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Friday, April 12, 2013

F/A-XX 6th Generation Aircraft


Last year, the US Navy issued a request for information (RFI) regarding its desire to replace its fleet of F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft in the 2030s. Boeing recently released an updated concept of their 6th generation F/A-XX originally unveiled last year. Lockheed Martin unveiled its own 6th generation concept in a calender distributed to journalists last year. If the development of the first 5th generation aircraft (the F-22 Raptor) is any indication, the 6th generation fighter(s) that enters service after 2030 will look entirely different from either company's initial conceptual proposals. 


Image 2: Lockheed Martin 6th generation concept. 

"The genesis of the Raptor can be traced to a Tactical Air Command (TAC) study known as TAC-85 undertaken in the early 1970s. In 1969-70, TAC-85 began inquiring into what the USAF fighter of the next century would look like. 'Look like' went far beyond the physical appearance of the 21st-century fighter...The initial Request For Information (RFI) for the ATF was issued to industry in June of 1981. Invited to submit bids were nine aerospace companies: Boeing, Fairchild, General Dynamics  Grumman  Lockheed, LTV, McDonnell Douglas, Northrup, and North American Rockwell...The RFI only specified the mission in the vaguest terms. [The] USAF waited for the industry brainstorming to come up with more defined design and capability parameters...The Advanced Tactical Fighter Statement of Operational Need (ATFSON) in November 1984 detailed the projected deficiencies of current generation fighters. This statement resulted in Congressional funding and approval for the ATF in 1985. The REP [Request Final Proposal] for the ATF was issued in July 1986." - Lou Drendel, 2011

The following timeline shows key dates in the Raptor's design and manufacturing evolution. Dates within parenthesis give a rough approximation of what can be expected of  the 6th generation development program. By no means are the estimated dates conclusive or set in stone. It is definitively known that the  RFI was issued by the US Navy in 2012. It is also definitively known that the US Navy plans to field the 6th generation Super Hornet replacement sometime after 2030. Given the immediate issue of F-35 procurement, it is likely that the 6th generation replacement program will be delayed beyond 2030. Current plans project the F-35 production line will remain open until at least 2036.

Timeline of Raptor Evolution

1981 (2012) RFI issued
1985 (2016) Funding Awarded by Congress
1986 (2017) Competing Firms Finalized
1990 Evaluation Concluded (2021)
1991 Raptor Declared Winner (2022)
1994 Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) contract (2025)
1997 F-22 First Flight (2028)
2001 Lot 1 Ordered (2032)
2003 First Deliveries (2034)
2005 IOC Reached (2036)

In 1981, none of the initial RFI proposals shown in the image below resemble either the YF-22 or the YF-23 (image courtesy of YF-23.net). Given that the USN issued the RFI in 2012, the 6th generation program is likely in the equivalent stage of development. Meaning that is is unlikely the conceptual images released by Lockheed Martin or Boeing will look like the final product or even the prototype.







Program requirements changed over time which partially contributed to the disparity in designs (e.g. stealth became a dominant factor). Lockheed Martin and its developmental partners (Boeing and General Dynamics) went through dozens of design iterations before submitting the Lockheed Model 090P shown below for the final proposal. The USAF chose Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin as the finalists in the concept demonstration phase. (image courtesy of Lockheed Martin)


Due to airframe weight concerns, Lockheed decided to completely redesign its initial Model 090P proposal during 1987. The redesign process yielded an aircraft that resembles YF-22. (image courtesy of Lockheed Martin) 



Sunday, April 7, 2013

A Word About Chinese Military Research


Image 1: Shenyang J-15 undergoing carrier flight testing. 

Authors Note: While conducting researching the China's anti-access series of articles, I was constantly reminded of how bad much of the existing source material is. The primary objective of this article is to aid those who wish to learn more about the Chinese military from reliable sources. A list of reliable research resources will be provided after the examination of why such a large extent of publicly available online resources on the Chinese military are unreliable. 

Many experienced analysts who routinely research military topics often encounter an assortment of difficulties while researching topics pertaining to the Chinese military

"American military attaches assigned to the country are taught that 'China's first line of strategic defense is the Chinese language.' It takes about a decade to become reasonably proficient in Chinese—all too often an impractical quest—but on top of that, many Chinese will admit that the vocabularies of the military and related sciences approach a separate language, unknown to most.” - Richard D. Fisher, 2012

To make matters worse, the Chinese Government is not a credible source in regards to military related information as it routinely commits acts of disinformation (e.g. providing false defense budget figures). Many English written articles on the Chinese military are often both poorly written and biased to the extent of qualifying as an outright fabrication. Articles about Chinese military systems on Wikipedia are a classic example of this phenomenon*. 

*NOTE: I do not use Wikipedia articles directly for research nor would I recommend it to anyone. However, I've found that examining the source material utilized in a well written Wikipedia article can be a good initial starting point for one's own research into a topic if conventional methods do not provide much useful information.

Many of the topics written on Chinese military systems on Wikipedia are beyond redemption and cite bogus source material. This is an excerpt from a particularly poor written Wikipedia article about the J-15 as of 4/5/2013. (Image 2) 




Nearly every claim made by the author(s) during the first three fourths of this paragraph are either demonstrably wrong or highly suspicious.   
  1. "likely exceeds or matches the aerodynamic capabilities of virtually all fighter aircraft currently operated by regional militaries, with the exception of the U.S. F-22 Raptor." Its hard to take these types of statements seriously as they are not grounded in reality to any extent. The J-15 is the product of China's reverse engineering efforts of Ukrainian Su-33 aircraft obtained between 2001 and 2005 (Source 4). While the original Soviet Su-33 airframe provides some decent maneuverability characteristics when compared to some legacy 4th generation aircraft, it is inferior to high performance fighter aircraft employed by other regional air forces such as the Su-30MIK, Su-30MKM, F-15SG, and F-15K. The J-15 will not even be as maneuverable as the original base Su-33 design if Shenyang cannot secure reliable high thrust engines. China's current domestically produced WS-10A engines are not very capable. In short, given that even basic quality control measures remain a major issue for Shenyang, any claim that compares the J-15 to the most lethal air superiority fighter in the world should be met with intense scrutiny. 
  2. In regards to 4.5 generation technological features mentioned: To the article's credit, it does mention the remarks made by Sun Cong, chief designer of the Shenyang J-15, in the subsequent paragraph. Sun Cong's full statement: "In an interview with Chinese state news agency Xinhua, Chinese aircraft designer Sun Cong said that the J-15 is 'generally close to the US F/A-18, reaching world class standards.'" (Source 6). However, Sun Cong's statements and the information provided in the paragraph above (image 2) are mutually exclusive. As capable as the original McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A Hornet is, the original F/A-18 Hornet did not feature AESA radar, RAM coatings, supermaneuverability, etc. The original Hornet would not even be in the same league of performance as an aircraft which features the aforementioned traits. If the J-15 really included the listed traits, its performance would be closer to that of an advanced 4.5 generation fighter design such as the Eurofighter Typhoon not the original 4th generation legacy Hornet. The technology incorporated within the J-15 design is reminiscent of 4th generation aircraft qualities as the J-15 does not quality for the 4.5 generation aircraft designation. Its also worth keeping in mind by the time the J-15 starts to enter service, the original Hornet will be transitioning out of service in the US Navy. The original Hornet will be replaced by the much more capable 5th generation F-35C which will serve alongside the 4.5 generation F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.  
  3. In regards to the AESA claims: No credible source has confirmed the incorporation of an AESA radar into the J-15 design. If previous domestically produced Chinese radars are any indication, China's current domestically produced fighter radars are comparable to late 1980s to early 1990s US fighter radars in terms of both detection power and tracking performance. The pulse doppler radar utilized in the J-11B as of 2006 was capable of tracking six to eight targets and engaging four of them simultaneously (Source 1).  The domestically produced J-10A's radar, based on the Israeli EL/M-2035 can track twenty targets and engage up to four simultaneously (Source 2). The  APG-71 radar developed for the F-14D Super Tomcat in the late 1980s and fielded in 1991 could track 24 targets and simultaneously engage six of them (Source 3). Radar systems aren't developed overnight. Considering the scheduled deployment date for the J-15 is 2016 (Source 12), its reasonable to assume the radar system utilized by the J-15 is currently being developed. Given the relative level of technological maturity featured in 2006 indigenous radars mentioned earlier, it is highly improbable that within a period of just seven years (2006-2013) Chinese radar technology advanced enough to build a capable fighter AESA radar system. Russian firms took a considerably longer period of time to gain the ability to produce an AESA fighter radar on par with US AESA systems. Russia's first AESA fighter radar, the Phazotron Zhuk AE/ASE, was publicly announced only a relatively short while ago in 2007. European firms also took a considerable period of time to develop their own AESA radar systems. Thales recently delivered the first European built fighter AESA radar sets to Dassault in 2012. However, it should be noted that Chinese firms will advance their radar technology faster than Russian firms did relative to US firms due to China's extensive cyber espionage efforts. In summary, no credible source has verified the inclusion of an AESA radar in the J-15 and the current state of Chinese domestic radar technology would make the development an AESA radar (or at least a competent AESA radar system) incredibly difficult for Chinese engineers. Its possible the J-15 could have a very basic AESA by 2016 but its unlikely. 
The J-15 Wikipedia article is representative of how inaccurate many online resources are that relate to the Chinese military. There are also an innumerable number of Chinese military blogs that post false information which in turn Wikipedia authors will use for their own articles.

Reliable and Easily Accessible Sources on the Chinese Military


There are a few good online resources about the Chinese military that I've found of the years. The list below are the main websites I use when researching the Chinese military. Assuming you do not purchase a subscription to based resource such as Jane's Defense & Security Intelligence & Analysis, these are among the best online resources on the Chinese military.

Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/index.html

  • Global Security provides an extensive series of thousands of articles that encompass nearly every major weapon systems employed by militaries worldwide. Global Security is technically a subscription based resource. However, the site provides 7 free article a month. Global Security is an excellent resource and is certainly a worthwhile investment to individuals who desire a reliable comprehensive resource on military equipment. 
  • Site introduction: "GlobalSecurity.org is the leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security. Launched in 2000, GlobalSecurity.org is the most comprehensive and authoritative online destination for those in need of both reliable background information and breaking news. GlobalSecurity.org, is well-respected, trusted and often-referenced in the media, both domestically and internationally."

US Department of Defense Publications: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/

  • The US Defense Department publishes an annual report to Congress concerning Chinese military capabilities. These reports contain a huge volume of information and provide a good introductory resource on the Chinese military. Specific weapon systems are usually mentioned briefly but these reports provide an invaluable perspective on aggregate Chinese military capabilities.  

Air Power Australia: http://www.ausairpower.net/index.html
  • Air Power Australia (APA) is an interesting resource which has published some of the most comprehensive analyses of Russian and Chinese weapon systems to date. However, Dr. Karlo Kopp's criticisms on the F-35 is largely unfounded. The main reason why APA appears on this list is much of the information published on the site cannot be found elsewhere. For example, some of the detailed performance figures of Russian fighter radars are simply not available anywhere else except in Russian whitepapers written in Russian.  
  • Site introduction: "The  Air Power Australia website was established in October, 2004, with the aim of  promoting air power; stimulating public and parliamentary debate on air power topics; educating the community; and, publishing and archiving papers and articles on air power topics. The website covers a wide range of air,  land and sea warfare topics, especially where these are related to the integration and synergy of air, land and sea warfighting capabilities."


  • The RAND corporation is a think tank that routinely publishes some of the most comprehensive national security analysis available to the public. Although the RAND website and its analysis contains a lot of useful information, finding a specific paper or topic can be difficult due to the sheer volume of reports. 
  • Site introduction: "The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.  RAND focuses on the issues that matter most such as health, education, national security, international affairs, law and business, the environment, and more. With a research staff consisting of some of the world's preeminent minds, RAND has been expanding the boundaries of human knowledge for more than 60 years.  As a nonpartisan organization, RAND is widely respected for operating independent of political and commercial pressures.  Through our dedication to high-quality and objective research and analysis and with sophisticated analytical tools developed over many years, RAND engages clients to create knowledge, insight, information, options, and solutions that will be both effective and enduring."
If you have any questions, feel free to ask. Discerning the credibility of a resource can be pretty difficult.

Sources 

  1. PLA’s Flanker fighter family, DX, 2009:                                                                                       http://sinodefence.com/2014/02/15/pla-flanker-fighter-family/
  2. Air Force Systems, Global Security, 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/04fisher/7airforcesystems.htm
  3. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems 1997-1998, Norman Friedman, 1997: http://books.google.com/books?id=l-DzknmTgDUC&pg=PA214&lpg=PA214&dq=apg-71+radar+performance&source=bl&ots=2sgOCVl9In&sig=T0R1KgIJAU1gIZscCMv9hbADwMk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=N3RfUZikNu_DiwLCwIGYDw&ved=0CFcQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=apg-71%20radar%20performance&f=false
  4. J-15 Flying Shark (Jianjiji-15 Fighter aircraft 15) / F-15, Global Security, 2013: www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-15.htm 
  5. Is China Buying Russia’s Su-35 Fighter?, Defense News, 2012: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121125/DEFREG03/311250003/Is-China-Buying-Russia-8217-s-Su-35-Fighter-?odyssey=nav|head
  6. China fighter designer compares J-15 to F/A-18 Hornet, Greg Waldron, 2013: 
  7. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/china-fighter-designer-compares-j-15-to-fa-18-hornet-383100/
  8. Sukhoi Su-33 and Su-33UB Flanker D  Shenyang J-15 Flanker D, Dr. Carlo Kopp, 2008: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Maritime-Flanker-D.html
  9. China’s Testing Woes Remind That Developing Carrier Planes Is Hard, David Axe, 2013: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/developing-warplanes-is-hard/
  10. China’s Defense Secrecy Still Robust, Richard D. Fisher, 2012: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_12_03_2012_p10-521006.xml
  11. Engine Tech, Cyber-Espionage Key To China’s Progress, Bill Sweetman, 2012: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_11_05_2012_p72-508358.xml
  12. New Pictures Of China's J-15 Suggest The Plane May Be Getting Ready For Carrier Takeoffs, Robert Johnson, 2012: http://www.businessinsider.com/china-j-15-carrier-takeoff-2012-1
  13. Flanker Radars in Beyond Visual Range Air Combat, Dr. Karlo Kopp, 2008: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker-Radars.html#mozTocId533477

Monday, April 1, 2013

China's Anti Access Strategy Part I


Image 1: China's island chain strategy (image courtesy of source 2)

In terms of global perceptions, the belief that The People's Republic of China will supersede the United States as the dominant economic, political and military power in the 21st century is becoming increasingly widespread. However, in order to achieve true superpower status like the United States, China must achieve the ability to project hard power (military force) across the globe in addition to its already extensive soft power influence. Global power projection is not an immediate concern among current Chinese strategic planers. China's military procurement portfolio reflects the desire to consolidate and project regional power rather than to achieve global military influence. Of the roughly $150 billion dollars spent by the Chinese military (estimates range $120-$180 billion USD official military budget is $115.7 billion USD), a comparatively small portion is spent on the development of China's single aircraft carrier and its related systems. Three main areas in terms of military capabilities have benefited from a disproportional level of funding since the 1990s: regional air power capabilities, short & medium range missile capabilities, and submarine warfare capabilities. These investments do not actively project power over long distances like America's ten multi-billion dollar carrier strike groups. Rather, these systems deny a potential aggressor access to key areas of the Pacific region. For example, between 1995 and 2012, China domestically produced 39 submarines and bought 12 Kilo class submarines from Russia (Source 1). Only eight of these submarines are capable of sustained global deployment (nuclear powered). The People's Army Liberation Navy (PLAN) forwent the procurement of global power projection assets in favor of increased regional submarine warfare capabilities. The PLAN lacks a large inventory of fleet replenishment and oliers to sustain the continued operation of its largely diesel powered surface fleet. These oliers are required for large scale naval deployments thousands of kilometers from Chinese naval ports. If the PLAN valued increasing its global power projection capabilities in the short term, it would have allocated a more substantial sum into assets like oliers and fleet replenishment vessels. The trade off made between oliers and an increased regional submarine presence is generally representative of current Chinese military thinking. As a whole, the selection of equipment by the Chinese military does not demonstrate an interest in global power projection at this time. The first part in this series will examine the primary strategic objectives China seeks to achieve. Subsequent parts in this series will examine the individual components of China's anti-access strategy listed above.

The Chinese military has been tasked with three main strategic objectives: maintain the capability to defeat Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, deny foreign intervention in a China-Taiwan War (e.g. keep the United States from aiding Taiwan), and secure China's continued access to natural resources (Source 2). In order to achieve these goals, China's strategic planners have devised the island chain strategy shown above in image 1. Under the plan, Chinese military forces will eventually be capable of projecting power up to the second island chain and deny US forces from operating within the island chains if necessary. The ability to project power out to the first line of island chains will be accomplished before power projection can be readily applied out to the second island chain. Chinese forces are already capable of projecting power out to the first island chain.

"China’s active defense strategy has a maritime component that aligns with the PRC’s 1982 naval maritime plan outlined by then-Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Liu Huaqing. This naval strategy delineated three stages. In the first stage, from 2000 to 2010, China was to establish control of waters within the first island chain that links Okinawa Prefecture, Taiwan and the Philippines. In the second stage, from 2010 to 2020, China would seek to establish control of waters within the second island chain that links the Ogasawara island chain, Guam and Indonesia. The final stage, from 2020 until 2040, China would put an end to U.S. military dominance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, using aircraft carriers as a key component of their military force." -  Stacy A. Pedrozo, Capt, JAGC, USN, U.S. Navy Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations



Image 2: China's oil supply routes (courtesy of source 3)

The third objective given to the Chinese military is to secure China's continued access to imported natural resources.

"Beijing is increasingly dependent upon imported energy to sustain its economy. A net oil exporter until 1993, China still lacks trust in international energy markets...In 2009, China imported approximately 56 percent of its oil and conservative estimates project that China will import almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and three-quarters by 2030...A second goal of Beijing’s foreign energy strategy is to alleviate China’s heavy dependence on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), particularly the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. In 2010, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca." - Source 2

A somewhat antiquated view holds that China seeks to establish naval and air bases along key oil routes to ensure its continued access to these resources (string of pearls strategy). China response to Pakistani invitations to build a naval base at Gwadar is not one of exuberance. However, China continues to invest heavily in Africa including substantial investments in ports. Although the relative merits of the string of pearls argument is somewhat questionable, China's intention to secure its access to oil supplies is undeniable. The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are of particular interest to China.

Further Reading (blog articles by topic) 

Sources 

  1. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, 2013  
  2. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011 
  3. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012 
  4. China’s Real Blue Water Navy, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, 2012
  5. Bold Projections Taken Out of Context Overstate China’s Leeway for Military Budget Growth, Defense Industry Daily, 2013
  6. http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/vessel.asp 
  7. http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/03/27/feature-01

Saturday, March 23, 2013

The Future of America's Eagles Part II

Image 1: A pair of F-15Cs over Okinawa Japan. Image credit: U.S. Air Force by Master Sgt. Marvin Krause

The Future of America's Eagles Part I

The Raptor was intended to replace the F-15C/D as the principle air superiority platform for the USAF. The cancellation of Raptor production in 2009 ensured the continued service of the Eagle. Despite its immense set of capabilities, a meager 184 Raptors does not come close to fulfilling the USAF's aggregate air superiority needs. The USAF will retain and upgrade 176 F-15C's in an attempt to retain significant air to air capabilities into the future. Although these upgraded F-15Cs do not come close to the Raptor in terms of  air to air capabilities, these heavily modified F-15's will comprise a significant portion of the USAF's total air to air assets in the Pacific. The Pacific will be the heart of America's strategic and economic interests for the next few decades. As such, the Pivot strategy seeks to ensure America's continued hard power influence in the region. Despite what State Department officials might say, the clear intent of the Pivot strategy is to offset China's increased military capabilities. China is a strategic competitor to the United States (China recognizes and has stated this fact itself ). However unlikely a conflict between the two powers is, multiple fighter squadrons (FS) will be placed at China's doorstep to ensure American interests and act as a deterrent. This article will examine the placement of operational Eagle units in the Pacific and their strategic impact on the region.


Image 2: United States airbases in proximity to China. Red aircraft icons represent PLAF bases. Image credit: RAND, 2008.

Fighter aircraft are most effective when land bases are within 500 nautical miles of the area of operations (AO) (RAND, 2008). Kadena is the only USAF base within 500 nautical miles of the Taiwanese strait. Although the Eagle has a combat radius in excess of 1,000 nautical miles, Eagles based at Kadena will have a longer loiter time over the AO in addition to being able to rearm and return to the AO faster due to the close proximity of Kadena when compared to Eagles operating from more distant bases. Kadena is also located in close proximity to the disputed Senkaku Islands / Diaoyudao Islands (located in between Okinawa and Taiwan). If a conflict between the United States and China does occur, forward deployed units at Kadena will likely be the United States' first line of defense.

Due to its aforementioned strategic significance, nearly a third of America's future Eagle fleet (54 aircraft) will be stationed at Kadena AFB. These Eagles will be flown by some of the most lethal pilots in the entire USAF. The 18th operation group at Kadena is comprised of the 44th FS and elite 67th FS which operate 24 Eagles each (Global Security, 2013). The 67th FS has the distinction of earning the highly coveted Raytheon trophy award, the most prestigious award given to fighter squadrons in the USAF.

"Units are graded on air defense and air superiority mission performance; operational mission performance; organizational readiness inspection results; training exercise participation; unit achievements and awards; individual achievements and awards; and unit incentive programs." - USAF, 2012

The following video shows the 67th FS practicing their visual range combat skills. The Raytheon 2012 award video below is, in my opinion, the best F-15 video online and has some excellent mock dogfight footage.



In an air war with China around 2020, the principle adversary of the F-15 will be the J-10, J-11B,  Su-27SK, and the Su-30MKK. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will only be able to field a few dozen 5th generation J-20 aircraft by 2020 and they will almost certainly have software and post-developmental issues during the first two to three years of deployment (similar to initial Raptors). Of the 4th generation aircraft accessible to the PLAAF, the Su-30MKK is the most capable. The PLAAF received a total of 76 Su-30MMK aircraft between 2000-2003 and the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) received 24 advanced Su-30MK2 aircraft in 2004 (Sinodefense, 2013).


Image 3: PLAAF Su-30MKK. Image retrieved via Sinodefense

Despite its age, the F-15C airframe still delivers excellent maneuverability performance. During training exercises at Nellis, American F-15Cs consistently defeated the more advanced Indian Su-30MKI in visual range engagements. The Indian Su-30MKI Flankers are more advanced than the Su-30MKK variant flown by the the PLAAF. Furthermore, American Aggressor Squadrons routinely replicate the Su-30 during mock combat exercises. The combination of both topnotch visual range combat skills and the upgrades specified in Part I, will ensure that American F-15C pilots will provide an effective air superiority capability to the USAF for decades to come.



Image 3: F-15C at Kadena.


Sources
  1. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/5af.htm
  2. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/18wg.htm
  3. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/67fs.htm 
  4. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/44fs.htm 
  5. http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/su30.asp 
  6. http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/default.asp
  7. Air Combat Past, Present and Future by RAND, 2008
  8. Modern Millitary Aircraft: Eagle by Lou Drendel, 1992
  9. F-15 Eagle in action by Lou Drendel, 2002
  10. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123290989

Monday, March 18, 2013

Blog Updates 2013


Image 1: Happy Saint Patrick's day (from North Korea). Clearly bright green camo is best suited to dead grass foliage environments. Apparently North Korean troops do not have basic marksmanship training either. If the intention is to hit a target, one does not generally shoot from the hip (unless its Hollywood). Image retrieved via Reuters 2013: http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/slideshow?articleId=USRTR3F1R9#a=2

I'm pretty busy but here's my agenda:
  • Canada and F-35 Updates: plan to added more information and new proposal options to both parts I and part III. Got a lot of good feedback as a result of F-16.net forums, thanks to those who contributed. Planned additional information includes: UAI, CF-18 life maintenance and life extension possibilities, CF-35 electronic warfare capabilities, and more. I'll post an update once the modifications have been made. 
  • New Articles in progress: The Future of America's Eagles Part II, The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors Part I, The Future of America's Strike Eagles
  • Planned Articles: What would an American Strike on Iran Accomplish?; America's Next Generation Bomber Part II (LSRB); The State of the NATO Alliance; The Importance of C4ISR; What Would a War Between The US And China Look Like? - analysis of air and sea assets
As always, let me know if you have any questions, suggestions or concerns in the comments.

Blog Articles by Topic 

Sorry about the North Korean silliness. I'll be more professional in the future (probably).

North Korean Air Force propaganda video: (gotta love the translations!)






Wednesday, March 13, 2013

The Future of America's Eagles Part I


Image 1: USAF F-15C. Image Credit: USAF

This article is a continuation of the future of the USAF article series. USAF plans for the F-15C will be examined.

The F-15 was envisioned to be the ultimate purebred dogfighter with the following as its design emphasis: "not a pound air to ground". The F-15A defined the characteristics of an entire generation of subsequent fighter aircraft: high maneuverability, powerful radar, and large air to air missile load.The first F-15A Eagles were delivered to the USAF nearly forty years ago. Since its deployment, the F-15 has earned a global reputation as one of the most successful fighter designs in history. The F-15 maintains the highest kill ratio of any fighter aircraft in history, 104-0 (Source 1). Despite the development and procurement of 5th generation aircraft like the F-22 and F-35, the venerable fourth generation F-15C will remain in service with the USAF until at least 2030. A core of 176 F-15C's will undergo an extensive $3 billion dollar upgrade program. A series of comprehensive structural upgrades will allow the F-15C's airframes to remain viable until 18,000 flight hours have been reached (Source 2). Other planned upgrades for the F-15C include APG-63(V)3 radar, improved electronic countermeasures, minimal drag infrared search and track (IRST) pod, mode 5 IFF, Advanced Display Core Processor (ADCP) II, improved data link capability, improved data sharing, satellite communications (SATCOM) radio, and Sniper targeting pod integration (Source 3 & 4). These upgrades and the added capabilities will be discussed in this article (Part I). Following the discussion of these upgrades, the important role of the F-15C will be discussed in regards to America's pivot to the Pacific (Part II).

UPGRADES 

Structural 

Image 2: Planned structural upgrade program during  programmed depot maintenance (PDM). Image credit: Major Richard Van Slyke & Russell Ewan (Source 6).   

The USAF plans to add an additional 6,000 service hours to the 12,000 hour rated F-15C airframe. These upgrades are desperately need if the USAF realistically desires to continually operate the F-15C past its original 9,000 service hour certification. Boeing will extend the life of 176 F-15C's as demonstrated by the image above. Areas of the airframe that tend to experience high structural stress, such as the wing, will be either replaced or strengthened to insure structural integrity during high g maneuvers. Structural fatigue testing of the new components should be completed by 2014 (Source 12). 

Radar


Image 3: AN/APG-63(V)3 radar. Image credit: Ratheyon

The AN/APG-63(V)3 is a 1,500 element actively scanned electronic array (AESA). The APG-63(V)3 represents a significant increase in capabilities for the F-15C. Added benefits from the APG-63(V)3 include: greatly increased maximum detection range, improved reliability over previous generation electronically scanned arrays (ESA), improved target tracking, and electronic warfare capabilities (Source 4). The addition of an AESA array will also keep the F-15C competitive against the newer generation of Russian Flanker designs which feature either a highly upgraded ESA radar or an AESA radar. Furthermore, the addition of the APG-63(V)3 will greatly aid Eagle pilots detect low observable targets such as the J-20 (Source 4). The USAF plans to equip 150 Eagles with the APG-63(V)3 (Source 20).

Although the F-15C is set to receive a number of sensor and radar upgrades, the Cold War era cockpit remains an issue for pilots. Dave Munjumar reported that F-15 pilots will not be able to take full advantage of their new avionics with their old cockpit interface (shown below).


"You have these phenomenal subsystems, but if you can't provide [sensor data] in a meaningful way to the operator, it doesn't matter." - former Eagle pilot, source 2


The 53rd Test and Evaluation Group is currently testing the addition of two modern liquid crystal displays in the F-15 cockpit. These changes are sorely needed (e.g. current radar display is a four by four inch screen). 



IRST


Image 5: F-15C with Lockheed Martin SpectIR pod mounted on station 5. Image retrieved via Defense Industry Daily

The USAF plans to acquire 100 IRST pods for its F-15C fleet beginning in 2015. The new IRST pod for the F-15C will likely be an evolved form of the Lockheed Martin built Tiger Eyes IRST system supplied to Korean F-15K's. The SpectIR pod shown above is an Lockheed financed development project to fulfill the USAF's F-15C IRST requirement. The SpectIR pod is also compatible with the F-16 and F-18 (Source 17). Despite its placement on the lower fuselage, the SpectIR pod is capable of looking up 5 degrees.

The addition of a low drag IRST system to the F-15 is vital. As I've mentioned before, both the Russian and Chinese stealth fighter designs lack IR signature reduction engine nozzles. The inclusion of  SpectIR will aid Eagle pilots in visual range engagements with 5th generation opponents. The Eagle is already capable of employing off-boresight missiles (e.g. AIM-9X) and features the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS). Furthermore  the addition of an IRST will also aid the F-15 detect incoming missile threats.

Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System (EPAWSS)

The Northrup Grumman built Eagle/Passive Active Warning and Survivability System (EPAWSS) grants the Eagle significantly increased survivability against missile threats. Without stealth, Eagle pilots will have to rely upon EPAWSS in conjunction with traditional missile defeating maneuvers to survive in a high threat environment. Before the inclusion of EPAWSS, the  F-15 electronic counter measure system was comprised of three 1980s era systems.

"The aircraft now rely on three ageing systems for self-defence - the ALR-56C radar warning receiver, ALQ-135 jammer and ALE-45 countermeasures dispenser." - Stephen Trimble

EPAWSS requirements can be found here.

Continue to Part II 


Sources


  1. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/February%202008/0208reformers.aspx  
  2. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-plans-f-15-modernization-but-pilots-want-better-displays-375612/ 
  3. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/10/air-force-f-15-upgrades-aim-double-service-life-102912w/ 
  4. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-may-convert-some-f-15cs-to-radar-jammers-340532/
  5. http://www.wrcoc-aic.org/archive/rs/rs09/rs09_03.pdf 
  6. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR528.html 
  7. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=578b5e3200c1a48922a9449c15a3bc25&tab=core&_cview=0
  8. http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-likely-to-modernise-its-f-15c-and-f-15e-fleets
  9. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/singapores-rsaf-decides-to-fly-like-an-eagle-01141/
  10. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-investigating-new-displays-for-f-15c-eagle-383308/
  11. http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/11/32000-hour-f-15.html 
  12. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=adf7dcdf27ab12fb1780405de8fa2f8f&tab=core&_cview=1
  13. http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/EPAWSS/Pages/default.aspx
  14. http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2013/AirForce/stamped/0207134F_7_PB_2013.pdf
  15. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/InfraredSearchTrack.html
  16. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f-18-super-hornets-to-get-irst-03429/
  17. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-adds-irst-pod-for-f-15s-332380/
  18. http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/f-15cd-eagle-upgrades-are-a-moving-target/
  19. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123290989

Image 6: F-15C from the 493rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron. Image Credit: USAF 

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

News: F-35 Rear Visibility Issues


A leaked DOD Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation report stated major new issues with the CTOL F-35A. A major issue the report cites is a lack of rear visibility.

"All four student pilots commented on the out-of-cockpit visibility of the F-35, an issue which not only adversely affects training, but safety and survivability as well. One rated the degree to which the visibility deficiencies impeded or degraded training effectiveness as 'Moderate;' the other three rated it as 'High' or 'Very High.' The majority of responses cited poor visibility; the ejection seat headrest and the canopy bow were identified as causal factors. 'High glare shield' and the HMD cable were also cited as sources of the problem. Of these, only the HMD cable has the potential to be readily redesigned. In three cases, student pilots explicitly cited visibility-related impacts that could be directly applicable to the Block 1A syllabus (a largely benign visual search environment); several other implicitly did so. One student pilot commented, 'Difficult to see [other aircraft in the visual traffic] pattern due to canopy bow.' Another stated, 'Staying visual with wingman during tactical formation maneuvering a little tougher than legacy due to reduced rearward visibility from cockpit.' - Operational Test and Evaluation Report, 2013

While avionic systems (e.g. DAS & HMD) will mitigate the effects of low rear visibility, the inclusion of both a conventional bubble canopy design and situational awareness enhancing avionics is preferable. Ensuring that the pilot has good visibility has been a mainstay of good fighter design for decades. The F-35 still has a lot of design changes (particularly software) to undergo but the lack of rear visibility will likely persist. Its odd this design oversight hasn't been mentioned prior to this report considering its presumably been part of the JSF design for a while. While this development is certainly a major concern, it is not worth cancelling the entire program over it.

As a side note, its important to bear in mind these reports are supposed to be hard on the evaluated aircraft.  A problem must not be sugar coated so that the necessary action is taken to remediate the issue. Immature designs always have issues that have to be ironed out over time. The software issues mentioned by the report will likely be fixed given enough time in a similar manner as the F-22's initial software problems. Its also important to note these are new pilots, arguably test pilots have a better understanding of the limitations of the aircraft (spazsinbad, 2013). Furthermore, not all the complaints among the new pilots were unanimous e.g. touch screen interface issues (Defense News, 2013).


Sources

  1. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130306/DEFREG02/303060011/F-35-Report-Warns-Visibility-Risks-Other-Dangers?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE
  2. http://www.pogo.org/blog/2013/03/20130306-air-forces-f-35a-not-ready-for-combat.html
  3. http://theaviationist.com/2013/03/07/f-35-visibility/
  4. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/6/report-super-fighter-will-get-pilots-shot-down/
  5. http://www.f-16.net/index.php?name=PNphpBB2&file=viewtopic&t=23118&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=15&sid=2f758d75517e434618d7de85aa255247

Image 2: F-35A cockpit (image credit: Darin Russell, retrieved via Code One)

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Blog Articles by Topic AUG 2015

Given the poor quality of Blogger's drop down menu, a supplemental article index by topic is necessary. If there is something specific you'd like to search for, please use the search bar below the viewer count.


F-35

News: F-35 Rear Visibility Issues 

F-X & F/A-XX - Sixth Generation Fighter Aircraft 

America's Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX - I
America's Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX - II
America's Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX - III
America's Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX - IV Works Cited
Japan's Domestic Stealth Fighter Ambitions - Assessment of the Proposed F-3

Fighter Aircraft Employment Doctrines 

Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft
Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft - The American Approach Part I
Divergent Thinking: How Best to Employ Fighter Aircraft - The American Approach Part II
The American Approach Part III: Future TTP - Network Centric Warfare & Cyber weapons
The Importance of Aggressor Training Part I
The Importance of Aggressor Training Part II
The Future of 4th Generation Aircraft in the 21st Century

F-15 Silent Eagle


Foreign Stealth Aircraft

Threat Analysis of Foreign Stealth Fighters Part I: Chengdu J-20
Threat Analysis of Foreign Stealth Fighters Part II: Sukhoi PAK FA
Threat Analysis of Foreign Stealth Fighters III: Emerging Threats (Announcement)
J-31 Preliminary Report Part I

Opinion

Deal or No Deal - The Case for Diplomacy with Iran Part I
Deal or No Deal: The Case for Diplomacy with Iran Part II - Assuaging Gulf Allies & Bolstering Regional Deterrence
Opinion - Syria: A No Win Situation for the United States?
What Would an Israeli Strike on Iran Accomplish? Part I
Rising Fighter Aircraft Costs
Oversized: Russia's Obsession with Massive Military Equipment
The Future of the USAF
The Future of America's Eagles Part I 
The Future of America's Eagles Part II
F/A-XX 6th Generation Aircraft
Black Widow vs. Raptor: Did the USAF Choose the Wrong Jet?
Red Flag 2012: Did the Raptor Seriously Just Get Owned?
X-47B Carrier Takeoff

Sunday, March 3, 2013

The Importance of Aggressor Training Part II


Image 1: Aggressor F-16

Continued from part I. (current Red Flag discussed, importance of Red Flag & Aggressor training into the future discussed)

Although Red Flag was originally developed to re-institute dogfighting skills among USAF pilots, it has become much more comprehensive. Current Red Flag exercises encompass surface to air threats, air to ground strike missions, space warfare and information warfare elements (e.g. electronic based attacks to GPS and cyber threats). The addition of these new elements will be critical to future conventional conflicts. The United States Military is heavily reliant on space based assets. The disruption and destruction of space based assets is a very real threat U.S forces will encounter in future large scale conventional wars.

Electronic warfare can be carried out through the use off-the shelf technology at low cost. For example, denying the use of the Global Positioning System is a fairly easy task to accomplish but would greatly diminish the effectiveness of many precision guided munitions (PGUs), navigation, and drone control. In 2011 North Korea jammed GPS signals along the border during the Operation Key Resolve, a joint South Korean - American military exercise (Source 1). GPS jamming and other simple electronic warfare tactics enable a less sophisticated force to more easily engage a higher tech. force. Preparing American and allied forces with the skills necessary to overcome electronic based attacks is imperative. To that end, the 26th and 527th Space Aggressor Squadrons replicate attacks to Blue space based assets at Red Flag. Dave Majumdar explains:

"During the present day Red Flag exercises, Toth explains that the Space Aggressor units simulate threats against Blue Force space based communications and navigation systems by jamming Global Positioning Systems (GPS) signals, satellite communications (SATCOM), and a host of radio signals."

Information and cyber warfare have become increasingly important aspects of training at Red Flag Nellis. The 57th and 117th Information Aggressor Squadrons launch cyber attacks on U.S facilities to prepare trainees for cyber attacks and test vulnerabilities of U.S bases. The combination of the information aggressors and space aggressors is a realistic threat environment.

"...the Information Aggressors simulate attacks on Blue Force computer networks and information systems. At the same time the 57th and 177th Information Aggressor Squadrons (57th and 177th IAS) might attempt to infiltrate Blue Force bases- including their dorms- to search for intelligence useful to the Aggressors during the simulated war. Combined with the aerial Aggressors flying the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters, these Aggressor forces mount a coordinated offensive against the Blue Force during exercises...
Similarly, in order to replicate the very real danger of computer network infiltration attacks the 57th and 177th Information Aggressor Squadrons stage elaborate attacks on various USAF installations in order to test their defenses...Toth said that due to the serious nature of the threat, the simulated attacks have to be very realistic. The bases that are subject to a simulated network attack by the Aggressors are not given any prior warning, Toth stated. He added that only a few seniors officer are given prior notice of these 'stimulation exercises' in order to ensure that the Aggressors tactics are not mistaken for an actual attack on the USAF network." - . Dave Majumdar


Image 2: F-35

Red Flag will continue to play an important role in preparing U.S pilots for war. F-35 pilots in particular must learn how to exploit the capabilities of their aircraft to their advantage. It is imperative tactics are developed to most effectively utilize the stronger aspects of the F-35's maneuverability characteristics (e.g. good transonic acceleration and high AOA) while avoiding maneuvers that would play to an opponents advantage (e.g. F-35 has comparatively poor turning radius).

The USAF must also learn to effectively operate a mix of both older 4th generation aircraft in conjunction with its newer 5th generation aircraft. Hundreds of F-16's and F-15's will remain in service until at least 2030. For example, compatibility issues with communication systems and data transfers remain problematic.  Test and evaluation squadrons will likely experiment with mixed generation force tactics.

Since the start of Red Flag, the United States has yet to face a adversary with pilot training on par with its own. It is probable that within 10-15 years United States might not be able to take its training advantage for granted. In addition to rapidly upgrading the quality of its aircraft, China has also instituted a number of initiatives to increase the quality of its pilots. Around 1999 Chinese pilots logged an average of 100 flight hours per year. Chinese pilots now fly well over 100 hours per year and advanced fighter aircraft are flown close to 200 hours per year (RAND, 2011). In comparison  USAF pilots regularly fly between 250 to 300 hours per year (Source 16).

"Based on recent trends, these changes are likely to accelerate in the future, so that, within another decade, the capabilities of China’s air force could begin to approach those of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) today. USAF capabilities will continue to improve as well, of course, so that it will still enjoy a significant qualitative advantage, but a conflict with China might not be the lopsided contest it likely would have been in the late 1990s." - RAND 2011

China has also improved the quality and scale of aerial combat exercises. China's Red Sword / Blue Sword combat exercises involved 14 combat regiments. The exercise is closely modeled after Red Flag and makes use of aggressor aircraft (Axe, 2013). Evidence of the PLAAF's increasing professionalism can be found in ordinary Taiwan strait intercepts.

"In 2008, PLAAF made over 1700 flights to but not past the middle line of the Taiwan straits. RF-16 used to occasionally go past middle line to get more intelligence on PLA installations, but is now getting locked on before even getting there. In some cases, PLAAF takes off in response before RF-16 even does so. It shows improved reaction time and professionalism in PLAAF." - Feng, 2011

It is paramount that the United States continues to fund and maintain training exercises like Red Flag to ensure a qualitative advantage. Current Aggressors under represent the threat USAF pilots will face.

"Right now, when an aggressor F-16 is replicating an enemy fighter like a Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker, it does not have an onboard system to simulate a weapon like the Vympel R-73 (NATO: AA-11 Archer). 'We do not have an IR [infrared] weapon on the aircraft that is similar to an Archer,' Barker says. 'So the F-16 pilot will use visual references that he has memorized to determine when the adversary airplane is in range and within the appropriate look angle.' Using the current configuration, there is no electronic system that tells the aggressor pilot if he is within the correct parameters for a valid missile shot. The shots have to be reviewed on the ground to ensure they are valid--even if they are called in real time during the training sortie. But the current system does not work well. 'Without a helmet--or at least a 9X CATM [Captive Air Training Missile]--the pilots have to basically spit-ball the threat WEZ and it is highly inaccurate,' one highly experienced USAF pilot says, 'So inaccurate that the feedback for training is useless most of the time.'' - Dave Majumdar




Image 3: Red / Blue Sword exercise with J-10

Sources 

  1. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/north-korea-jams-gps-in-war-game-retaliation/
  2. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/05/north-korea-pumps-up-the-gps-jamming-in-week-long-attack/
  3. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-seeks-information-on-connecting-4th-and-5th-gen-fighters-382396/
  4. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/darpa-gps/
  5. http://bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/23/air-force-retrains-pilots-confront-high-tech-enemy/8ZSwUe4IPREnLgDcxQqjRJ/story.html
  6. http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:1253fb8a-3b45-4f68-b273-fff9b8f2f73d
  7. http://www.pixel-moments.de/8.html
  8. http://www.examiner.com/article/the-aggressors-someone-has-to-play-the-bad-guy-part-one
  9. http://www.examiner.com/article/the-aggressors-someone-has-to-play-the-bad-guy-part-two
  10. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/12/airforce_aggressors_121309/
  11. http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/f-15-eagles-were-the-deadliest-birds-of-desert-storm/
  12. http://www.eielson.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102438
  13. http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/4311433
  14. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2000/November%202000/1100flag.aspx
  15. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG915.pdf
  16. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-life.htm
  17. http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/08/evolution-of-plaaf-doctrinetraining.html
  18. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/china-mock-air-war/all/
  19. http://www.offiziere.ch/?p=10556
  20. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-air-force-hopes-to-upgrade-aggressor-f-16s-381625/
  21. http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2013/01/upgrading-the-aggressors.html