in areas such as cyber, where the barriers to entry are low and the capability development may not take massive financial resources." - Defense Science Board, 2013
In summary, the US is likely to retain a technological advantage in a few areas over its adversaries and competitors vs. the current state of technological dominance across an entire spectrum of technical fields. Part II will outline the response of the USAF to adapt its fleet of F-22s to meet new US national security needs in a rapidly developing world.
Recent news about the Russian PAK FA, and its Indian counterpart the FGFA, has unveiled numerous shortcomings within the aircraft. Indian officials have voiced concern over the aircraft's limited reliability, inadequate radar, and poor stealth features. In December, patents from the Sukhoi Design Bureau were released; these documents detail the limits of its radar reduction features.
“Business Standard has reviewed the minutes of that meeting. The IAF’s three top objections to the FGFA were: (a) The Russians are reluctant to share critical design information with India; (b) The fighter’s current AL-41F1 engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of the Sukhoi-30MKI’s AL-31 engines; and (c) It is too expensive. With India paying $6 billion to co-develop the FGFA, “a large percentage of IAF’s capital budget will be locked up...On January 15, the IAF renewed the attack in New Delhi, at a MoD meeting to review progress on the FGFA. The IAF’s deputy chief of air staff (DCAS), its top procurement official, declared the FGFA’s engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate, its stealth features badly engineered, India’s work share too low, and that the fighter’s price would be exorbitant by the time it enters service."
The FGFA program is looking like another example of Russian-Indian "co-development" in which India pays an exorbitant sum of money to Russia for only marginal improvements in its domestic defense industry resulting from Russian technology transfers.
"The papers claim that the radar cross-section (RCS) of an Su-27 was in the order of 10-15 m 2 , with the intention being to reduce the size of the RCS in the T-50 to an "average figure of 0.1-1 m 2...In particular, the patent spells out the benefits of internal weapons carriage, s-shaped engine air ducts, (which were considered but are actually not implemented in the production PAK FA), and the use of radar blockers. It adds that the inlet guide vanes of the engines' compressors generate "a significant portion [up to 60%] of the radar cross-section of the airframe-powerplant system in the forward hemisphere" and that this is reduced by using radar-blocking devices and radar-absorbing coatings in the walls of the air ducts."
"Press reports in 2013 indicated that Sukhoi was having problems with quality control in the T-50 effort. At least one of the prototypes needed patches on its wings to keep from falling apart during high-stress maneuvers." - David Axe, 2014
The engine blades for the PAK FA are easily visible in the image above.
For comparison, Global Security cites the F-22A's frontal radar cross section (rcs) at .0001m^2 and the F-35 has a frontal rcs of .0015m^2. The PAK FA's rcs is subsequently several orders of magnitude larger than its American counterparts.
Author's Note: I am still working on the Raptor article, but I'm not able to work on blogging as much due to college work. However, I will try to consistently publish at least one article per week.
Image 5: F-16 technology demonstrator with diverterless supersonic inlet
Recommendations
Lockheed Martin could make several additions to the F-16 to make the aircraft more competitive against the Gripen and new Russian 4.5 generation designs such as the Su-30MK2 and Mig-35. In order to reduce costs, these new upgrades should ideally build upon Lockheed Martin's existing F-16 R&D projects. Lockheed Martin has already experimented with a variety of advanced technology in the F-16 as a means to test technology for the F-35 such as "power-by-wire" flight controls, diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI), and low-observable asymmetric nozzle (LOAN) technology. Furthermore, Lockheed Martin has also experimented with other non F-35 related F-16 technology demonstrator projects such as the 85 degree angle of attack capable thrust vectoring NF-16D Variable-stability In-flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA) and the F-16 Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI) which had an internally mounted forward looking infrared (FLIR) system. The combination of all of the following features would be unpractical and it would make the F-16 too expensive for the low-end fighter market. Ideally, the most feasible of the following upgrades would be offered in a way such that the customer could pick and choose which upgraded features they are willing to pay for.
Upgrades to Lower Radar Signature
Image 6: low-observable asymmetric nozzle technology demonstrator on the F-16
The incorporation of DSI into a mass production variant of the F-16 is likely unfeasible despite the significant reductions to the F-16's frontal rcs that would result from its incorporation into the design. However, incorporating Have Glass I, Have Glass II, composite materials from the F-2, and an internal weapon pod remain feasible and relatively inexpensive. Both Have Glass I and Have Glass II are already used to reduce the radar cross section of operational F-16s (Evangelidis, 2004). In conjunction Mitsubishi, Lockheed Martin has already developed composite materials used in the construction of the F-2 (a modified Japanese F-16 variant) which both reduces the weight of the aircraft and slightly reduces its radar cross section (Defense Industry Daily, 2013). Boeing's development of a low-observable weapons pod for the F/A-18E Block III demonstrates the feasibility for developing a similar pod for the F-16. A low observable weapons pod would limit radar returns that typically result from the carriage of armaments on external wing mounted pylons.
The combination of all of these features would significantly reduce the radar cross section of the F-16 but the aircraft will not be comparable to the F-35 due to the radar returns resulting from the F-16's unstealthy vertical tail and lack of planform alignment. Furthermore, this heavily upgraded F-16 would have easily detectable electronic emissions and would only have limited infrared spectrum protection from Have Glass II. However, the goal of proposed comprehensive F-16 upgrade program is merely to grant the F-16 a competitive edge over other low-end fighter aircraft, not to attempt to match the F-35 in low observability characteristics. Furthermore, if the level of technological sophistication is too high, the aircraft's export prospects will be diminished as a result of the AECA. Thus, the incorporation of the most feasible low observable recommendations would fulfill both making the F-16 more competitive against other reduced radar cross section low-end fighter designs and the level of technological sophistication would likely not pose a major problem with regards to exports. Furthermore, it is likely the composition of the Have Glass II RAM can be downgraded as needed to alleviate export concerns.
Image 7: Have Glass II RAM treatment with characteristic speckled texture. Have Glass II has been applied to over 1,700 F-16s using the Computer Aided Spray Paint Expelling Robot (CASPER) which also applies RAM coatings to the F-22 (Evangelidis, 2004). Have Glass II is typically applied to F-16CJ "Wild Weasel" aircraft which hunt surface-to-air missile sites.
As with the radar signature reduction features, adding all of these maneuverability enhancements is impractical. While adding thrust vectoring to the F-16 from the VISTA program would undoubtedly yield extensive tangible improvements to the F-16's maneuverability characteristics, adding thrust vectoring would also almost certainly be the most expensive upgrades on the list of potential maneuverability related proposals. However, the F110-GE-132 turbofan is already in production and in use in UAE F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft. The F110-GE-132 turbofan offers a considerable improvement over the current 28,500 lbf Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229 turbofan in the Block 50 and the 28,984 lbf F110-GE-129 turbofan (all figures in afterburner or military power). It is important to note F110-GE-132 is not currently offered as part of the F-16V configuration (Dorr, 2012). The addition of the GE-132 would synergize with the incorporation of both "power-by-wire", which removes the mechanical backup for a total 6% reduction in weight, and the composite materials from the F-2 which would further increase airframe weight reduction. As a result of reduced weight and increased thrust, the upgraded aircraft would have a significantly higher thrust to weight ratio over the current F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft.
Image 8: Composite wing from an F-2. From Defense Industry Daily: "In the end, the F-2 delivered on its techno-industrial promises. Mitsubishi’s heavy use of graphite epoxy and co-cured composite technology for the wings encountered some teething problems, but proved to be a leading-edge use of a technology that provides weight savings, improved range, and some stealth benefits. This technology was then transferred back to America, as part of the program’s industrial partnership."
Improvements to Sensors
Image 9: FLIR in F-16 AFTI. Image retrieved via F-16.net
Lockheed Martin has been diligent about consistently upgrading the F-16's internal avionics with its most recent F-16 variants. The incorporation of either Northrup Grumman's Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) or Raytheon's Advanced Combat Radar (RACR) into the F-16V grants greatly increased situational awareness and beyond visual range (bvr) combat capabilities. Currently the United States enjoys nearly a ten year lead over its international competitors in the field of fighter mounted AESA. However, by the 2020s other low-end fighter aircraft will incorporate AESAs such as the Eurofighter, Mig-35, Gripen Next Generation (NG), etc. In order for the F-16 to remain competitive, the inclusion of an internally mounted infrared search and track (IRST) system is necessary. Lockheed Martin has developed an externally pod mounted IRST system for the F-16 called "IRST". While this is a relatively low cost and efficient means of adding IRST capabilities to older existing airframes, externally mounted pods generally diminish aerodynamic performance. Lockheed might be able to use the incorporation of the AN/ASQ-28 IFTS on the F-16E/F Block 60 as a starting point for incorporating an internally mounted IRST on the F-16.
Upgrade Summary
The objective of a comprehensive upgrade program for the F-16 is to provide enough new capabilities to the F-16 airframe as to make the aircraft viable against the Gripen NG and new super maneuverable Russian fourth generation fighter aircraft. At a minimum, this would entail the inclusion composite materials to reduce weight and provide some rcs reduction, "power-by-wire" for additional weight reductions, the addition of a more powerful engine such as the F110-GE-132, a low-observable weapon pod, and incorporation of an internally mounted IRST system. The research and development time for many of these improvements would be reduced as Lockheed Martin has already researched the basis for these improvements in past F-16 technology demonstrator programs during the 1990s to early 2000s. Furthermore, many of these features are incorporated in existing operational aircraft (either the J-2 or F-16E/F Block 60).
Capitalizing on Saab's Weaknesses
Image 10: JAS-39 F Demonstrator. Image Credit: Saab.
Despite its recent success in Brazil's $4.5 billion dollar FX-2 contract, Saab retains three key vulnerabilities Lockheed Martin could exploit in the future.
Finite production capacity and significant additional R&D is required for Gripen NG
Limited training and logistics support from Saab
Sweden's comparatively limited international clout vs. the United States
Saab has a comparatively limited production capacity compared to Lockheed Martin. Sweden's order of 60 next generation Gripen aircraft will occur between 2018 and 2026 (Hoyle, 2013). With more orders from Switzerland and Brazil, any additional Gripen NG customers will likely have to wait past 2020 for their initial deliveries. Lockheed Martin can deliver F-16's at a much faster rate and only a modest amount of R&D work remains for the aforementioned F-16 improvements when compared to the NG.
"'This is not just an upgrade of the existing Gripen; it is a complete redesign, and essentially a new aircraft. Because of the small number to be built, the R&D costs per unit are likely to be very high.' The upgraded Gripen would grow in length from 14.1 to 14.9 meters, it would have a slightly wider wingspan, and its maximum takeoff weight would increase from 14 to 16.5 tons. The number of onboard weapon stations would rise from eight to 10, engine power would increase by 22 percent, and range would expand from 3,500 to 4,075 kilometers." - Gerard O'Dwyer, 2012
Saab's proposal to build a fighter pilot school at Air Force Base Overberg South Africa has been denied by the South African Government (Martin, 2013). This facility would have provided much needed training and logistic support to current Gripen users. Saab is in the process of finding a new site for its fighter pilot school but it will likely not be completed for several years. Meanwhile, the United States Air Force conducts training exercises with other nations that operate the F-16 on a routine basis e.g. a detachment of USAF F-16's from the 176th Fighter Squadron (FS) was recently deployed to Poland for training exercises.
Limitations of Analysis
Image 11: Lockheed Martin Fort Worth F-16 production facility. Image Credit: Kenny Roberts
Before concluding, its worth mentioning the limits of the analysis above. While the analysis above emphasizes the volume of orders within the low-end fighter market, it does not address aggregate value of high-end vs low-end fighter sales. One of the basic tenants of economics is the assumption that firms act in a profit maximizing manner. For example, despite the larger volume of aircraft sold in the low-end market, the few sales of high-end aircraft can provide a disproportionately large source of revenue when compared to even the largest sales of low-end aircraft. For example, Boeing was recently awarded a massive $29.4 billion dollar contract for 84 new F-15SA strike eagles and 68 upgrade kits for Saudi Arabia's current strike F-15S eagle fleet. In comparison, the largest F-16 sale in recent years, the UAE purchase of 80 new F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft, was valued at only $6.4 billion. It could be that Lockheed Martin has already judged marginal benefit, in terms of continued or increased F-16 sales as a result of more than piecemeal upgrades to the F-16, as insufficient to justify the marginal cost of comprehensive F-16 upgrades. It is also possible that Lockheed Martin has judged the opportunity cost, in terms of resources allocated to sustaining F-16 production, to be too high at a time when it needs additional resources for the F-35 program.
However, Lockheed Martin's concern that heavily upgrading the F-16 could result diminished international interest in the F-35 is ill-founded.
"LockMart has been very discrete with marketing and upgrading this plane, because aggressively selling a very capable fourth generation fighter at $45 million could easily annoy the Air Force and jeopardize international F-35 sales too. It even moved the F-16 production line to a much smaller and less prominent building. The worst enemy of The Best is The Good Enough." - Richard Aboulafia, 2012
So long as the upgrades provide enough new capability to nations as to make the F-16 comparable to its 4.5 generation counterparts, its low price and the diplomatic ties with the United States will once again make the F-16 very attractive to low-end customers. It is plausible that Lockheed doesn't need to fully match the Gripen NG from a capabilities standpoint due to the variable of strengthening diplomatic ties with the US as discussed in Part I, but as of now the F-16 is sufficiently behind its counterparts as to diminish the effectiveness diplomatic ties variable. In the high-end market, the upgraded F-16 will not offer enough new capability to justify foregoing the fifth generation F-35. The F-X III fighter competition in South Korea serves as an example of a high-end fighter market customer chose the F-35 over a cheaper heavily upgraded 4.5 generation alternative, Boeing's F-15SE "Silent Eagle". In many respects the F-15SE is similar to the upgraded F-16. Thus, Lockheed Martin can effectively meet demand from both markets without fear of damaging its own prospects in the high-end market with the F-35 by appropriately upgrading and marketing the F-16.
Conclusion
Image 12: F-16 near Fort Worth. Image Credit: Code One Magazine
It is in Lockheed Martin's best interests to aggressively market upgraded variants of the F-16 to countries within the low-end fighter market such that it can retain the high-end market with the F-35 and the low-end market with the F-16. This is not a call to replace the F-35, rather Lockheed Martin should seek to meet the demands of both the low-end and high-end as to not loose out on potential revenue. By aggressively marketing a heavily upgraded F-16, Lockheed Martin can increase sales without serious concern that interest in the F-35 would be diminished, the low-end and high-end fighter market largely represent two separate markets blocks of international consumers.
Author's Note: Next article will be: "The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors". Release date is yet to be determined, maybe next week?
